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What if...?
In the last century, Europe has witnessed mass expansion of 
educational levels and substantial declines in church membership, 
church attendance and religious beliefs. These processes have 
fundamentally reshaped the socio-demographic composition of 
European societies. This book explores to what extent these societal 
developments have been accompanied by changes in public opinions. 
In four empirical chapters, trends in public support for ethnic 
prejudice, gender egalitarianism and authoritarian values (in short: 
cultural conservatism) in the Netherlands and in other European 
countries are explored, based on representative surveys. In addition, 
different explanations for the relationship between educational 
expansion, secularisation, and changes in these public opinions are 
tested. The results show that public support for cultural conservatism 
has developed in different directions. Educational expansion and 
secularisation have to a certain extent contributed to these trends, 
although the ‘liberalising’ influence of these developments is 
not as clear-cut as is often expected. This book contributes to the 
understanding of long term changes in cultural conservatism and 
puts contemporary societal debates about issues of cultural freedom 
into a wider perspective.
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1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Educational expansion, secularisation, and their consequences
In the last century, European societies have undergone major social, demographic, 
economic, political, and cultural developments. These changes are considered to be part 
of a broader modernisation process, in which societies transformed from (pre-)industrial 
to modern and post-industrial (Inglehart, 1997). One of the most ubiquitous developments 
in this process is the mass expansion of educational attainment in many parts of the 
world (Meyer, Ramirez, Rubinson, & Boli-Bennett, 1977; Schofer & Meyer, 2005). Another 
important development is the changing role of religion in European societies, also referred 
to as secularisation (Bruce, 2002; Dobbelaere, 2002; Tschannen, 1991). Over the past 
decades, many European countries, have witnessed substantial declines in the share of 
the population that belongs to a Christian religious denomination, attends church, and 
holds religious beliefs. These developments have fundamentally reshaped the socio-
demographic composition of European societies.
At the individual level, educational attainment and religious affiliation are among the 
most important determinants for a wide range of social, cultural, and political attitudes 
and values. Time and again, research has shown that higher educated and non-religious 
people are less conservative with regard to gendered roles, pre-, extramarital, and 
homosexual relationships, abortion, euthanasia, and more tolerant towards ethnic 
and religious out-groups (Allport & Ross, 1967; Bobo & Licari, 1989; Davis, 1982; Davis 
& Greenstein, 2009; Hyman & Wright, 1979; Jaspers, 2008; Scheepers & Eisinga, 2015; 
Scheepers, Te Grotenhuis, & Van der Slik, 2002; Stouffer, 1955; Surridge, 2016; Vogt, 1997; 
Wagner & Zick, 1995; Wilcox & Jelen, 1991). These specific attitudes can be conceptualised 
under the heading of “cultural conservatism” (Middendorp, 1978). Given that educational 
attainment and religious affiliation are such strong predictors of people’s attitudes related 
to cultural conservatism, shifts in the share of higher educated and non-religious people 
in European societies may have resulted in a widespread decline in cultural conservatism. 
In this dissertation, I explore to what extent educational expansion and secularisation 
have indeed contributed to changes in cultural conservatism. 
Changes in cultural conservatism have been widely studied in the social sciences. Scholars 
have observed changes in the ideological landscape in western societies from conservative 
to more progressive (e.g., Inglehart, 1990, 1997; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Middendorp, 1978). 
It is often theoretically proposed that educational expansion and secularisation play an 
important role in explaining these changes (Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Cotter, Hermsen, 
& Vanneman, 2011; Halman & Van Ingen, 2015; Mason, Czajka, & Arber, 1976; Pampel, 
2011; Quillian, 1996). However, empirical studies to this relationship are more scarce. An 
exception is the research of several Dutch sociologists, who empirically analysed the 
ideological and political consequences of educational expansion and secularisation in the 
Netherlands (Felling, Peters, & Scheepers, 2000; Scheepers, Te Grotenhuis, & Bosch, 1999; 
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Te Grotenhuis, 1999; Te Grotenhuis, Scheepers, & Eisinga, 1998). However, these scholars 
relied on data collected until 1995 and they could not establish the significance of these 
developments in explaining trends in cultural conservatism. Hence, to what extent the 
processes of educational expansion and secularisation continue to contribute to changes 
in cultural conservatism at the societal level remains a lacuna to be explored. 
In addition, shifts in the composition of the population are not the only explanation 
for changes in cultural conservatism in the population. Educational expansion and 
secularisation have likely changed the societal context to which people are exposed, which 
may directly shape people’s attitudes and behaviour over and beyond their own social 
position in society. Moreover, European societies have recently witnessed major economic 
and cultural challenges. Between 2008 and 2012, an economic recession swept across Europe. 
Increased unemployment, financial insecurity and austerity measures have put a strain on 
European countries and their populations (European Commission, 2009). In addition, many 
European countries have faced rising immigration, which have increased ethnic, cultural and 
religious diversity, and heightened interethnic tensions (OECD, 2016a). These developments 
could also have affected people’s attitudes, and may even have counterbalanced the 
supposed “liberalising” influence of educational expansion and secularisation. As yet, few 
empirical studies have analysed these explanations simultaneously.
The central aim of this study is therefore to provide insights into the relationship of 
educational expansion, secularisation, and recent economic and cultural developments 
on the one hand, and changes in cultural conservatism on the other hand. Throughout 
most of this dissertation, the focus lies on the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the 
processes of educational expansion and secularisation have been particularly strong (Bar 
Haim & Shavit, 2013; De Graaf & Te Grotenhuis, 2008; Tolsma & Wolbers, 2014). In addition, 
its ideological landscape has shifted considerably. In the first half of the 20th century, 
a conservative, paternalistic cultural discourse with strong collective values and norms 
prescribed by the Christian churches characterised public and private life of the Dutch, 
and politics was dominated by confessional parties (Felling et al., 2000). By the end of the 
20th century, the Netherlands was considered as one of the most liberal countries in the 
world (Jaspers, 2008). For example, the Netherlands was one of the first to grant same-
sex couples the right to marry and to remove euthanasia from the penal code (Jaspers, 
Lubbers, & De Graaf, 2007). It is therefore that the Netherlands provides an interesting 
case to study the relationship between educational expansion, secularisation and trends 
in cultural conservatism.
The central research question of this dissertation reads: 
To what extent have educational expansion, secularisation, and changes in national 
economic and cultural contexts contributed to liberalising trends in dimensions of cultural 
conservatism in the Netherlands and in Europe over the past decades?
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1.1.2 Educational expansion and secularisation in the Netherlands
Since the introduction of the Compulsory Education Act in 1901, a number of educational 
reforms, such as raises of the school-leaving age, the Law on Continued Education (also 
known as the “Mammoth Law”) in 1962, and the introduction of student grants, have paved 
the way for a mass expansion of educational levels in the Netherlands. Figure 1.1 shows 
the average level of education (according to the Dutch Standard Education Classification 
(SOI)) of those entering the labour market since 1900. Dutch men and women entering 
the labour market in 1900 were on average primary educated. In 1980, men’s and women’s 
educational levels had risen to upper secondary education. By 2010, Dutch graduates on 
average had reached levels above upper secondary education, and women had surpassed 
men. While the trend in men’s educational levels seems to have stabilised since the late 
1990s, women’s educational attainment has continued to rise. 
In addition, the Dutch en masse left the traditional Christian churches during the 20th 
century. Figure 1.2 shows the percentage of the total population in the Netherlands that 
is not affiliated to a religion over the past century. In 1900, less than 3 percent of the 
population indicated to have no religious affiliation. This percentage had risen to over 
60 percent by 2010. Secularisation was particularly strong during the 1960s, when the 
Catholic pillar started to crumble, but the decline of religious affiliation has continued 
well into the 21st century and only recently shows signs of stabilisation.
Figure 1.1 | Average educational levels in the Netherlands, 1900-2010
Source: Dutch labour force surveys 1992, 1994, 1996, and 2016 (Statistics Netherlands, 1987, 2016);  
Te Grotenhuis (1999).
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Figure 1.2 |  Percentage of the total population without a religious affiliation in the 
Netherlands, 1900-2010
Source: Dutch population census 1899, 1909, 1920, 1930, 1947, 1960, and 1971 (Statistics Netherlands, 1999); 
CV 1970-2006 (The Netherlands Institute for Social Research, 2016); SOCON 1979-2011 (Eisinga, Kraaykamp, 
Scheepers, & Thijs, 2012).
1.1.3 Cultural conservatism as an ideology in the Netherlands
In the early 1970s, the Dutch sociologist Middendorp started to systematically define and 
conceptualise conservatism as an ideology in the Netherlands. According to Middendorp 
(1978), an ideology refers to a number of related ideas that are centred around a few central, 
underlying values. These ideas are shared by certain groups or categories of people and 
they reflect the social position of these groups and their interests. Middendorp identified 
two distinct values underlying ideology in the Netherlands: freedom and equality. In 
addition, he added a distinction between the economic and cultural domain. In the 
economic domain, conservatives are in favour of freedom, i.e., freedom of the individual 
businessman, but they oppose to equal economic opportunities for all individuals. In 
the cultural domain, conservatives are in favour of equality because that means equal 
adherence of everyone to “absolute” moral values and traditional ways of life. They oppose 
to individual freedom to choose one’s own lifestyle, because it may damage traditional 
norms and institutions. Middendorp’s conceptualisation of a progressive ideology is, vice 
versa, based on the values of cultural freedom, i.e., people should be free to choose their 
own way of life, and economic equality, i.e., equal economic opportunities for everyone. 
In this dissertation, I focus on three dimensions of a cultural conservative ideology 
that can be considered to reflect the underlying dimension of (opposition to) cultural 
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freedom: support for ethnic prejudice, support for gender egalitarianism, and support 
for authoritarian values. Ethnic prejudice refers to negative attitudes towards out-groups 
with different lifestyles and customs, which supposedly damage the traditional norms 
and lifestyles of the in-group. Gender egalitarianism refers to the rejection of traditional 
gender norms that sustain gender inequality and restrict people’s freedom to make their 
own decisions regardless of gender. Support for authoritarian values refers to a preference 
for conventionalism, the preservation of the social and normative order, and obedience to 
traditional authority. 
Public support for these dimensions of cultural conservatism may have important 
societal consequences. Rising levels of ethnic prejudice may induce negative behaviour 
towards other ethnic groups, such as discrimination and hostility. As a consequence, 
it may deteriorate interethnic relations and social cohesion in society (Gorodzeisky & 
Semyonov, 2016; Koopmans & Schaeffer, 2016; Laméris, 2018; Laurence, 2014; Putnam, 
2007; Van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014). Moreover, when certain groups in society feel 
marginalised, excluded, or discriminated against, they may be less inclined to participate 
in the economic, social and political domain (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012; Verkuyten 
& Zaremba, 2005). This may eventually result in radicalisation and polarisation between 
ethnic groups in society. Rising support for gender egalitarianism may contribute to a 
more egalitarian division of work and family responsibilities, and equal opportunities 
for both men and women in the public and private domain (Charles, 2011; England, 2010; 
Epstein, 2007; Fortin, 2005). More support for authoritarian values has been found to 
relate to higher levels of nationalism and nativism, opposition to individual freedom and 
alternative lifestyles, and to voting for populist radical right (and left) parties (Feldman & 
Stenner, 1997; Lubbers & Coenders, 2017; Mudde, 2007; Rooduijn, 2014; Scheepers, Felling, 
& Peters, 1990; Vasilopoulos & Lachat, 2017). Consequently, people may be more willing to 
submit to authoritarian leaders and accept restrictions of individual freedom for the sake 
of protecting the traditional social order. 
In the societal and political debate, these issues are subject to considerable speculations, 
for example about the direction in which public opinion is moving. Such speculations are 
often amplified in online and offline media. By analysing the actual development of public 
attitudes on these issues and their underlying determinants, this dissertation contributes 
to the understanding of where such changes come from and where they might be going, 
thereby putting these societal debates into perspective.
In the remainder of this chapter, I first present an overview of the theoretical perspectives, 
empirical findings, and knowledge gaps in the literature. Next, I outline the contributions 
of this dissertation. Subsequently, the data and research design are described, after 
which I provide an overview of the empirical chapters. Lastly, I present the conclusions, 
directions for future research and implications of this dissertation. 
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1.2  Theoretical perspectives, empirical findings, and 
knowledge gaps
1.2.1 Classic perspectives of macro-level processes
The macro-level relationship between societal developments and ideological changes has 
been widely studied, starting with the founding fathers of sociology. For example, Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels (1848/2002) argued that changes in the economic system, such 
as industrialisation, urbanisation, the expanding division of labour, and the accumulation 
of capital, were related to profound social, political, and ideological transformations, 
which would eventually result in a revolt of the proletariat against capitalism. Weber 
(1930/2001) explored how the emergence of the Protestant ethic in Northwestern 
Europe facilitated the rise of capitalism, which contributed to the rationalisation of all 
spheres of society. According to Durkheim (1893/1997), as society became more complex, 
differentiated, and specialised, people would become increasingly dissimilar in their 
social experiences, material interests, values, and beliefs. 
Stemming from these classic perspectives on social change, theories of modernisation 
and individualisation arose to describe and interpret the profound structural and 
cultural changes that have taken place over the past decades. Modernisation theory is 
centred around the idea that technological and economic developments lead to more 
or less coherent and predictable patterns of cultural and political change. It assumes 
that societies develop in a rather uniform and linear way, from traditional (agrarian, 
communal, religious) to modern (secular, individualistic, rational) (Knöbl, 2003; Levy, 
1949; Marsh, 2014). The central idea of individualisation theory is that, as part of the 
process of modernisation, individuals have lost their bonds with traditional institutions, 
such as the traditional churches. Consequently, people’s attitudes and behaviour have 
become less determined by the social constraints of their social background and their 
membership of social institutions, while an increasing emphasis is placed on individual 
autonomy and freedom to choose one’s own values and lifestyles (Bauman, 2012; Beck & 
Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Felling et al., 2000).
Although often criticised for being too general, suggesting linear, universal and irreversible 
developments (Alexander, 1994; Wallerstein, 1976), these macro-sociological theories have 
been widely adopted in the social sciences. The majority of research, however, has focused 
on theoretical conceptualisations and historical descriptions of social processes rather 
than on specific explanations and explicit hypotheses that can be empirically tested 
(Felling et al., 2000; Knöbl, 2003). Studies aimed at empirically testing these theories often 
compared people’s attitudes and behaviour at different points in time, or across societies 
at different stages of development. For example, based on Murdock’s Ethnographic 
Atlas, Nolan and Lenski (1996) compared several organisational and normative features 
of societies, such as norms of premarital sexual conduct for girls, across various types of 
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societies ranging from hunting and gathering to industrial. However, such macro-level 
theoretical and descriptive studies are not very helpful to understand how economic, 
demographic, and ideological developments within a society are related. To derive testable 
hypotheses, additional assumptions are needed. This dissertation therefore combines 
macro-sociological theories of social change with other theoretical perspectives to provide 
insights into the mechanisms behind the relationship between structural developments 
and changes in cultural conservatism at the macro-level. 
1.2.2  Mechanisms of social change: individual, compositional, and 
contextual explanations
Individual differences and compositional change
Every society is made up of a collection of individuals. Individual processes therefore 
play an important role in explaining the relationship between macro-level societal 
developments and changes in cultural conservatism. At the individual level, numerous 
studies have established that higher educated people generally hold less conservative 
attitudes (Middendorp, 1978), among which lower levels of ethnic exclusionism (Coenders 
& Scheepers, 2003; Hello, Scheepers, & Sleegers, 2006; Jackman & Muha, 1984; Selznick & 
Steinberg, 1969; Vogt, 1997), more support for gender egalitarianism (Brewster & Padavic, 
2000; Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Thornton, Alwin, & Camburn, 
1983; Thornton & Freedman, 1979), and lower support for authoritarian values (Baars & 
Scheepers, 1993; Dekker & Ester, 1991; Gabennesch, 1972; Middendorp, 1978; Middendorp 
& Meloen, 1991; Stubager, 2008; Vogt, 1997). Religiosity has been identified as another 
important determinant of cultural conservatism. Empirical research has repeatedly found 
that individuals who do not belong to a religious denomination and those who do not 
attend church are less conservative with regard to gender norms, pre- and extramarital 
relationships, homosexuality, and abortion (Norris & Inglehart, 2011; Scheepers, Te 
Grotenhuis, et al., 2002; Schnabel, 2016; Voicu, 2009), are less authoritarian (Gabennesch, 
1972; Scheepers et al., 1990), and show less ethnic prejudice (Allport & Ross, 1967; Ekici & 
Yucel, 2014; Gorsuch & Aleshire, 1974; Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010; Scheepers & Eisinga, 2015; 
Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Hello, 2002). 
Given the importance of education and religiosity in predicting people’s level of cultural 
conservatism, it has been widely argued that rising levels of education and declining 
religiosity in the population should have contributed to a decline in cultural conservatism 
at the societal level (Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Cotter et al., 2011; Halman & Van Ingen, 
2015; Mason et al., 1976; Pampel, 2011; Quillian, 1996). Although studies that compared 
attitudes across different contexts or time periods often accounted for compositional 
differences in the population, few studies have quantified the actual contribution of 
changes in the population composition to trends in cultural conservatism. As an exception 
to this, Dutch sociologists showed that educational expansion and secularisation indeed 
contributed to a decline in Christian beliefs, Christian voting, and cultural conservatism 
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(Felling et al., 2000; Scheepers et al., 1999; Te Grotenhuis, 1999; Te Grotenhuis et al., 1998). 
However, these studies relied on data collected until 1995. In this dissertation, I extend 
their research by analysing whether the liberalising influence of shifts in the educational 
and religious composition of the population has continued into the 21st century. 
Cohort socialisation and periodic exposure
Shifts in the distribution of individual characteristics across the population do not tell the 
whole story of attitude change. Many sociologists have assumed that the societal context 
also directly influences people’s attitudes and beliefs. For example, Middendorp (1978) 
argued that ideologies and ideas emerge as a function of the social and cultural context 
during a certain period. 
In the literature on social change, two theoretical perspectives have been commonly 
used to relate the societal context to individual attitudes. According to the perspective 
of cohort socialisation, social change may result from the continual replacement of older 
“participants” of society by newer ones through birth and death. The German sociologist 
Karl Mannheim (1952) introduced the concept of birth cohort to describe these new 
participants, who share the same year of birth and the same location in history.1 According 
to Mannheim, this location in history is characterised by certain circumstances and 
events, which shape the formative experiences of each new birth cohort (Mannheim, 
1952). Young people in their formative years (late adolescence and early adulthood) are 
deemed especially “impressionable” to these societal circumstances, which crystallise 
into basic values, attitudes and world views (Alwin & McCammon, 2003; Krosnick & Alwin, 
1989). Once formed, these normative orientations and attitudes are assumed to remain 
relatively stable over the life course (Inglehart, 1990; Mannheim, 1952). Thus, according to 
this perspective, social change is the sum of changes in the societal circumstances during 
which each new cohort is socialised, and the continual replacement of older cohorts by 
new cohorts with different formative experiences. 
In order to study the influence of different formative experiences, the majority of research 
has compared attitudes and values across subsequent birth cohorts or generations. 
Such differences are also referred to as “cohort effects”. One of the most well-known 
applications of the socialisation perspective is Ronald Inglehart’s (1990, 1997, 2008) 
research on value change. Inglehart’s main hypothesis is that as a result of rapid economic 
development and the expansion of the welfare state after World War II, the formative 
experiences of the younger post-war cohorts in most industrial societies differed from 
those of older cohorts, leading them to give priority to different values. Indeed, Inglehart 
1     Note that Mannheim (1952) used the term “generation” to describe all individuals born in the same year. 
I use the term birth cohort here, because generation is also used as a kinship term, referring to members 
of the same family within an ancestral line. Birth cohorts and generations do not necessarily overlap, 
i.e., generations may consist of varying numbers of birth cohorts due to differences in fertility within 
and between families (Alwin & McCammon, 2003).
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found that pre- and interwar generations attached value to economic and physical 
security, and traditional authority, while post-war generations placed more emphasis on 
values of individual autonomy, self-expression, and quality of life. From this, Inglehart 
concluded that generational replacement has brought about a massive long-term shift 
– a “silent revolution” – in people’s basic values (Inglehart, 1990, 1997, 2008). Why such 
value shifts have occurred across cohorts, however, remains empirically understudied in 
Inglehart’s research.
An alternative perspective on social change proposes that the societal context affects 
people’s attitudes and behaviour not only during their formative years, but also in 
other stages of the life course. This perspective assumes that people are open to change 
throughout their life (Alwin & McCammon, 2003). Historical events and developments 
in society, such as war, economic depression or social movements, may affect the entire 
population of a society at the same time, producing a shift in attitudes at the macro-level. 
Such “period effects” have been mainly studied by comparing attitudes across different 
national or regional contexts. Research has shown that people in less religious states or 
countries hold more egalitarian gender attitudes (Moore & Vanneman, 2003), show less 
disapproval of homosexuality (Van den Akker, Van der Ploeg, & Scheepers, 2012), and are 
more tolerant towards immigration (Bohman & Hjerm, 2013). More support for gender 
egalitarianism was found in countries with higher levels of societal gender equality (Dotti 
Sani & Quaranta, 2017), and higher female labour force participation (André, Gesthuizen, & 
Scheepers, 2013). Other studies analysed the influence of immigration and unemployment 
rates on anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe, although evidence for this relation is mixed 
(Billiet, Meuleman, & De Witte, 2014; Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010). 
Explanations for differences in public attitudes between countries are, however, not 
necessarily generalisable to changes in attitudes within a particular context over time. 
Countries differ from each other on many characteristics, and inferences about the 
influence of the societal context may therefore (partly) rely on unobserved or unspecified 
country-specific characteristics. According to Te Grotenhuis and colleagues (2015), testing 
the influence of the societal context within countries over time suffers less from such 
unobserved or unspecified indicators, because people within one country are more likely 
to resemble one another on important characteristics due to a shared national history. 
As such, this provides a more stringent test of the theoretically proposed relationship 
between changes in the societal context and changes in cultural conservatism.
Since data collected at different points in time has become increasingly available, 
an emerging body of literature has studied dimensions of cultural conservatism in a 
longitudinal perspective, combining the theoretical approaches of cohort socialisation 
and periodic exposure. The majority of these studies has focused on the decomposition 
of time trends into the separate influences of cohort replacement and period effects by 
comparing the rates of change across cohorts and across time. Evidence has been found 
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for both cohort and period effects (Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Ciabattari, 2001; Davis, 
1975; Firebaugh, 1992; Firebaugh & Davis, 1988; Inglehart, 2008; Mason & Lu, 1988; Pampel, 
2011; Quillian, 1996; Scott, Alwin, & Braun, 1996; Smith, 1985; Thornton et al., 1983; Tilley, 
2005; Wilkes & Corrigall-Brown, 2010). As yet, it remains ambiguous what the exact 
contribution of either explanation is, because this depends on the time period that was 
studied (Glenn, 2005). 
Moreover, changes observed among people within the same birth cohort may also be 
due to people getting older, and differences between cohorts could just as well be due to 
age differences. Studies that try to decompose the effects of cohort and period therefore 
face a serious methodological difficulty: when studying change over time using cross-
sectional data, it is hardly possible to isolate the net effects of cohort replacement from 
ageing or life cycle effects because there is a perfect linear relation between these effects 
(age = period – birth cohort) (Mason, Mason, Winsborough, & Poole, 1973). Although no 
uncontroversial solution to this problem has been found as yet, many scholars have 
attempted to circumvent the issue, for example by grouping survey years or birth cohorts, 
by leaving age out of the analyses altogether, or by substituting age with indicators for 
important life events, such as marriage, giving birth or divorce. However, one needs 
a strong set of assumptions to impose such a priori restrictions on models (Alwin & 
McCammon, 2003; Firebaugh & Chen, 1995). More recently, studies have started to employ 
hierarchical multilevel models (so-called cross-classified random effect models) to 
separate the effects of cohort, period and age (Yang & Land, 2006, 2008), proposing that 
these models could solve the problem of linear dependency (Pampel, 2011; Shu & Meagher, 
2017; Tormos, Vauclair, & Dobewall, 2017; Wilkes & Corrigall-Brown, 2010). However, Bell 
and Jones (2014) showed that this method may still yield biased results and they casted 
their doubts about this method as a solution to the APC identification problem.
What is more, even if we would be able to reliably separate the effects of period and cohort, 
such effects do not tell us why people’s attitudes differ across periods and cohorts. Several 
scholars have therefore directly tested the theoretically proposed influence of the societal 
context on people’s attitudes through cohort socialisation and contemporary exposure. 
Such approach has also been advocated as a way to identify the effects of age, period, and 
cohort in repeated cross-sectional studies. For example, Converse (1976) proposed that 
“side information” with a strong theoretical basis could be used to identify and interpret 
the effects of cohort and period (Alwin & McCammon, 2003). According to Rodgers (1990), 
“[t]he estimability problems that arise in assessing the effects of temporal dimensions 
[such as age, period, and cohort] would disappear if those indicator variables were replaced 
by more direct measures of the substantively relevant variables.” (p. 437). 
Studies that analysed the influence of exposure to contemporary events or developments 
found more negative anti-immigrant and anti-immigration attitudes in Europe in times 
of increasing unemployment rates (Coenders, Lubbers, Scheepers, & Verkuyten, 2008), 
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increasing immigration (Hatton, 2016; Meuleman, Davidov, & Billiet, 2009), and strong 
changes in national debt (Van Setten, Scheepers, & Lubbers, 2017). Scheepers et al. (1999) 
found lower levels of cultural conservatism in times of higher societal education and 
secularisation between 1970 and 1992. Studies that focused on the influence of cohort 
socialisation showed more widespread support for ethnic discrimination among cohorts 
that have been socialised in times of higher ethnic immigration and unemployment 
(Coenders & Scheepers, 1998), and more cultural conservatism among cohorts that grew 
up in times of higher unemployment rates (Scheepers et al., 1999). Kraaykamp (2002) 
showed higher levels of female labour force participation during people’s formative years 
to be related to more conservative attitudes towards pre- and extramarital sexuality in 
the Netherlands, whereas Pepin and Cotter (2018) found a small positive influence of 
higher employment rates of mothers on adolescent girls’ gender attitudes in the U.S., but 
whether this influence persists throughout these girls’ lives remains to be seen. However, 
studies that empirically test the influence of societal conditions during people’s formative 
years on cultural conservatism are still scarce because historical information is difficult to 
obtain, if available at all. 
1.2.3 Towards an integrated framework of social change
The different mechanisms from which the relationship between macro-level societal 
developments and macro-level changes in cultural conservatism may arise, can be 
summarised in a diagram that is a version of the so-called “Coleman’s Boat” (Coleman, 
1990), visualised in Figure 1.3. Arrow A depicts the relationship between (changes in) the 
societal context and (changes in) cultural conservatism at the macro-level. As discussed 
above, this macro-level relationship can be viewed as being the result of different 
individual processes. Each society is made up of a collection of individuals with certain 
characteristics, which is represented by arrow B. These individual characteristics, such 
as people’s educational level and religious affiliation, in turn influence people’s level of 
cultural conservatism. This relationship at the individual level is represented by arrow 
C. In addition, people’s support for cultural conservatism may be directly shaped and 
influenced by the societal context, as depicted by arrow D. The average level of cultural 
conservatism observed at the societal level is in turn the aggregate of attitudes held by all 
individuals in society. This aggregation is represented by arrow E.2
The relationship between macro-level societal developments and macro-level changes 
in cultural conservatism in society over time may thus be the result of (a combination 
of): changes in the distribution of individual characteristics across society, changes 
in the relationships between individual characteristics and people’s levels of cultural 
conservatism, and changes in the societal context which influences people’s support for 
cultural conservatism directly. 
2    In this dissertation, arrows A, C, and D are considered to be relationships whereas B and E are studied as 
aggregations between the micro- and macro-level.
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Figure 1.3 | Integrated framework of macro- and micro-level mechanisms of social change
1.3 Contributions to previous theoretical insights
This dissertation contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I provide insight into 
the relationship between educational expansion, secularisation, and changes in three 
dimensions of cultural conservatism at the macro-level. For this purpose, I combine general 
macro-sociological theories of social change with micro-level theoretical perspectives. 
This allows to derive specific hypotheses that can be empirically tested. Taking the 
individual level into account is important because the relationship between education or 
religiosity and cultural conservatism at the level of individuals may be different from that 
at the level of society, which involves the risk of making an ecological fallacy. For example, 
we might find that a population’s average level of cultural conservatism is lower when 
this population is more highly educated. We may conclude that educational expansion 
leads to a decline in cultural conservatism at the societal level. But if lower educated 
people in particular have become less conservative, then we may observe a decline in 
cultural conservatism at the macro-level even without an increase in the populations’ 
average educational level. Thus, the relationship between individual characteristics and 
cultural conservatism may have changed, giving rise to aggregate changes in cultural 
conservatism. In Chapter 2, I analyse to what extent this has been the case with regard 
to ethnic prejudice in the Netherlands. Alternatively, aggregate changes in dimensions of 
cultural conservatism may be due to shifts in the distribution of important characteristics 
that determine people’s cultural conservatism across the population. This is the focus of 
Chapter 3. 
Second, I empirically test the actual contribution of these individual and compositional 
explanations to trends in dimensions of cultural conservatism using counterfactual 
simulations (Clogg, 1978). This method, also referred to as purging (Te Grotenhuis, Eisinga, 
& Scheepers, 2004), allows to answer “what-if-things-had-been-different” questions, 
such as: how would the level of cultural conservatism have developed over time if the 
processes of educational expansion and secularisation had not taken place? With this 
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MACRO-LEVEL
MICRO-LEVEL
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B
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approach, I am able to isolate and quantify the separate contribution of either changes 
in individual associations or compositional shifts in the population to the observed 
trend, which improves upon studies that merely controlled for individual characteristics. 
By analysing an extended time period and by introducing a test for significance using 
bootstrapping, I add to previous studies in which the method of purging has been applied 
to study the consequences of educational expansion and secularisation (De Graaf & Te 
Grotenhuis, 2005; Felling et al., 2000; Grotenhuis, Eisinga, & Meer, 2012; Te Grotenhuis 
et al., 1998). In addition, this approach has not yet been used to explain trends in ethnic 
prejudice and gender egalitarianism.
Third, this dissertation contributes to the extensive body of literature that focuses on so-
called cohort and period explanations of changes in cultural conservatism. Theoretically, 
these studies propose that trends in public attitudes and behaviour can be explained 
in terms of socialisation under certain societal conditions during people’s formative 
years (cohort effects) or in terms of contemporary exposure to a certain societal context 
(period effects). To test these explanations, the lion’s share of research has compared 
people’s attitudes across different time periods or birth cohorts, or tried to disentangle 
the two. However, as argued above, these studies generally suffer from the perfectly 
linear combination of period, cohort, and age effects. Strong assumptions are needed 
to circumvent this problem. I add to this body of literature by identifying a theoretically 
justified restriction on the effect of age, which allows to estimate the influences of period 
and cohort effects on a dimension of cultural conservatism, i.e., gender egalitarianism, in 
a restricted APC model (constrained generalised linear regression model) (Mason et al., 1973). 
Fourth, I aim to bring this field of research further by shifting the question from how 
cultural conservatism has changed over time and across cohorts to why people in different 
periods and birth cohorts differ in the first place. Answering this question provides a 
more direct test of the widely theorised perspectives of cohort socialisation and periodic 
exposure, and it provides a more meaningful interpretation of period and cohort effects. 
As such, I advance the hitherto underspecified theoretical propositions of social change. In 
Chapter 4, I deduce hypotheses about cohort- and period-specific societal conditions that 
may explain changes in gender egalitarianism. I test these hypotheses by substituting 
period and cohort effects with theoretically relevant contextual indicators of societal 
conditions. To date, empirical tests of such contextual cohort explanations for the trend 
in gender egalitarianism have remained scarce. In Chapter 5, I examine the influence of 
more recent demographic and economic changes in European countries on public support 
for authoritarian values. These contextual explanations for trends in authoritarianism 
have not yet been analysed simultaneously. Moreover, I analyse the effect of both levels 
and sudden changes in economic and demographic indicators on people’s support 
for authoritarian values, building on scholars who argued that “shocks” in contextual 
indicators may have a stronger influence on people’s attitudes and behaviour than 
customary levels of these same indicators (Meuleman et al., 2009; Olzak, 1992).
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Lastly, I advance the research on trends in dimensions of cultural conservatism by not 
only studying these trends in the general population, but also how they differ between 
educational and religious categories (Chapter 2), between men and women (Chapter 3 
and 4), and between Western and Eastern European countries (Chapter 5). Exploring under 
which conditions, among whom, and in which contexts people’s support for dimensions of 
cultural conservatism has changed allows to test the generalisability of theories of social 
change and provides a more in-depth understanding of trends in cultural conservatism. 
1.4 Studying social change: data and methods
To study changes in cultural conservatism over time, large scale representative surveys 
are needed that contain information on people’s attitudes at different points in time. 
In this dissertation, I use repeated cross-sectional data on individuals from three 
different sources. I complemented these data with macro-level information about the 
social context from various sources. The following section provides an overview of the 
data sources, measurements of the dependent variables and the methods that are used 
throughout this dissertation.
1.4.1 Data and measurements
Socio-cultural developments in the Netherlands surveys 1985-2011: ethnic prejudice
In Chapter 2, I use data from the Socio-cultural developments in the Netherlands surveys 
(“Sociaal-Culturele Ontwikkelingen in Nederland”, SOCON) (Eisinga et al., 2012). Developed 
as a national survey on religious and secular attitudes and behaviour in Dutch society, 
these surveys were collected every five years between 1979 and 2011 among a nationally 
representative cross-section of the Dutch population between 18 and 70 years old. The 
questionnaires contain only previously tested, valid and reliable measurements. Because 
the design and the measurements remained unchanged across the surveys, the SOCON 
data are well suited for long-term comparisons of attitudes over time. I use the surveys 
of 1985, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2011 to measure support for ethnic prejudice over time. 
Respondents were presented five statements measuring common stereotypical views 
about the five largest minority groups in the Netherlands. Based on factor analyses, I 
combined the answers on these statements into one scale indicating an individual’s 
level of ethnic prejudice. The surveys of 1979 and 1990 were excluded because these lack 
comparable measurements of ethnic prejudice. The SOCON data also contain information 
on individuals’ educational attainment, religiosity, and a range of other individual 
characteristics. 
Cultural Changes in the Netherlands surveys 1979-2012: gender egalitarianism
In Chapter 3 and 4, I employ the Cultural Changes in the Netherlands surveys (“Culturele 
Veranderingen in Nederland”, CV) (The Netherlands Institute for Social Research, 
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2016). These data have been collected at least once every two years since 1970 in order 
to study changes in social and cultural opinions and attitudes of the Dutch population 
on a wide range of issues. Each survey consists of a nationally representative sample of 
individuals between 16 and 74 years old. The CV surveys contain measurements of gender 
attitudes that are comparable across the waves, allowing to analyse changes in gender 
egalitarianism over time. In Chapter 3, I use 16 waves between 1979 and 2012, which contain 
information about respondents’ gender attitudes, educational attainment, religiosity, 
and employment status. In Chapter 4, I employ 14 waves between 1979 and 2006, enriched 
with contextual information on societal circumstances at the province level for each birth 
cohort and each survey year. Because the surveys from 2006 onwards lacked detailed 
information about the province in which respondents live, I had to exclude these waves 
from the analyses. Contextual information was retrieved from Dutch population censuses, 
labour force surveys, CV surveys 1970-2006, and SOCON surveys 1979-2011. Based on this 
information, I constructed measures of the average educational level in the Netherlands 
of the cohort that entered the labour market, the percentage of the Dutch population with 
no religious affiliation, and the percentage of women participating on the labour market 
from 1900 onwards. These measures are used as proxies for cohort- and period-specific 
societal circumstances. 
European Social Survey 2002-2014: authoritarian values
Chapter 5 is based on seven rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), which were collected 
once every two years between 2002 and 2014 across a large number of European countries. 
The purpose of these data is to monitor and interpret changing public attitudes and values 
within Europe. The surveys therefore include several questions to measure authoritarian 
values. These questions were asked in the same way in each survey and in each country, 
which makes these data well suited to analyse over time changes in support for these 
values across European countries. The data were collected through face-to-face interviews 
among representative samples of all persons aged 15 years and over, living within private 
households in one of the participating countries. I use information on people’s support 
for authoritarian values, educational level, religiosity, and a number of other individual 
characteristics in thirteen Western European and five Eastern European countries. To 
measure the influence of changes in the societal context, I enriched the individual-level 
data with contextual economic and cultural indicators for each country and survey year, 
retrieved from the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union.
1.4.2 Methods
In this dissertation, I use different methods to test the mechanisms that I proposed for 
the relationship between societal developments and changes in cultural conservatism. In 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I aim to explain trends in dimensions of cultural conservatism at 
the macro-level as a result of changes in the associations between important individual 
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characteristics and cultural conservatism, as well as shifts in the distribution of these 
characteristics in the population. To disentangle these two explanations and to estimate 
their actual contribution, I conduct counterfactual simulations. These simulations, also 
called purging, are based on the method described by Clogg (1978), and further developed 
and employed by Te Grotenhuis, Eisinga, and Scheepers (2004). This method allows 
to simulate new mean levels of support for cultural conservatism in the sample under 
the condition that either the individual associations or the distributions of individual 
characteristics in the sample would not have changed over time. For a straightforward 
example of this method I refer to the Appendix of Chapter 1. Because the sampling 
distribution of the simulated mean levels of cultural conservatism is unknown, I use a 
bootstrap procedure to test the significance of the contribution of these explanations to 
trends in cultural conservatism.
In Chapter 2, I focus on changes in the associations between individual characteristics 
and ethnic prejudice as an explanation for the aggregate trend in ethnic prejudice in the 
Netherlands. I employ multivariate linear regression analyses to establish the associations 
of education, church membership, and church attendance with ethnic prejudice in 
each survey year and I investigate changes in support for ethnic prejudice within each 
category of educational attainment, church membership, and church attendance. The 
outcomes are subsequently used in counterfactual analyses to estimate and decompose 
the contribution of these changes to the aggregate trend in ethnic prejudice in the 
Netherlands, while simultaneously accounting for shifts in the distribution of these 
characteristics due to educational expansion and secularisation. 
In Chapter 3, I analyse the extent to which changes in aggregate support for gender 
egalitarianism in the Netherlands can be explained by shifts in the social structure of 
the population due to the demographic processes of cohort replacement, educational 
expansion, secularisation, and women’s increased labour force participation. To separate 
the effect of birth cohort from the effects of period and age, I use constrained generalised 
linear regression models (CGLIM) (Mason et al., 1973) with a theoretically informed 
restriction on the effect of age. This approach is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. I apply 
counterfactual simulation analyses to the outcomes of these models to estimate the 
separate contribution of cohort replacement, educational expansion, secularisation, 
and the rise of female labour force participation to the trend in support for gender 
egalitarianism. All analyses are performed for men and women separately, because men 
and women have different interests in gender equality and may respond differently to 
questions about gender egalitarianism (Ciabattari, 2001; Jennings, 2006).
In the last two chapters, I analyse the direct influence of the societal context on people’s 
support for cultural conservatism. Changes in the societal context may account for trends 
in cultural conservatism. In Chapter 4, I replace the effects of birth cohort and period with 
theoretically relevant contextual indicators at the province level. This approach has been 
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proposed as an alternative way to identify the effects of period, cohort, and age (besides 
restricted APC models), and may provide a more substantive theoretical interpretation 
of period and cohort effects (Rodgers, 1990). I use multivariate regression analyses 
to simultaneously estimate the influence of cohort- and period-specific contextual 
indicators of educational expansion, secularisation, and the feminisation of the labour 
force, while controlling for age effects. To prevent the estimates from being confounded 
with age, I apply the same restriction on age as in Chapter 3. The analyses are performed 
separately for men and women to investigate whether the effects differ for men and 
women. 
In Chapter 5, I focus on the influence of economic and cultural conditions, and sudden 
changes herein, on support for authoritarian values in Europe. These developments may 
have counterbalanced the liberalising impact of educational expansion and secularisation. 
I employ multilevel regression analyses with individuals nested in country-year 
combinations. This approach takes account of the nested structure of the data. Because I 
am interested in variation in authoritarian values within countries across time, I include a 
dummy variable for each country to account for unobserved country characteristics. The 
analyses are performed for Western and Eastern Europe separately, because the level of 
support for authoritarian values, as well as its explanations, may differ between Western 
and Eastern Europe. 
Table 1.1 summarises the data sources and methods of the empirical chapters.
Table 1.1 | Overview of data sources and methods of the empirical chapters
Ch. Data source Time period Dependent 
variable
Explanation tested Methods
2 Socio-cultural 
developments 
in the Nether-
lands (SOCON)
5 waves
1985-2011
Ethnic 
 prejudice
Changes in the 
effects of education 
and religiosity in the 
Netherlands
Linear regression 
analyses + 
Counterfactual 
simulations
3 Cultural 
Changes in the 
Netherlands 
(CV)
16 waves 
1979-2012
Gender 
 egalitarianism
Changes in the 
educational and re-
ligious composition 
of the Netherlands
Constrained 
generalised linear 
regression analyses 
+ Counterfactual 
simulations
4 Cultural 
Changes in the 
Netherlands 
(CV)
14 waves 
1979-2006
Gender 
 egalitarianism
Changes in the 
societal context of 
the Netherlands
Linear regression 
analyses with con-
textual period and 
cohort indicators
5 European 
Social Survey 
(ESS)
7 waves
2002-2014
Authoritarian 
values
Changes in the 
societal context of 
13 Western European 
and 5 Eastern Euro-
pean countries
Multilevel regres-
sion analyses 
with contextual 
period and cohort 
indicators
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1.5 Overview of the empirical chapters
Chapter 2: The paradox of rising ethnic prejudice in times of educational expansion and 
secularisation in the Netherlands, 1985-2011
In Chapter 2, I investigate the trend in ethnic prejudice in the Netherlands. Despite rising 
educational levels and declining religious affiliations, it seems that the Dutch have 
increasingly expressed ethnic prejudice over the past decades. I propose two possible 
theoretical explanations for this apparent paradox. First, the rise in ethnic prejudice could 
have been so strong, that it has offset the liberalising impact of educational expansion and 
secularisation. Second, the individual relationship between having a higher educational 
level and/or being non-religious, and rejecting ethnic prejudice could have decreased 
over time. As a consequence, increases in the shares of highly educated and non-religious 
individuals in the population have not automatically been accompanied by the expected 
decline in ethnic prejudice. 
In order to test these theoretical explanations, I examine whether higher educated 
people and non-religious people have become more prejudiced over time than others, 
and, if so, to what extent these changes have contributed to the observed rise in ethnic 
prejudice in the Netherlands. I use nationally representative data from five waves of cross-
sectional surveys (SOCON) collected in the Netherlands between 1985 and 2011. To test the 
unique contribution of changes in ethnic prejudice within each category of educational 
attainment, church membership and church attendance, I use counterfactual simulations. 
This method allows to investigate whether the observed rise in ethnic prejudice would 
still be present if the levels of ethic prejudice within specific categories of education and 
religious affiliation had not changed over time (over and above the overall increase in 
ethnic prejudice), while taking into account the rising shares of higher educated and non-
religious individuals in society. 
The results show that support for ethnic prejudice has indeed increased in the 
Netherlands between 1985 and 2011. Although people’s educational levels appear an 
important determinant of lower levels of ethnic prejudice, the rise in ethnic prejudice was 
stronger among higher educated individuals in particular. The liberalising influence of 
educational expansion has consequently been smaller than expected. In addition, I hardly 
find any differences in ethnic prejudice between religiously affiliated and non-affiliated 
individuals in the Netherlands. It is therefore that the rising shares of non-religious 
people in the Dutch population have not automatically resulted in a decline of prejudice. 
Moreover, the overall rise in ethnic prejudice has been stronger than the gradual processes 
of educational expansion and secularisation could compensate for, which suggests 
that certain societal developments have offset the liberalising influence of educational 
expansion and secularisation. 
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Chapter 3: The relationship between societal change and rising support for gender 
egalitarianism among men and women: results from counterfactual analyses in the 
Netherlands, 1979-2012
In Chapter 3, I examine the widely theorised relationship between shifts in the 
social, cultural, and economic structure of the population, and rising support for 
gender egalitarianism in the Netherlands between 1979 and 2012. Despite theoretical 
speculations, the actual contribution of demographic changes in the population to the 
trend in support for gender egalitarianism has been hardly quantified in previous research. 
I therefore analyse the exact contribution of shifts in the composition of the population 
due to cohort replacement, educational expansion, secularisation, and changes in labour 
force participation to the trend in gender egalitarianism. In addition, I investigate whether 
the trend in gender egalitarianism, as well as its explanations, differ between men and 
women. 
I use data on people’s support for gender egalitarianism with regard to the care for little 
children from 16 cross-sections of nationally representative surveys (CV), which were 
collected in the Netherlands between 1979 and 2012. First, I estimate constrained age-
period-cohort regression models, and I subsequently perform counterfactual simulations 
on the outcomes. This method allows to investigate how support for gender egalitarianism 
would have developed between 1979 and 2012 if the demographic composition of the 
Dutch population had not changed in this period.
This study shows that support for gender egalitarianism indeed increased between 1979 
and 2012, albeit stronger among women than men. Changes in women’s demographic 
composition in society could well explain the rise in gender egalitarianism among 
women. Especially the replacement of older female cohorts by younger ones seems to 
have propelled support for gender egalitarianism. By contrast, only a small part of men’s 
increase in support for gender egalitarianism can be attributed to cohort replacement, 
because the differences in support for gender egalitarianism between older and 
younger male cohorts are small. The increase of educational levels in the population 
has also contributed somewhat to the trends, but the impact of secularisation and the 
rise of women’s labour force participation is limited. Apparently, either the individual- 
level effects religiosity and employment status or shifts in the distribution of these 
characteristics in the population were not strong enough to exert a substantive influence 
on aggregate support for gender egalitarianism.
Chapter 4: Cohort and period explanations for the upward trend in support for gender 
egalitarianism in the Netherlands, 1979-2006
Chapter 4 builds upon the previous chapter by further exploring why support for gender 
egalitarianism has increased over time, and across Dutch birth cohorts in particular. 
Structural and cultural developments such as educational expansion, declining 
religiosity, and the rise of women’s employment have not only shifted the composition 
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of the population, but have likely also changed the normative societal discourse. Despite 
theoretical speculations, however, few studies have empirically tested why people living 
and growing up under different societal circumstances vary in their support for gender 
egalitarianism. I therefore explore to what extent the upward trend in support for gender 
egalitarianism can be explained by specific changes in the historical and contemporary 
societal context. I use levels of educational expansion, secularisation, and women’s 
labour force participation as theoretically relevant proxies for the societal context to 
which people are exposed. In addition, I investigate whether these explanations differ 
between men and women. 
I use data from 14 waves of cross-sectional surveys (CV) collected in the Netherlands 
between 1979 and 2006. I enriched these data with contextual information at the province 
level per birth cohort and survey year, retrieved from Dutch population censuses and 
labour force surveys. The influence of period- and cohort-specific contextual indicators 
is analysed simultaneously in multivariate regression analyses, controlled for age and 
individual characteristics.
The results reveal that educational expansion has contributed to the rise in gender 
egalitarianism, especially among women. Being socialised in a more highly educated 
context during the formative years is a strong indicator of support for gender 
egalitarianism. This suggests that educational expansion has induced more gender 
egalitarianism in each subsequent cohort. Periodic exposure to a context in which 
educational levels of the population are higher exerts an additional influence on people’s 
support for gender egalitarianism, independent of their own social position or the birth 
cohort they belong to. I find that the contribution of secularisation in explaining the rise 
in gender egalitarianism is modest, whereas exposure to higher levels of female labour 
force participation could not in itself explain the upward trend in support for gender 
egalitarianism and may even have induced a counter-reaction to gender egalitarianism.
Chapter 5: Changes in support for authoritarian values in Western and Eastern Europe in 
times of insecurity, 2002-2014
In Chapter 5, I analyse recent changes in support for authoritarian values in Europe, and 
to what extent these changes can be explained by different economic and demographic 
developments. Based on the scarcity hypothesis, I propose that economic development, 
secularisation and educational expansion should have decreased Europeans’ support for 
authoritarian values, whereas the recent economic crisis and mass immigration should 
have increased support for authoritarian values. In addition, I aim to explore to what 
extent these explanations differ between Western and Eastern European countries. 
To test these expectations, I use data from 18 countries in seven waves of the European 
Social Surveys (ESS) 2002-2014, enriched with contextual economic and cultural indicators. 
I perform stepwise multilevel regression analyses for Western and Eastern Europe 
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separately, including contextual indicators, sudden changes in these indicators, country 
dummies, and individual characteristics.
The results show that support for authoritarian values in Europe have, on average, 
remained rather stable over time, albeit at higher levels in Eastern Europe than in Western 
Europe. Despite little variation within countries over time, I show that changes in 
support for authoritarian values can partly be explained by economic and demographic 
developments in national contexts. In contrast to the expectation derived from 
modernisation theory, support for authoritarian values in Western Europe appears to 
be higher in times of higher levels of economic prosperity. In both Western and Eastern 
Europe, support for authoritarian values is stronger in times of sudden economic decline, 
which may explain the slight increase in support for authoritarianism in Europe during 
the economic crisis. I find no influence of educational expansion on Western Europeans’ 
support for authoritarian values, once controlled for levels of economic prosperity, but 
continuing secularisation seems to have reduced support for authoritarian values in 
Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, educational expansion has contributed to a slight 
increase rather than a decrease in support for authoritarian values, reflecting the legacy 
of the former communist regimes. Although secularisation has also taken place in Eastern 
Europe, this process has not influenced Eastern Europeans’ support for authoritarian 
values. Rising immigration seems unrelated to support for authoritarian values when the 
economic situation is taken into account.
1.6 Conclusions
Over the past decades, Europe has witnessed mass expansion of educational levels and 
substantial declines in church membership, church attendance, and religious beliefs. 
These processes have fundamentally reshaped the socio-demographic composition 
of European societies. In this dissertation, I explored to what extent these societal 
developments have been accompanied by changes in ideological views from conservative 
to more progressive. I focused on three dimensions of cultural conservatism which reflect 
the underlying value of cultural freedom, as conceptualised in the work of the Dutch 
sociologist Middendorp (1978). I compared people’s responses to questions regarding 
ethnic prejudice, gender egalitarianism, and authoritarian values in the Netherlands and 
in other European countries, which were collected with representative surveys at different 
moments in time during the past decades. At this point, it is time to take stock of the role 
of educational expansion and secularisation. To what extent have these developments 
indeed contributed to liberalising trends in cultural conservatism? 
The trend in ethnic prejudice
Between 1985 and 2011, people’s support for ethnic prejudice increased rather than 
decreased in the Netherlands. So why has the expected liberalising trend in ethnic 
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prejudice not taken place, despite educational expansion and secularisation? The 
answer is threefold. First, the influence of educational expansion has been smaller than 
expected, because the differences in ethnic prejudice between higher and lower educated 
individuals have declined. Second, the increase in the shares of secular individuals hardly 
affected the level of ethnic prejudice in society, because the differences in prejudice 
between religiously affiliated and secular individuals were small to begin with. Third, the 
liberalising potential of educational expansion and secularisation has apparently been 
offset by certain societal pressures, which seem to have induced a general rise in ethnic 
prejudice among the entire Dutch population. 
These findings are in line with theories of individualisation (Bauman, 2012; Beck & Beck-
Gernsheim, 2002; Felling et al., 2000), which propose that people’s social background 
and membership of institutions have to some extent lost their determining influence on 
people’s attitudes and behaviour. Consequently, people may have become increasingly 
susceptible to societal uncertainty and threats. The persistent inflow of both economic 
and political migrants along with fluctuating numbers of refugees, for example, may 
have induced perceptions of ethnic threat and ethnic prejudice in society (Coenders & 
Scheepers, 1998; Hatton, 2016; Meuleman et al., 2009), in particular with regard to Muslims 
(Savelkoul, Scheepers, Tolsma, & Hagendoorn, 2011; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). Even higher 
educated individuals may not be immune to such perceptions of threat. In addition, ethnic 
minorities and immigrants have become increasingly framed as undermining the liberal 
Dutch values. This may have gradually legitimised the expression of prejudice against 
ethnic minorities.
The trend in gender egalitarianism
With regard to support for gender egalitarianism, Dutch people’s responses have shifted 
in a less conservative direction between 1979 and 2012. The rise is stronger among 
women than among men. Educational expansion appears to play an important role in 
explaining this upward trend. For a small part, this is due to the rise in the share of higher 
educated individuals – who are generally more supportive of gender egalitarianism – in 
the population. Much more pronounced, however, is the direct influence of educational 
expansion in shaping people’s attitudes, in particular during the formative years but 
also later in life. In line with theories of socialisation (Inglehart, 1990, 1997; Mannheim, 
1952), this dissertation shows that people who have been socialised in times of higher 
educational levels in society are more supportive of gender egalitarianism. The 
replacement of birth cohorts therefore substantially contributed to the rise in gender 
egalitarianism, in particular among women. 
Moreover, educational expansion has exposed all individuals in society to a more highly 
educated societal context. As a consequence, people may have increasingly adopted the 
more egalitarian norms that prevail in such context regardless of their social position 
or birth year, which provides an additional explanation for the upward trend in support 
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for gender egalitarianism in the Netherlands. The findings of this study therefore also 
support the perspective of exposure and life-long openness to change, which argues that 
societal circumstances or events affect all individuals who are exposed to such conditions 
at a particular moment in time (Alwin & McCammon, 2003). Educational expansion 
thus serves as an important indicator of a changing normative societal climate in which 
people grow up and live. The contribution of educational expansion to the trend in gender 
egalitarianism is stronger for women than for men, suggesting that women have a 
greater interest in challenging existing gender structures and promoting gender equality 
(Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Dotti Sani & Quaranta, 2017). It is women from younger 
cohorts who appear to be the forerunners in the process towards gender egalitarianism.
Secularisation plays a less decisive role in explaining trends in gender egalitarianism. 
Although people who are religiously affiliated and who attend church generally adhere 
to more traditional norms about gender, the decline in the shares of people who attend 
church in the Netherlands only marginally contributed to the rise in gender egalitarianism 
in the period that I studied. As yet, I cannot exclude that the influence of secularisation 
would have been stronger when analysed over a more extended time period. In addition, 
I found that socialisation in, and exposure to a more secularised societal context 
slightly increased people’s support for gender egalitarianism. Thus, next to educational 
expansion, secularisation has also had some liberalising influence on support for gender 
egalitarianism, but its influence was limited.
In addition to the role of educational expansion and secularisation, I analysed the 
influence of women’s increased labour force participation. In contrast to widely theorised 
propositions (e.g., Banaszak & Plutzer, 1993; Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Cotter et al., 2011; 
Mason & Lu, 1988), demographic shifts in the labour force hardly contributed to the rise in 
gender egalitarianism in the Netherlands between 1979 and 2012. A possible explanation 
is that the difference in gender egalitarianism between employed and non-employed 
women is not very substantial in the Netherlands, and the rise in women’s labour force 
participation has apparently not been strong enough to induce more support for gender 
egalitarianism at the societal level. 
Growing up or living in times of high female labour force participation even seems to 
have reduced support for gender egalitarianism when educational expansion was taken 
into account. This finding may not be as surprising as it seems, since Dutch women’s 
labour force participation remained stable at a fairly low level during the first half of the 
20th century and has only taken off substantially since the late 1980s, while the trend in 
support for gender egalitarianism by that time already started to slow down. Moreover, 
women’s increased labour force participation may have evoked a counter-reaction in 
people’s support for gender egalitarianism. One explanation for such reaction could be 
that women have adopted more traditional views on men’s and women’s role in child care 
as a way to deal with the double burden of career expectations and family responsibilities 
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(Damaske, 2013; Johnston & Swanson, 2006; Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 2001). Indeed, full-
time working Dutch women still spend more time on household tasks and child care than 
Dutch men (Merens & Van den Brakel, 2014). Another possible explanation is that female 
labour force participation has raised concerns in society about good motherhood, which 
may have intensified a motherhood ideology that stresses mothers’ responsibility for the 
child’s well-being (Douglas & Michaels, 2005; Hays, 1996). Such a counter-reaction may 
also explain the slowdown of people’s support for gender egalitarianism in the Netherlands 
during the second half of the 1990s, although further research is clearly warranted. 
Trends in authoritarian values 
Widening my scope to the larger European context, I found no clear trend towards lower 
support for authoritarian values in Western and Eastern European countries between 2002 
and 2014. Educational expansion has not contributed to a liberalisation of authoritarian 
values in Western Europe: in times of a more highly educated societal context, people did 
not support authoritarian values significantly less. By contrast, in Eastern Europe, people 
even attached more importance to authoritarian values with the continuous expansion 
of education. This supports the notion that the influence of education on liberal values is 
conditional on which values are transmitted in educational systems (Weil, 1985). In Eastern 
European countries, the content of school curricula may echo the legacy of the former 
communist regimes, with a focus on obedience and conformity (Dobbins & Kwiek, 2017; 
Kováts, Heidrich, & Chandler, 2017; Mishler & Rose, 2002). Secularisation exerted a small 
liberalising influence on support for authoritarian values in Western Europe, but not in 
Eastern Europe. 
In addition, I analysed the influence of recent changes in the economic and cultural context 
in European societies. In contrast to modernisation theory (Inglehart, 1997), Western 
Europeans’ support for authoritarian values increased rather than decreased with rising levels 
of economic prosperity. This suggests that economic development does not automatically 
contribute to an ever declining emphasis on authoritarian values beyond a certain level of 
existential security, which challenges the assumption that modernisation is an irreversible 
and unidirectional process. Although economic prosperity continues to rise in Western 
Europe, people may have become more aware of the limits and darker sides of economic 
growth, and their sense of existential security may have become increasingly threatened. 
The economic crisis has likely intensified perceptions that financial security and stability 
cannot be taken for granted (Mols & Jetten, 2017). Indeed, in both Western and Eastern 
Europe, the economic crisis appeared to be partly responsible for the small increase 
in support for authoritarian values between 2008 and 2012. This is in line with the 
scarcity hypothesis, which predicts that conditions of economic insecurity increase the 
importance that people attach to authoritarian values (Inglehart, 1997, 2008). The findings 
also support the idea that it is sudden changes in the societal context that affect people’s 
attitudes in particular (Olzak, 1992).
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Overall conclusion
This dissertation demonstrates that educational expansion and secularisation have 
indeed contributed to trends in several dimensions of cultural conservatism in the 
Netherlands and in Europe over the past decades. However, the liberalising influence 
of these developments is neither linear nor universal. First, the exact contribution 
varies between the different dimensions of cultural conservatism that were studied. 
The liberalising influence is more pronounced regarding gender egalitarianism, but less 
regarding ethnic prejudice and authoritarianism. Second, the contribution of educational 
expansion and secularisation is not equally strong for everyone, nor is it present in 
every time period or context. Some groups in society seem more responsive to societal 
conditions, depending on their interest or social position. Third, as far as the processes of 
educational expansion and secularisation have had a gradually liberalising impact, several 
developments have counterbalanced this effect. Contemporary changes in the national 
context, such as worsening economic conditions, act as a cross-pressure against the 
liberalising influence of educational expansion and secularisation. Such developments in 
the national context may account for deviations from the supposed liberalising trend in 
cultural conservatism, such as the slowdown of gender egalitarianism in the 1990s, the 
increase in ethnic prejudice over the past decades, and stability of authoritarian values 
since the turn of the century.
1.7 Directions for future research
This dissertation leaves several questions unanswered and raises new ones. I propose 
a few directions for future research that may provide answers to these questions. First, 
in this dissertation I focused on the cultural dimension of the progressive-conservative 
antithesis that refers to the approval or rejection of values of individual freedom. The 
economic dimension, referring to the underlying value of equal economic opportunities, 
is not covered in this dissertation. Cultural conservatism in turn consists of several 
subdimensions, which are only partially covered by the three dimensions that I explored 
in this study (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). This leaves the question unanswered whether 
the trends and explanations identified in this dissertation also apply to other dimensions 
of cultural conservatism, such as attitudes towards abortion and euthanasia, tolerance 
towards homosexuals and other sexual minorities, other dimensions of gender equality, 
prejudice against other out-groups, or questions about civil liberties such as freedom of 
speech. A lack of cross-sectional data covering an extended period of time often impairs 
answers to these questions. I therefore advocate the continuation of data collection with 
surveys containing repeated measurements that are comparable over time. 
In addition, this dissertation mainly focused on the Netherlands. Although similar societal 
developments have taken place in other (western) countries, the degree of change, as well 
as its impact on trends in cultural conservatism may differ across countries or regions. For 
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example, I found that obtaining higher education in Eastern European countries was related 
to more support for authoritarian values rather than less. The liberalising potential of 
educational expansion thus seems to depend on the specific national history (Inglehart & 
Baker, 2000; Weil, 1985) and the content of school curricula (Quillian, 1996). Future research 
could establish whether the results of this study can be generalised to other contexts.
Besides educational expansion and secularisation, western societies have witnessed 
other developments that have changed both the socio-demographic composition and the 
normative context of these societies, such as urbanisation, declining fertility, increasing 
divorce rates, and changing living arrangements. Questions about the influence of such 
developments remain unanswered, however, because appropriate and valid contextual 
indicators that cover a substantial number of birth cohorts and time periods are scarce, 
if available at all. Collecting such contextual indicators to empirically test the theoretical 
speculations about the influence of these developments provides a promising direction 
for future research. 
The rise of female labour force participation is another frequently proposed explanation 
for social change. By contrast, however, I found that this measure could not explain the 
rise in support for gender egalitarianism in the Netherlands when accounted for rising 
educational levels. Exposure to higher levels of female labour force participation even 
seemed to induce lower support for gender egalitarianism. I proposed that the strong 
motherhood ideology in the Netherlands, which seems to linger as a residue of Christian 
norms regarding the role of women in society (Voas, McAndrew, & Storm, 2013), could 
possibly account for this unexpected finding. Despite women’s increased labour force 
participation, gendered divisions of labour persist in both the public and private domain. 
For example, Dutch women work part-time, the majority works in traditionally female 
sectors such as education and care, and full-time working women in the Netherlands 
generally spend more time on household tasks and childcare than men (Merens & Van 
den Brakel, 2014). Future research should further explore the role of female labour force 
participation – and mother’s employment in particular – in explaining trends in public 
support for gender egalitarianism, taking into account occupational segregation and 
part-time employment.
In addition, the influence of social movements and networks, policies, political elites, 
role models such as public figures, the media, and specific events remains overlooked 
in this study. Recently, social media have become increasingly influential in the public 
debate. Moreover, people are not only exposed to conditions and developments at the 
level of society or province, but also to their more immediate social environment such as 
their family, school, workplace, and neighbourhood. Future research would benefit from 
including contextual indicators that are closer to people’s direct living environment to 
analyse their contribution to changes in cultural conservatism over time. 
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Lastly, the mechanisms that lie behind the influence of educational attainment and 
religiosity at the individual level received little attention in this dissertation. For example, 
several explanations for the liberalising influence of education on conservatism have been 
proposed and tested, but the empirical evidence regarding the underlying determinants 
remains ambiguous (Easterbrook, Kuppens, & Manstead, 2016; Hello et al., 2006; Surridge, 
2016; Vogt, 1997). Next to an actual influence of education on people’s attitudes, social 
desirability and selection may play a role. That is, the more progressive views of higher 
educated individuals may be an artefact because higher educated people know how 
to respond to questions in surveys (Jackman & Muha, 1984), or because children and 
adolescents who express less conservative attitudes end up at higher educational levels 
with the help of their parental background (Lancee & Sarrasin, 2015). Understanding 
the underlying mechanisms of the effects of education and religiosity, for example 
benefitting from a panel design, may provide further insights into the liberalising 
potential of rising educational levels and declining religiosity. In addition, more research 
is needed to investigate why certain groups in society have changed their attitudes more 
strongly than others, and how people respond to changes in the social context throughout 
the life course. Panel studies may be employed to analyse such changes within individuals 
over time, whereas (survey) experiments and qualitative studies could be used to get more 
in-depth knowledge about the motivations behind people’s attitudes and values.
1.8 Implications
1.8.1 Implications for the study of social change
The findings of this dissertation have several implications for research on social change. 
These implications are not limited to the study of cultural conservatism, but in principle 
apply to research on any trend in public attitudes or behaviour over time. 
First, theories of social change are often stated in very general terms. As a consequence, 
additional assumptions are needed to empirically test these theories. By integrating 
macro- and micro-level perspectives, more specific hypotheses can be derived to answer 
questions such as to what extent changes in the societal context have contributed to 
trends in cultural conservatism, and why, among whom, where, and when that has 
happened. For example, I have proposed that formulating and testing hypotheses on 
why people differ across birth cohorts and over time allows for a more direct test of the 
theoretical propositions of cohort socialisation and periodic exposure as explanations 
for social change. The study of social change would theoretically benefit from further 
specifying why, and under what conditions changes in public attitudes can be observed. 
Second, since theories about the influence of the social context are mostly stated in terms 
of changes, the literature would benefit from comparisons over time based on data from 
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as many points in time as possible. To date, conclusions about the influence of changes 
in the societal context over time are still regularly drawn on the basis of static analyses 
comparing different countries at one moment in time. Previous research has shown that 
such conclusions are not necessarily generalisable to changes within a particular context 
over time (Te Grotenhuis et al., 2015). It is therefore important to continue the collection 
of repeated cross-sectional data on individuals’ attitudes and behaviour, as well as macro-
level indicators, that allow for comparisons across time. Moreover, this dissertation 
demonstrated that the existing research on social change can be extended with studies 
that include sudden changes in macro-level conditions, which allows for a more stringent 
test of hypotheses regarding changes in the societal context.
Third, I have demonstrated that the impact of demographic changes on trends in 
cultural conservatism depends on a combination of changes in the association between 
individual characteristics, and shifts in the distribution of these characteristics across the 
population. Hence, future research should take into account that either may change over 
time in possibly different directions. I showed that counterfactual simulations can be used 
to separate the influence of changes in individual associations from compositional shifts. 
Lastly, scholars of social change face the impossibility of identifying age, period, and 
cohort effects. In this dissertation, it was shown that it is possible to estimate the 
effects of age, period, and cohort simultaneously by constraining one of the effects. Such 
constraint should be based on strong theoretical assumptions that can be empirically 
supported, since the estimates are only unbiased if the constraint is valid. Moreover, 
sociologists might also (or principally) be interested in the underlying determinants of 
period and cohort effects, especially if they aim to test expectations derived from the 
theoretical perspectives of cohort socialisation and exposure. Research on period and 
cohort explanations of social change can be fruitfully extended by replacing the effects 
of period and cohort with theoretically relevant indicators of specific conditions or 
developments that supposedly underlie these effects. This approach is more informative 
than the mere decomposition of age, period, and cohort effects, for it yields insight into 
the possible root causes of social change. 
1.8.2 Societal implications
The conclusions of this dissertation may also have implications for Dutch society and 
Europe as a whole. The dimensions of cultural conservatism that I studied relate to issues 
that have received considerable attention in contemporary political and public debates. One 
of these issues concerns the rise of ethnic diversity and its consequences for social cohesion. 
Immigration of refugees and economic migrants, in particular from Muslim majority 
countries, has recently incited heated debates in Europe, including the Netherlands. The 
findings of this dissertation indicate that exclusionary reactions towards ethnic out-groups 
have their roots in the slowly growing ease with which people seem to express prejudice 
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towards ethnic minorities. It appears that ethnic minorities and immigrants – Muslims in 
particular – have become increasingly framed as undermining Dutch progressive values 
(Spierings, Lubbers, & Zaslove, 2017). Ironically, the liberal values that have been the basis 
of tolerance towards different out-groups have become a source of exclusion. This may have 
detrimental consequences for interethnic relations and social cohesion in society.
Another issue that is high on the policy agenda is gender equality. This dissertation 
highlights that support for gender egalitarianism has become increasingly widespread 
among the Dutch public, which may pave the way for a more egalitarian division of work 
and family responsibilities, and equal opportunities for men and women (Charles, 2011; 
England, 2010; Epstein, 2007; Fortin, 2005). Women’s improved position in Dutch society 
notwithstanding, there are still domains in which actual progress is slow. For example, 
women continue to be underrepresented in politics and in management positions (Portegijs 
& Van den Brakel, 2016), and women’s increased labour force participation has not yet 
been matched with men’s equal involvement in traditionally “feminine” tasks, such as 
family responsibilities. Despite the rise in support for gender egalitarianism, stereotypical 
expectations about men’s and women’s roles and behaviour have by no means disappeared 
in Dutch society. This affects the choices that men and women make in their everyday 
lives. Emancipation policies could therefore be aimed at removing structural barriers and 
addressing cultural expectations that impede further progress towards gender equality. 
In the wake of increasing electoral success of populist, conservative, and authoritarian 
political parties and leaders, the media have speculated about a supposed rise in 
authoritarianism among the public. This dissertation puts these speculations in 
perspective by highlighting that a rise in support for authoritarian values has hardly 
taken place among the general European public. This finding raises questions about the 
legitimacy of political parties and leaders that aim to curb cultural freedom to preserve or 
restore the traditional social order. Why authoritarian regimes have nevertheless gained 
foothold in several Eastern European countries, such as Hungary and Poland, and why 
radical right parties have mobilised increasing shares of the Western European electorate, 
needs further investigation.
Lastly, this dissertation causes to reflect upon the future of religion and education in Dutch 
society. The Christian church seems to have lost its influence in determining attitudes, 
values and beliefs in the general population. Although its cultural heritage is still visible in 
the older cohorts, it is a matter of time before these older cohorts are replaced by new cohorts 
that have not been socialised with the traditional norms of the Christian church. Education, 
on the other hand, continues to be one of the most important determinants of cultural 
conservatism. The expansion of education has played an important role in reducing cultural 
conservatism in the population. However, the liberalising potential of education appears to 
depend on which values are transmitted in the educational system. The role of education in 
liberalising trends in cultural conservatism should therefore not be taken for granted.
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2.1 Introduction
Throughout the 20th century, Western European societies have witnessed a considerable 
increase in educational levels (Meyer et al., 1977; Schofer & Meyer, 2005). Over the same 
period, religious affiliation and religious participation have declined (Norris & Inglehart, 
2011). The Netherlands is a leading country with regard to these processes of educational 
expansion and secularisation (Bar Haim & Shavit, 2013; Becker & De Hart, 2006). Since the 
second half of the 20th century, the educational levels of the Dutch have risen substantially 
(Tolsma & Wolbers, 2014; Van Hek, Kraaykamp, & Wolbers, 2015), which coincided with 
strong declines in religious affiliation, church attendance, and traditional Christian beliefs 
(De Graaf & Te Grotenhuis, 2008; Need & De Graaf, 1996).
Previous research consistently found higher educated individuals to show less ethnic 
prejudice than lower educated individuals (Coenders & Scheepers, 2003; Hello, Scheepers, 
& Gijsberts, 2002; Wagner & Zick, 1995). In addition, people with no religious affiliation 
and people who do not attend church were found less prejudiced than church members 
and regular churchgoers (Allport & Ross, 1967; Scheepers & Eisinga, 2015). Thus, education, 
religious affiliation, and attendance are statistically related to ethnic prejudice at the 
individual level, while the shares of highly educated and non-religious individuals have 
increased. Consequently, one would expect a longitudinal decline in prejudice at the 
national level. 
Contrary to this expectation, however, levels of ethnic prejudice seem to have risen in the 
Netherlands. Several scholars found more widespread support for ethnic discrimination 
in the housing and labour markets since the late 1980s (Coenders et al., 2008; Coenders & 
Scheepers, 1998; Huijnk & Dagevos, 2012), and stronger support for ethnic prejudice since the 
1990s (Coenders, Lubbers, Grotenhuis, Thijs, & Scheepers, 2015). Similar changes have been 
found in other European countries (see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010 for an overview). For 
example, Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky (2006) found a rise in anti-foreigner sentiment 
between 1988 and 2000 in 12 European countries. Other studies have shown considerable 
differences between European countries in the direction and magnitude of changes in anti-
immigrant and anti-immigration attitudes since 2000, with attitudes recently becoming 
somewhat less negative in several countries, including among others the Netherlands, 
Germany and Poland (Hjerm & Bohman, 2014; Meuleman et al., 2009; Van Setten et al., 2017). 
Although there are indications that Dutch public opinions on ethnic diversity have recently 
become milder (Huijnk & Andriessen, 2016), the documented increase in ethnic prejudice 
over the past decades gives rise to a puzzling paradox: while the shares of higher educated 
people and non-affiliated people in Dutch society – known for their relatively lower levels of 
prejudice – have increased over time, prejudice against ethnic out-groups has yet increased.
There are two possible explanations for this. First, ethnic prejudice may have risen to 
such a degree throughout society that it has offset the impact of educational expansion 
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and secularisation. In this scenario, the levels of ethic prejudice within all categories of 
education and religious affiliation have risen to the same extent. Second, the levels of 
ethnic prejudice may have risen particularly within the higher educated and the non-
affiliated. As a consequence, educational expansion and secularisation could then hardly 
have reduced prejudice in society.
Few studies, however, have examined whether the relationship of education and religious 
affiliation with prejudice has changed over time and empirical findings are mixed. For 
example, Quillian (1996) and Jaspers (2008) showed that the effect of education increased 
over time in the U.S. and in the Netherlands, whereas Easterbrook, Kuppens, and Sears 
(2016) found stable relationships between education and anti-immigrant attitudes over 
time based on British and cross-national surveys. In their meta-analysis, Hall, Matz, 
and Wood (2010) found decreasing associations between extrinsic religiosity and ethnic 
prejudice over time, whereas Jaspers (2008) found no changes in the effect of church 
membership over time in the Netherlands. 
In addition, if the relationship of education and religious affiliation with ethnic prejudice 
has indeed changed, it remains unclear which educational and religiously (non-)affiliated 
groups are responsible for these changes by expressing more or less ethnic prejudice over 
time. In a Dutch study, De Lange, Tolsma, and Wolbers (2015) found a widening gap in 
ethnic threat between higher and lower educated people, caused by a stronger increase 
among the latter. However, the authors only considered linear trends. We therefore 
examine whether the levels of ethic prejudice within categories of education, church 
membership, and church attendance have changed over time at any (non-linear) rate. 
Most importantly, it remains unknown to what extent these changes in the levels of 
ethic prejudice can explain the longitudinal rise in ethnic prejudice despite educational 
expansion and secularisation. Although few studies considered the effect of changing 
levels of prejudice within particular groups, none of these studies took distributional shifts 
of these groups into account, which may have resulted in biased effects. To overcome this 
lacuna, we use counterfactual analyses (Te Grotenhuis et al., 2004). We examine whether 
the rise in ethnic prejudice is still present if the levels of ethic prejudice within categories 
of education and religious affiliation would not have changed over time, while controlling 
for distributional shifts, i.e., educational expansion and secularisation. This leads to the 
following research questions: Have the higher educated and the non-affiliated become 
more prejudiced than others between 1985 and 2011? If so, to what extent have these changes 
contributed to the observed rise in prejudice in the Netherlands between 1985 and 2011, while 
taking into account educational expansion and secularisation?
Rising levels of ethnic prejudice may have detrimental consequences for interethnic 
relations in society. Ethnic prejudice may lead to negative intergroup behaviour, 
such as discrimination, exclusion or hostility (Allport, 1954). Feelings of exclusion 
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and discrimination may hamper ethnic minorities’ social integration and increase 
withdrawal into one’s own ethnic group, which could eventually result in radicalisation or 
criminalisation (Huijnk & Dagevos, 2012). Understanding to what extent the rise in ethnic 
prejudice can be explained by certain groups in society expressing more prejudice over 
time may inform policies aimed at reducing interethnic tensions. 
2.2 Theory and hypotheses
2.2.1 Ethnic competition theory
On the individual level, ethnic competition theory has proven fruitful to explain differences 
in ethnic prejudice between the higher and lower educated (Coenders & Scheepers, 
2003; Hello et al., 2002; Wagner & Zick, 1995), and between non-religious and religiously 
affiliated individuals (Allport & Ross, 1967; Scheepers & Eisinga, 2015; Scheepers, Gijsberts, 
& Hello, 2002). Competition between in-group members and ethnic out-group members 
over scarce economic or cultural resources poses a real threat to the social position of 
the in-group as a whole, and in particular to those competing more severely with ethnic 
out-groups (Blalock, 1967; Coenders, 2001). This encourages perceptions of interethnic 
threat, which in turn induce ethnic prejudice and exclusionism (Quillian, 1995; Scheepers, 
Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002).
In general, ethnic minorities have more disadvantaged socio-economic positions and less 
education than the average population (Gijsberts, Huijnk, & Dagevos, 2012). Natives with 
lower education are more likely to hold similar economic positions to ethnic minorities than 
higher educated natives. Lower educated natives may therefore have stronger perceptions 
of threat from ethnic minorities over economic resources, such as jobs and social security 
benefits than higher educated individuals, which induces prejudice against ethnic 
minorities (Hello et al., 2002, 2006). Higher educated individuals may perceive less ethnic 
threat because they compete less with ethnic minorities, but also because they may be less 
susceptible to ethnic threat. It is argued that education increases awareness to alternative 
viewpoints and broadens people’s perspectives, including ideas of cultural relativity and 
diversity (Gabennesch, 1972). As a consequence, higher educated individuals will be better 
able to recognise cultural expressions and more willing to accept cultural and ethnic 
differences (Manevska & Achterberg, 2013). Likewise, the educational system is argued to 
transmit democratic norms and values that emphasise individual and cultural freedom, 
and enables pupils to generalise these principles to minority groups (Vogt, 1997). The higher 
people’s educational level, the longer their exposure to this “liberalising” influence of 
education and the less ethnic prejudice they have (Hello et al., 2002).
Competition between Dutch natives and ethnic minorities may also concern cultural 
resources, that is, belief systems and dominant cultural norms and values. Ethnic 
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minorities often belong to non-Christian religions and have different cultural norms and 
values, or are perceived as such by Dutch natives. Consequently, these conflicting values 
may be perceived as a threat to the central values of the in-group (Schneider, 2008; Stephan 
& Stephan, 2000), which could evoke prejudice against any ethnic out-group (Sniderman, 
Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004). Religiously affiliated natives may perceive ethnic minorities’ 
beliefs as a threat to their own religious beliefs and practices, which would induce higher 
levels of prejudice among the religiously affiliated than among non-affiliated people 
(Coenders, 2001; McLaren, 2003).
2.2.2 Changing levels of ethnic prejudice: education
According to ethnic competition theory, actual economic competition increases 
perceptions of ethnic threat, in particular among those who are in similar socio-economic 
positions as most members of ethnic out-groups. During the second half of the 20th 
century, the number of low educated, unskilled migrants has increased in the Netherlands 
and the established minority groups maintained a disadvantaged socio-economic 
position compared to Dutch natives (Gijsberts et al., 2012; Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2014). 
Consequently, ethnic competition may have increased among lower educated individuals 
in particular, inducing higher levels of ethnic prejudice among the lower educated. 
In addition, modernisation has considerably improved educational opportunities for 
children from lower socio-economic backgrounds (Breen & Jonsson, 2005). As a result, 
the group of lowest educated people in Dutch society has become smaller and more 
homogeneous, with fewer cognitive, financial, and social resources (Gesthuizen, De Graaf, 
& Kraaykamp, 2005), and less cultural capital (Manevska & Achterberg, 2013). Following 
the “losers of modernisation” thesis, the lowest educated categories in society lack 
sufficient cultural capital to get ahead in a rapidly changing world and find themselves 
in an increasingly vulnerable and isolated social position (Betz, 1994). As a result, lower 
educated individuals may have become more susceptible to perceptions of ethnic threat, 
inducing higher levels of ethnic prejudice among these individuals. Either perspectives 
predict that the average level of prejudice has risen because the lower educated – who 
already held more ethnic prejudice – have become even more prejudiced than before. We 
hypothesise that particularly lower educated people have become more prejudiced over time, 
which consequently increased the general level of ethnic prejudice in the Netherlands (H1a).
Although the established minority groups in the Netherlands still have a disadvantaged 
socio-economic position compared to the native majority, their educational levels and 
participation in senior or academic level occupations have improved over the past decades 
(Dagevos & Gijsberts, 2010; Gijsberts, 2004). Following ethnic competition theory, 
middle and higher educated natives may therefore have increasingly perceived economic 
threat from ethnic out-groups, inducing higher levels of ethnic prejudice among these 
categories. Lancee and Sarrasin (2015), for example, found that higher educated individuals 
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in Switzerland show more negative attitudes towards immigrants once they enter the 
labour market on which they compete with ethnic minorities.
Moreover, increased educational opportunities due to modernisation have likely resulted 
in a more heterogeneous group of higher educated individuals, with more variation in 
parental background, cognitive abilities, and cultural capital. Although scholars have 
demonstrated the importance of education in reducing people’s ethnic prejudice, others 
also found that part of the educational effect originates from differences in cultural 
capital (Manevska & Achterberg, 2013), or even from factors that influence people’s level 
of ethnic prejudice before they attend secondary education, such as parental background 
(Lancee & Sarrasin, 2015). The heterogenisation of higher education may therefore imply 
that people who are more susceptible to ethnic threat have increasingly attained higher 
educational levels. As a result, higher educated individuals as a group may have become 
more prejudiced over time, thereby reducing the liberalising effect of educational 
expansion. Based on these arguments, we expect that the higher educated have converged 
towards the already prejudiced lower educated over time, which consequently increased the 
general level of ethnic prejudice in the Netherlands (H1b).
2.2.3  Changing levels of ethnic prejudice: church membership and 
attendance
Following ethnic competition theory, strong identification with a religious group, as 
well as the belief that one’s religion is the only true religion, increase (perceptions of) 
competition with out-group members from different religions (Ekici & Yucel, 2014; Glock 
& Stark, 1965; Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Hello, 2002). Due to immigration of in particular 
non-Christian migrants, cultural and religious diversity has increased considerably in 
the Netherlands. The percentage Muslims as part of the Dutch population has risen from 
0.4 percent in 1971 (Statistics Netherlands [CBS], 2004) to 5 percent in 2012 (Maliepaard 
& Gijsberts, 2012). Hence, over time, Christian natives have likely perceived increasing 
threat from ethnic minorities belonging to other religions, especially in a secularising 
country as the Netherlands (Becker & De Hart, 2006; McLaren, 2003). As a consequence, 
people affiliated to Christian churches may have become more inclined to preserve their 
religious identity by stressing the boundaries between the Christian religious in-group 
and other (non-Christian) out-groups, increasing their levels of ethnic prejudice. Based on 
these arguments, church members and regular churchgoers may have become even more 
prejudiced over time. Thus, we expect that particularly church members (H2a) and regular 
churchgoers (H2b) have become more prejudiced over time, which consequently increased the 
general level of ethnic prejudice in the Netherlands.
On the contrary, the increased salience of cultural and religious threat posed by ethnic 
minorities may have also affected the non-affiliated part of the Dutch population. Due 
to modernisation and individualisation, the significance of traditional Christian norms 
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and values has diminished over the past decades (Felling et al., 2000; Inglehart, 1997). At 
the same time, the increasingly secular Dutch population has been confronted with rising 
numbers of ethnic minorities belonging to non-Christian religions (Maliepaard & Gijsberts, 
2012). Hence, the debate on ethnic minorities has become increasingly centred around 
value conflicts. Ethnic minorities have often been framed as undermining liberal and 
democratic “Dutch” values, such as gender equality and tolerance towards homosexuals, 
which are particularly cherished by the secular part of the population (Koopmans, 2015; 
Vasta, 2007). It is argued that secular natives want to defend their liberal values against 
the perceived moral conservatism of ethnic minorities’ religions (Schuh, Burchardt, & 
Wohlrab-Sahr, 2012). This could have induced higher levels of prejudice among the non-
affiliated in particular, thereby reducing the positive effect of secularisation. We therefore 
hypothesise that non-church members (H2c) and non-churchgoers (H2d) have converged 
towards the already prejudiced religiously affiliated over time, which consequently increased 
the general level of ethnic prejudice in the Netherlands. 
2.3 Data and measurements
To test our hypotheses, we used data from the Socio-Cultural Developments in the 
Netherlands (SOCON) surveys. Between 1979 and 2011, seven cross-sectional waves 
were conducted, with each successive wave being a replication and extension of the 
previous waves (Eisinga et al., 2012). The methodological design of the repeated cross-
sections has remained largely similar and comparable over time. Each survey consists of 
a representative sample of the Dutch population between 18 and 70 years, and contains 
questions on a wide variety of social issues derived from previously tested, valid, and 
reliable measurements. We used the surveys of 1985, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2011, which were 
combined into one pooled data set. The surveys of 1979 and 1990 were excluded because 
comparable measures on ethnic prejudice were missing. Questions measuring ethnic 
prejudice were administered solely to respondents whose nationality and that of their 
parents and grandparents. Therefore, our study only includes native Dutch individuals.
2.3.1 Dependent variable
To measure ethnic prejudice, respondents were presented five statements indicating 
prejudice against ethnic out-groups: “With Moroccans you never know for certain whether 
they are going to be aggressive or not”, “Most people from Surinam work quite slowly”, 
“Gypsies are never to be trusted”, “Turks are backward” and “When you do business with 
Jews, you have to be extra careful” (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.77, see Table A2.1, Appendix 
Chapter 2). These statements are based on common stereotypes about Moroccans, Turks, 
and Surinamese, which are members of the three largest out-groups in the Netherlands, 
and gypsies and Jews, which had often been the object of prejudice and derogation in the 
past (Hagendoorn & Janssen, 1983). The items are a selection of a wider range of similar 
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items which were previously tested and often used to measure prejudice against ethnic 
minorities (Scheepers et al., 1990). Response categories on each statement ranged from (1) 
agree entirely to (5) do not agree at all, constituting a five-point Likert-scale. The response 
category never thought about was excluded from analysis. 
In 1985 and 1995, the five questions on ethnic prejudice were filled out by a random 
subsample of the total sample in these waves, resulting in a total sample size of 5,530 
respondents. To further limit the loss of cases on the dependent variable due to missing 
answers (1,256 respondents), we conducted multiple imputation of missing values in SPSS 
for respondents with a valid answer on at least three of the five items. Respondents with 
missing answers on more than two of the five items were excluded from the analyses. Five 
sets of imputed values were independently drawn, which were combined into one pooled 
set on which the analyses were performed. After imputation, 5,229 respondents with a 
valid answer were left.
Factor analysis of the five items indicated that the items refer to one single underlying 
dimension.1 Separate factor analyses per wave showed acceptable factor loadings and 
communalities, which were comparable across the surveys (see Table A2.1, Appendix 
Chapter 2). Factor scores were computed, representing the weighted linear combination 
of the five items.2 We subtracted the minimum value from the factor scores to have the 
dependent variable starting at zero. A higher score on the scale indicates more ethnic 
prejudice.
2.3.2 Independent variables
Educational attainment was measured as the respondent’s highest education completed 
after elementary school. Response categories were recoded into seven categories ranging 
from primary education to master’s or equivalent level and higher. Responses on the other 
category were treated as missing values (0.2 percent) and excluded from analysis. Between 
1985 and 2011, the relative share of lower educated individuals decreased significantly 
from 14.3 to 2.8 percent for people with only primary education, while the relative share 
of highly educated individuals increased significantly from 3.5 to 11.4 percent for people 
holding a master’s degree or equivalent (see Figure A2.1, Appendix Chapter 2).
To measure religious affiliation, we used both church membership and church attendance. 
Respondents were first asked whether they considered themselves a member of a (Christian) 
church or religious community (yes/no). Next, respondents who answered yes were asked 
which church or religious community they considered themselves a member of. We 
1   Factor analyses performed before and after imputation yielded similar results.
2    Factor scores take account of the factor structure of the data and different weights are applied to items 
according to the factor loadings. The mean values on the ethnic prejudice scale calculated with factor 
scores were highly comparable to the mean values on a scale based on Likert scores.
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combined these questions into one variable indicating church membership and reduced 
the response categories to Catholic, Protestant, other Christian, non-Christian, and non-
member. We excluded individuals belonging to other Christian and non-Christian religions 
because of their marginal numbers in the sample (less than five percent), and because 
secularisation has mainly taken place within the Catholic and Protestant churches in the 
Netherlands (Becker & De Hart, 2006). Church attendance was measured by a question on 
the frequency at which one attends services of a church or religious community: about 
once a week, about once a month, once or twice a year or hardly ever/never. Respondents 
who had no valid answer on the variable for church attendance (0.2 percent) were excluded 
from analysis. Between 1985 and 2011, the relative share of people considering themselves 
non-religious increased significantly from 47.3 to 68.3 percent (see Figure A2.2, Appendix 
Chapter 2). The percentage hardly ever or never attending services of a church or religious 
community increased significantly from 43.1 percent in 1985 to 58.3 percent in 2011 (see 
Figure A2.3, Appendix Chapter 2).
2.3.3 Control variables
Birth cohort, sex, socio-economic position, degree of urbanisation, and province were 
included as control variables in the analyses, as these characteristics are shown to be related 
to the dependent variable (Coenders & Scheepers, 1998), and could possibly confound the 
relation of education, church membership, and church attendance with prejudice.3 Birth 
cohort was derived from the respondent’s birth year. A linearity test indicated that we could 
include birth cohort linearly in the analyses without significant loss of explanatory power. 
Sex was measured as male (0) or female (1). To obtain one measure for socio-economic 
position, the EGP classification of social class (Erikson, Goldthorpe, & Portocarero, 1983) 
and main activity of the respondent were combined. Degree of urbanisation was based on 
a measure of address density per square kilometre provided by Statistics Netherlands (Den 
Dulk, Van de Stadt, & Vliegen, 1992), divided in five categories.4 Province was measured 
as which of the twelve Dutch provinces the respondent was living in at the time of the 
interview. To control for possible non-linear relations between the dependent variable 
and the independent variables, dummy variables were created for each category of our 
individual and control characteristics except for birth cohort. 
Missing values on the independent and control variables were deleted listwise, resulting 
in a sample size of 4,780 respondents in our analyses. See Table 2.1 for descriptive statistics 
of all variables in the analysis. 
3    We controlled for the province respondents live in, because levels of prejudice differ considerably across 
the twelve Dutch provinces..
4    In the survey of 1985 a different categorisation was used which was not comparable with the address 
density measure of the other waves. Therefore, we classified the municipalities of the 1985 survey 
according to their score on degree of urbanisation in 1995. These data are retrieved from Statistics 
Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands, 1995).
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Table 2.1 | Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables
Min Max Mean SD
Ethnic prejudice 0.00 4.52 1.74 0.88
Educational attainment
 Primary 0 1 0.09
 Primary vocational 0 1 0.17
 Lower secondary 0 1 0.14
 Secondary vocational 0 1 0.23
 Upper secondary 0 1 0.12
 Bachelor’s or equivalent 0 1 0.19
 Master’s or equivalent 0 1 0.08
Church membership
 Catholic 0 1 0.24
 Protestant 0 1 0.18
 Non-member 0 1 0.59
Church attendance
 Yes, about once a week 0 1 0.14
 Yes, about once a month 0 1 0.09
 Yes, once or twice a year 0 1 0.26
 No, hardly ever/never 0 1 0.52
Cohort 1915 1993 1954.04 15.68
Sex (women) 0 1 0.51
Socio-economic position
 Professional 0 1 0.26
 Other white collar 0 1 0.18
 Self-employed 0 1 0.04
 Skilled manual 0 1 0.06
 Unskilled manual 0 1 0.10
 Unemployed 0 1 0.06
 Retired 0 1 0.09
 Housekeeping 0 1 0.15
 Education 0 1 0.05
 Other 0 1 0.03
Degree of urbanisation
 Very strong urbanisation 0 1 0.18
 Strong urbanisation 0 1 0.23
 Moderate urbanisation 0 1 0.20
 Little urbanisation 0 1 0.20
 No urbanisation 0 1 0.19
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Table 2.1 Continued
Min Max Mean SD
Province
 Groningen 0 1 0.03
 Friesland 0 1 0.05
 Drenthe 0 1 0.04
 Overijssel 0 1 0.07
 Gelderland 0 1 0.13
 Utrecht 0 1 0.07
 Noord-Holland 0 1 0.14
 Zuid-Holland 0 1 0.21
 Zeeland 0 1 0.04
 Noord-Brabant 0 1 0.13
 Limburg 0 1 0.09
Source: SOCON 1985-2011; N = 4,780.
2.4 Methods
To investigate whether and how prejudice has changed over time within the different 
categories of educational attainment, church membership, and church attendance, 
we used multivariate OLS regression models. To account for non-linear changes, we 
performed these analyses for each survey year separately. Next, we calculated mean levels 
of prejudice for each category of educational attainment, church membership, and church 
attendance, while controlling for all relevant variables. Secondly, we examined the relative 
contribution of these changes to the observed trend in prejudice in a counterfactual 
simulation analysis (Te Grotenhuis et al., 2004). We simulated the trend in prejudice as if the 
differential changes in prejudice within each category of education, church membership, 
and attendance had not taken place since 1985. We chose 1985 as a reference point, because 
educational expansion and secularisation were on their lowest in the period under study. 
We used the predicted levels of prejudice in 1985 within all categories of education, church 
membership, and church attendance as found in the multivariate regression models to 
estimate a new (simulated) mean level of prejudice in each subsequent survey year, while 
taking into account the rising shares of higher educated and non-religious individuals. 
The differences between the observed and the simulated trends in prejudice show to what 
extent the observed trend is due to differential changes in prejudice within categories of 
education, church membership, and church attendance between 1985 and 2011. See the 
Appendix of Chapter 1 for an explanation of this counterfactual simulation method using a 
straightforward bivariate example for two survey years.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 General and differential trends in prejudice
Figure 2.1 shows the general trend in ethnic prejudice over time. We observe a significant 
increase in prejudice against ethnic minorities (Moroccans, Turks, Surinamese, gypsies, 
and Jews) from 1.59 in 1985 to 1.89 in 2011 (on the scale ranging between 0 and 4.52).5 
Between 1995 and 2000, and between 2005 and 2011 the change in ethnic prejudice was 
not significant.6
 
Figure 2.1 | The trend in ethnic prejudice in the Netherlands, 1985-2011 
Source: SOCON 1985-2011; N = 4,780.
Note: filled markers indicate a significant mean difference compared to the previous survey year. The grey 
area shows the 95% confidence interval.
5    Separate investigations of the five items revealed that three items showed a similar pattern, i.e., 
prejudice against Moroccans, Surinamese and gypsies has increased over the years, whereas two items 
deviated slightly from this pattern. To test for robustness of the findings, the multivariate regression 
model was tested on a scale based on these three items. The results did not deviate notably from the 
model including all five minority groups. As an additional robustness test, we estimated a model 
without Jews and Gypsies. The results are virtually similar to the model with all five minority groups 
included. We also estimated the model for Turks and Moroccans only, as it is argued that prejudice 
against Muslims in particular might have increased. Again, there are no substantial differences 
between this model and a model including all five minority groups.
6    The overall increase in prejudice is significant (F = 23.11, p < .001). A post hoc Bonferroni test revealed  
that the change in the mean between 1995 and 2000 and between 2005 and 2011 was not significant at 
p < .05 (two-tailed).
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Table 2.2 shows the associations of education, church membership, and church 
attendance with ethnic prejudice per survey year, based on multivariate OLS regression 
analyses. For ease of interpretation, we transformed the regression coefficients in such 
way that the intercept represents the weighted (sample) mean level of prejudice in each 
year, while the dummy variable coefficients reflect the deviance from this overall sample 
mean (Sweeney & Ulveling, 1972; Te Grotenhuis et al., 2016). In line with previous research, 
Table 2.2 shows a positive relationship of educational attainment with prejudice. In each 
survey year, lower educated individuals held significantly more prejudice than average, 
while the higher educated (upper secondary education or higher) held significantly less 
prejudice than average. In 1985, for example, the mean level of prejudice among people 
with primary education lies 0.38 points above the average of 1.59. People with master’s or 
equivalent level show a prejudice level that lies 0.60 points below the average of 1.59. The 
standardised coefficient (beta) shows a considerable impact of education, which seems 
to have slightly decreased over time. The influence of church membership and church 
attendance on prejudice was very small, as indicated by the low standardised coefficients. 
Only in 2011 the categories of church membership added significantly to the model, as 
indicated by a significant beta-coefficient of 0.13, because Catholics were significantly 
more prejudiced than average, i.e., 0.23 points above the average of 1.89.7 Together, the 
characteristics in the model explained 24 percent of the individual variation in prejudice in 
1985, which dropped to 12 percent in 2011. 
To analyse whether and how ethnic prejudice has changed over time within categories 
of education, church membership, and church attendance, we calculated the controlled 
predicted mean levels of prejudice for each category (i.e., by adding the intercept to the 
coefficients from Table 2.2), which are presented in Table 2.3. To test whether the mean level 
of prejudice in each category has changed significantly between two subsequent survey 
years, we used a statistical test for the difference between two regression coefficients 
across independent samples as suggested by Paternoster and colleagues (1998).
Table 2.3 shows that the trend in ethnic prejudice developed differently within each 
category of educational attainment. Between 1985 and 1995, particularly higher educated 
people became more prejudiced, as their mean level of prejudice rose significantly from 
0.99 (1.59-0.60) to 1.44 (1.72-0.28). Consequently, higher educated individuals converged 
towards the lower and middle educated. The last column of Table 2.3 shows the increase 
in prejudice between 1985 and 2011, which was stronger among the higher educational 
levels and weaker among people with vocational training. The strongest increase is found 
among people with a master’s degree or equivalent level (+0.59, significant). This can also 
be seen in Figure 2.2, in which we visualised the changes in ethnic prejudice among the 
lowest, middle and highest educated individuals.
 7    Additional regression analyses indicated that the non-significant difference in prejudice between the 
categories of church attendance is partly due to the inclusion of church membership in the model.
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Table 2.2 |  Unstandardised and standardised regression coefficients of educational 
attainment, church membership, and church attendance on ethnic prejudice, 
expressed as the deviance from the sample mean in each survey year
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Table 2.3 also shows significant increases in prejudice among Protestants, non-members 
and monthly churchgoers between 1985 and 1995, and among non-members and weekly 
churchgoers between 2000 and 2005. Yet, the last column of Table 2.3 shows that the 
overall increase in prejudice between 1985 and 2011 was strongest among Catholics (+0.43, 
significant) and weekly churchgoers (+0.48, significant), by which they diverged from 
the average prejudice level. Notwithstanding, the differences in prejudice levels between 
these groups remain very small.
Table 2.3 |  Predicted mean levels of ethnic prejudice in each survey year per category of 
educational attainment, church membership, and church attendance  
(intercept + coefficient) 
Source: SOCON 1985-2011; N = 4,780.
Note. Controlled for cohort, socio-economic position, sex, degree of urbanisation, and province.
*   significant mean difference (p < .05, two-tailed) as compared to the previous survey year, tested with a 
Paternoster test (Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, & Piquero, 1998).
1985
(N = 1,491)
1995
(N = 743)
2000
(N = 772)
2005
(N = 1,029)
2011
(N = 745)
Change 
1985-2011
Intercept  1.59 1.72* 1.71 1.88* 1.89 +0.30*
Educational attainment
   Primary 1.97 2.03 2.03 2.31 2.40 +0.43*
   Lower vocational 1.80 2.01* 2.04 2.13 2.13 +0.33*
   Lower secondary 1.56 1.75 1.91 2.04 1.98 +0.42*
   Secondary vocational 1.60 1.78* 1.78 1.86 1.90 +0.30*
   Upper secondary 1.40 1.56 1.53 1.88 1.84 +0.44*
   Bachelor’s or equivalent 1.25 1.48* 1.43 1.66* 1.76 +0.51*
   Master’s or equivalent 0.99 1.44* 1.45 1.49 1.58 +0.59*
Church membership 
   Non-member 1.52 1.66* 1.66 1.86* 1.85 +0.33*
   Catholic 1.68 1.82 1.84 1.96 2.12 +0.43*
   Protestant 1.60 1.80* 1.76 1.85 1.77 +0.17
Church attendance
   No, hardly ever/never 1.59 1.68 1.71 1.86* 1.84 +0.26*
   Yes, once or twice a year 1.59 1.72 1.76 1.88 1.94 +0.36*
   Yes, about once a month 1.63 1.89* 1.65 1.91 1.79 +0.16
   Yes, about once a week 1.57 1.77 1.65 1.96* 2.05 +0.48*
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Figure 2.2 |  Predicted mean levels of ethnic prejudice and 95% confidence intervals for 
people with the lowest, middle and highest level of education, 1985-2011
Source: SOCON 1985-2011; N = 4,780.
Note. Estimates are controlled for cohort, socio-economic position, sex, degree of urbanisation, and 
province. Filled markers indicate a significant mean difference (p < .05, two-tailed) compared to the 
previous survey year. The grey area shows the 95% confidence interval.
2.5.2 Counterfactual analyses
To this point we have found considerable changes in levels of prejudice among the 
categories of educational attainment, while the changes within the categories of church 
membership and church attendance were limited (see Table 2.3 and Figure 2.2). Although 
prejudice on average rose significantly across all of these groups in society between 1985 
and 2011, we found stronger increases among higher educated individuals, Catholics 
and weekly churchgoers. To test whether these differential changes have contributed 
significantly to the observed overall increase in prejudice, we used the outcomes of the 
multivariate regression analyses from Table 2.3 in a series of counterfactual simulations. 
Figure 2.3 graphically presents the observed trend in prejudice and the simulated trends 
resulting from simulations for which we held the levels of prejudice within each category 
of educational attainment, church membership and church attendance constant on the 
1985 level, while taking into account the shifts in the distribution of these categories 
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within the sample. The exact differences between the observed and simulated means and 
the corresponding bootstrapped confidence intervals are shown in Table 2.4.8
In Figure 2.3, the horizontal baseline (a) represents a simulated null-model with no change 
in the levels of prejudice within categories of education, church membership, and church 
attendance, and no shift in the distribution of these characteristics since 1985. The exact 
differences between the flat baseline (no trend) and the actual observed trend are shown 
in Table 2.4, row (a). The corresponding confidence intervals all indicate that the observed 
means differ significantly from the baseline mean in each survey year. To illustrate, the 
difference between the 1985 baseline mean and the observed mean in 2011 is 0.30 (that 
is the difference between the intercepts 1.59 and 1.89 from Table 2.2). The corresponding 
bootstrapped 95% confidence interval for this difference indicates that the true difference 
in the population is to be found between 0.26 and 0.33.
 
Figure 2.3 |  Observed and simulated trends in ethnic prejudice with differences between 
social categories on the 1985 level
Source: SOCON 1985-2011; N = 4,780.
8    The sampling distribution of the differences between the observed and the simulated means is 
unknown and depends on the estimated and simulated effects, on the observed distributions, and 
the co-variances between all variables. Therefore, we used a bootstrapping procedure to empirically 
determine the shape of the sample distribution for each estimated difference in Table 2.4. For each 
survey year, we drew 25,000 bootstrap samples (5,000 for each of the 5 imputation data sets) with 
replacement from the original sample. Based on these samples we could determine the lower and 
upper boundaries of the 95% confidence interval to test the significance of the difference between the 
observed means and our simulated means. For instance, the difference between the total simulated 
mean in 2011 and the baseline mean (the observed mean in 1985), which amounts to -0.15, will most 
likely lie somewhere between -0.16 and -0.13 in the target population (see Table 2.4, row (e)).
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Next, we simulated a new mean level of prejudice in each survey year for which only the 
levels of prejudice within each category of educational attainment were held constant on 
the 1985 level, whereas all other levels as well as the sample distributions of all variables 
were allowed to vary across subsequent years. 
Line (b) in Figure 2.3 shows the resulting simulated trend. As previously demonstrated, 
the three highest educational levels showed a stronger increase in their mean levels of 
prejudice between 1985 and 1995 than the other educational categories (see Table 2.3 
and Figure 2.2). Consequently, these categories converged towards the average level of 
prejudice (see Table 2.2). In Table 2.4, row (b) shows that if levels of prejudice within these 
educational categories had not changed since 1985, the overall level of prejudice would 
have significantly decreased with 0.07 points compared to the baseline, which reflects 
the counterfactual situation in which everyone would have had the overall 1985 level of 
prejudice. Any difference between this baseline and line (b) reflects differential changes in 
levels of prejudice within the categories of education.
In addition, prejudice rose strongly among lower educated individuals between 2000 
and 2011 (see Table 2.3 and Figure 2.2), who consequently moved further away from the 
average level of prejudice (see Table 2.2). Row (b) of Table 2.4 shows that the simulated 
trend continues to decline if these changes had not taken place and that this decline is 
significant in each survey year. To illustrate, the simulated mean prejudice level in 2011 
would lie 0.12 points below the baseline. The corresponding confidence interval indicates 
that the true decline in the mean level of prejudice in the population probably lies 
somewhere between 0.10 and 0.13. Thus, the stronger rises among higher educated and 
lower educated people have either contributed to the observed trend in ethnic prejudice 
in the Netherlands, over and above the general rise in the average prejudice level. If these 
changes within the educational groups had not taken place, the rising proportion of 
higher educated people in the Netherlands would have resulted in a longitudinal decline 
in the mean level of prejudice in society. This supports hypothesis 1a (for the period 1985-
1995) and hypothesis 1b (for the period 2000-2011).
Line (c) in Figure 2.3 shows the simulated trend for a situation in which only the levels of 
prejudice within categories of church membership with prejudice were held constant on 
the 1985 level, whereas all other levels as well as all distributions could vary across the 
survey years. Because we found little influence of church membership on ethnic prejudice 
(see Table 2.2), line (c) shows a minimal decline in the mean level of prejudice between 1985 
and 2011. In row (c) of Table 2.4, for example, the simulated mean in 2011 would have been 
0.03 points lower than the baseline. The corresponding confidence interval indicates that 
the true decline in the mean level of prejudice in the population probably lies somewhere 
between 0.02 and 0.04. Row (c) of Table 2.4 also shows that the differences between the 
baseline and the simulated means with constant levels for church membership in each 
survey year are significant, albeit very small. Thus, the rise in ethnic prejudice between 
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1985 and 2011 among Catholic church members (from 1.68 to 2.12, see Table 2.3), and to a 
lesser extent among non-members (from 1.52 to 1.85, Table 2.3) has contributed for a very 
small part to the observed trend, supporting both hypothesis 2a and 2c.
Line (d) in Figure 2.3 demonstrates the simulated trend in prejudice for which we held 
only the prejudice levels within categories of church attendance constant on the 1985 
level. In the previous section, we found little influence of church attendance on ethnic 
prejudice (see Table 2.2). As a consequence, the simulated trend (d), for which the rising 
shares of non-churchgoers are taken into account, hardly deviates from the baseline. This 
is confirmed by row (d) of Table 2.4, which shows no significant differences between the 
baseline means and the simulated means with constant levels for church attendance. 
Therefore, we found no support for hypothesis 2b and hypothesis 2d.
The separate contributions of differential changes in levels of ethnic prejudice within 
the various categories of educational attainment (b), church membership (c), and church 
attendance (d) add up to the total simulated trend (e) in Figure 2.3. If each of these levels 
had remained constant since 1985, the average level of prejudice would have declined 
between 1985 and 2011. Table 2.4, row (e) shows that this decline amounts to 0.15 points 
below the baseline by 2011, and probably lies between 0.13 and 0.16 in the population. The 
confidence intervals in row (e) of Table 2.4 indicate that the difference between the total 
simulated means and the baseline is significant in each survey year. 
Table 2.4 |  Estimated differences between observed, baseline, and simulated mean levels 
of ethnic prejudice [with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals]
Year 1985 1995 2000 2005 2011
Baseline – observed (a) 0
-.13*
[-.17, -.10]
-.13*
[-.16,-.09]
-.29*
[-.32,-.26]
-.30*
[-.33,-.26]
Educational attainment – baseline (b) 0
-.07*
[-.08, -.06]
-.10*
[-.12, -.09]
-.09*
[-.10, -.08]
-.12*
[-.13, -.10]
Church membership – baseline (c) 0
-.02*
[-.02, -.01]
-.02*
[-.03, -.01]
.-.02*
[-.03, -.01]
-.03*
[-.04, -.02]
Church attendance – baseline (d) 0
.00
[-.01, .01]
.00
[-.01, .01]
.00
[-.01, .01]
.00
[-.01, .01]
Total – baseline (e)a 0
-.09*
[-.10, -.07]
-.12*
[-.13, -.10]
-.11*
[-.13, -.10]
-.15*
[-.16, -.13]
 Source: SOCON 1985-2011; N = 4,780.
a row e is sum of ∆ educational attainment (b) + ∆ church membership (c) + ∆ church attendance (d).
* significant with α = .05 (two-tailed).
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2.6 Conclusion and discussion
This study was aimed at providing insights into the paradox of increasing shares of 
highly educated and non-religious individuals in Dutch society – categories which 
generally hold less prejudice – on the one hand, and yet, on the other hand, a longitudinal 
rise in ethnic prejudice in the Netherlands. Based on ethnic competition theory we 
formulated hypotheses on differential changes in prejudice within specific educational 
and religiously (non-)affiliated groups in Dutch society that could explain the observed 
rise in ethnic prejudice despite educational expansion and secularisation. We added to 
previous research by testing the unique contribution of these differential changes to the 
observed trend in ethnic prejudice, while controlling for shifts in the distribution of these 
characteristics. For this purpose, we used five nationally representative cross-sectional 
surveys collected between 1985 and 2011 in counterfactual analyses.
In line with prior studies, we found that lower educated people held significantly more, 
and higher educated people significantly less prejudice than average. While the average 
level of prejudice rose significantly between 1985 and 2011 across all educational categories 
in society, the increase was stronger among the higher educated, who thus converged 
towards the average level of prejudice, particularly between 1985 and 1995. This stronger 
increase in ethnic prejudice among higher educated individuals in particular could partially 
explain why an overall rise in ethnic prejudice is observed despite educational expansion. 
We further found a weak and largely non-significant influence of church membership 
and church attendance on prejudice. Although Catholics and weekly churchgoers 
showed a stronger increase in ethnic prejudice than Protestants, non-church members, 
and people less frequently or never attending church, differences in prejudice between 
these groups remained small. We showed that, as a consequence, rising shares of non-
members and non-churchgoers have hardly resulted in a decline of prejudice. Additionally, 
all Dutch individuals have become more prejudiced between 1985 and 2011, irrespective 
of their educational level and religious affiliation, which has partly offset the supposed 
liberalising influence of educational expansion and secularisation. This development is 
not limited to the Netherlands. Research has shown similar increases in negative attitudes 
towards minorities, immigrants, and immigration in other European countries over the 
past decades (see Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010).
This study has several implications for research on the relationship of education and 
religious affiliation with ethnic prejudice. Our results suggest that the liberalising 
influence of education on ethnic prejudice as suggested by several researchers (Vogt, 1997; 
Weil, 1985) has decreased. Hence, the idea that liberal attitudes automatically diffuse from 
higher educated individuals to lower educated, in part through the educational system 
(Weil, 1985), has contemporarily become open to doubt. Higher educated individuals do not 
seem immune to (perceptions of) ethnic threat, either due to increasing shares of ethnic 
minorities obtaining higher levels of education, due to increasing salience of cultural and 
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religious differences, or due to a heterogenisation of higher education, which may have 
changed the composition of the group higher educated individuals. Alternatively, some 
researchers have argued that higher educated are less prejudiced because they are more 
skilled at suppressing prejudiced responses in survey research and more sophisticated in 
defending their group ideology (Jackman, 1978; Jackman & Muha, 1984). Although this 
approach is sometimes contested, it provides an alternative explanation for our findings, 
namely that a taboo to express prejudice against ethnic minorities among higher 
educated individuals has been slowly disappearing. However, it is beyond the scope of our 
contribution to test the mechanisms behind the differential changes in ethnic prejudice 
among the educational categories. Therefore, we propose this as a direction for future 
research.
Moreover, we found the relationship of church membership and attendance with ethnic 
prejudice to be largely absent. This suggests that the generally accepted idea that religious 
affiliation strongly influences people’s level of ethnic prejudice may need refinement. 
This was also proposed by other researchers. For example, Hall et al. (2010) found that 
the positive relationship between extrinsic religiosity and racism declined over time in 
the United States. It seems that modernisation has indeed eliminated the importance of 
religion (Norris & Inglehart, 2011), although there might be a small group of religiously 
affiliated whose identity has become increasingly threatened in the secular Dutch society.
Finally, we showed that even substantial shifts in the relative shares of highly educated 
and secular individuals have had little impact on the general level of ethnic prejudice over 
time, because the differences in prejudice between higher and lower educated individuals 
declined and the differences between the religiously affiliated and non-affiliated were 
small to begin with. 
Overall, these findings are perfectly in line with individualisation theory (e.g., Beck & 
Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Felling et al., 2000), which proposes that people’s attitudes have 
become less and less determined by individual backgrounds and social institutions, such 
as their educational level and religious affiliation. Therefore, it is exactly this process of 
individualisation that provides an answer to the paradox: as the importance of educational 
attainment and religious non-affiliation as barriers to ethnic prejudice has diminished, 
educational expansion and secularisation have not resulted in the expected decrease in 
prejudice in the Netherlands over time.
Several limitations of this study should be acknowledged. Since data containing 
comparable measures of prejudice over such extended time periods are scarce, we 
could not determine whether the upward trend in prejudice is a recent or contemporary 
phenomenon, or had already started before 1985. In addition, educational expansion 
and secularisation took off in the 1950s. Therefore, these processes may have actually 
reduced prejudice in the period before our data were collected. Likewise, we were not able 
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to include more recent developments in ethnic prejudice. Although studies have shown 
slight decreases in negative public opinions towards the presence of ethnic minorities, 
immigration, and ethnic diversity in the Netherlands (Hjerm & Bohman, 2014; Meuleman 
et al., 2009; Van Setten et al., 2017), future research should indicate whether that also 
holds for ethnic prejudice. Moreover, we possibly underestimated the trend towards more 
prejudice because we were not able to examine prejudice against other ethnic minorities 
than the five groups in this research. Recently, the numbers of Eastern European and 
Muslim migrants have increased substantially in the Netherlands, which may have 
evoked stronger prejudice against these groups than against the five established minority 
groups included in the SOCON surveys. For example, Strabac and Listhaug (2008) found 
prejudice against Muslims in Europe to be more widespread than prejudice against other 
immigrants. In the Netherlands, a considerable share of recently migrated Poles and 
Bulgarians in the Netherlands reported perceptions of frequent discrimination of their 
own ethnic group and these perceptions have recently intensified (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 
2015; McGinnity & Gijsberts, 2017).
Lastly, the question remains why ethnic prejudice has increased in the Netherlands 
“across-the-board”. Along with differential changes within particular social categories, it 
seems that all social categories have become somewhat more prejudiced over time, though 
some at a stronger pace than others. Certain societal circumstances could have affected 
all Dutch individuals similarly, further increasing the general level of ethnic prejudice. This 
supposition leads us to speculate on which societal circumstances may have reinforced the 
general level of prejudice. The persistent inflow of both economic and political migrants 
along with fluctuating numbers of refugees have repeatedly incited societal debates on 
the influx and presence of ethnic minorities. This might have increased perceptions of 
threat among all individuals in society. Moreover, from the 1980s onwards, several liberal 
Dutch politicians and opinion leaders (Bolkestein, Scheffer, Fortuyn, and more recently 
Wilders) have openly voiced concerns about immigration and poor integration of ethnic 
minorities. Ethnic minorities are increasingly framed as undermining the liberal Dutch 
values, which may have gradually legitimised the expression of prejudice against ethnic 
minorities in society, justified by an appeal to “free” speech. Ironically then, the liberal 
values which have long been the basis of tolerance towards minorities have over time 
become a source of free expressions of prejudice and exclusion. Unfortunately, we could 
not analyse which societal changes have contributed to the upward trend in prejudice 
due to the confounding of age, period and cohort explanations. Further research should 
address this question. 
To summarise, a longitudinal increase in ethnic prejudice has taken place in the 
Netherlands despite educational expansion and secularisation, which was the puzzling 
paradox we tried to solve. The answer is twofold. Firstly, the liberalising influences of 
educational expansion and secularisation have diminished over time: higher educated 
Dutch people have converged towards the secondary and lower educated Dutch, whereas 
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the differences between the religiously affiliated and secular Dutch were largely absent 
from the beginning. Secondly, these processes seem to have set all Dutch individuals 
“free” to become more prejudiced over time. Because immigration of ethnic minorities 
into the Netherlands as well as to other European countries is not likely to cease, these 
findings suggest that the trend towards more ethnic prejudice will likely continue, which 
may further heighten interethnic tensions in society.
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3.1 Introduction
Many countries have witnessed over time increases in support for gender egalitarianism 
during the past decades (e.g., Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Lee, 
Alwin, & Tufiş, 2007). As men and women differ in their support for gender egalitarianism 
(Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Ciabattari, 2001; Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Mason & Lu, 
1988), these trends may have developed differently for men and women. Some studies 
reported that the rise in support for gender egalitarianism has been similar among men 
and women (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Neve, 1995), others found stronger rates of change 
among women than among men over time (Brewster & Padavic, 2000; Lee et al., 2007) 
and across cohorts (Brewster & Padavic, 2000; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Pampel, 2011; 
Shorrocks, 2016). Moreover, even a reversal of the gender gap regarding support for gender 
egalitarianism was found (Jennings, 2006).
Previously proposed explanations for the general trend towards more gender 
egalitarianism relate to the different historical and contemporary circumstances in which 
people are socialised and live, i.e., cohort and period effects (Brewster & Padavic, 2000; 
Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Mannheim, 1952). Other researchers stress the 
importance of shifts in the social, cultural and economic structure of the population, such 
as educational expansion, secularisation, and the feminisation of the labour force (Brooks 
& Bolzendahl, 2004; Cotter et al., 2011; Mason et al., 1976; Pampel, 2011).
Because men and women benefit differently from supporting gender egalitarianism 
(Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Ciabattari, 2001), the liberalising processes of educational 
expansion, secularisation and labour force participation, together with cohort 
replacement, may affect the trend among men less as compared to women. So far, 
however, there remains a lacuna in our knowledge regarding how strong these processes 
are related to the trend in support for gender egalitarianism among men and women. 
Previous studies speculated about the influence of important societal changes in the 
social, cultural, demographic and economic structure of a population, but the actual 
contribution of these changes to the trend was neither tested nor quantified. Studies on 
the effects of cohort and period have difficulties disentangling cohort, period and age 
effects due to methodological problems (Mason et al., 1973). Moreover, the conclusions 
drawn in these studies rely on models in which only the effect sizes of certain individual 
characteristics were estimated, but the actual strength of societal processes related to 
such characteristics originates from the interplay between effect sizes and rates of change. 
As a consequence, the contribution of societal processes like cohort replacement may 
have been over- or underestimated, if tested at all. 
In this study, we aim to shed light on the extent to which the processes of cohort 
replacement, educational expansion, secularisation, and labour force participation have 
affected the trend in support for gender egalitarianism among men and women. We 
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analyse to what extent cohort, education, church attendance, and labour participation are 
related to support for gender egalitarianism and whether the estimated effect sizes differ 
for men and women. We advance upon previous research by taking into account both 
the effect sizes of the individual characteristics, and – importantly – their distributional 
shifts in the structure of the population as observed in our samples. For this purpose, 
we employ a counterfactual simulation analysis (Te Grotenhuis et al., 2004), allowing to 
examine to what extent the observed trend is still present if the aforementioned shifts in 
distributions would not have taken place, given the estimated effect sizes. By analysing 
the combination of effect sizes of individual characteristics and the sizes of shifts in the 
distribution of these characteristics, we are, to our knowledge, the first to quantify the 
actual contribution of societal changes in the social, cultural, demographic and economic 
structure of a population to the trend in support for gender egalitarianism.
We investigate trends in support for gender egalitarianism for men and women in 
the Netherlands between 1979 and 2012. We focus on one specific aspect of gender 
egalitarianism related to the private dimension (Wilcox & Jelen, 1991), i.e., whether a 
woman is more suited to raise little children than a man. This measure is an important 
indicator of support for gender egalitarianism because it captures a notion of gendered 
separate spheres rooted in a distinct male and female “nature” that goes beyond the mere 
division of roles (Davis & Greenstein, 2009), which may have substantial consequences for 
gender equality (Charles, 2011; England, 2010). As such, low levels of support for this item 
may imply persistent gender inequality in societies with relatively widespread norms of 
gender egalitarianism, such as the Netherlands.
The Netherlands provides an interesting case to study the liberalising influence of societal 
processes to the trend in gender egalitarianism, because the average educational level of 
the Dutch population has increased substantially since the 1950s (Bar Haim & Shavit, 2013; 
Tolsma & Wolbers, 2014), while church attendance has dropped considerably (De Graaf 
& Te Grotenhuis, 2008). Moreover, increasing numbers of Dutch women have entered 
the labour force over the last decades (OECD, 2016b; Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 2002). As 
similar social, cultural, economic, and demographic changes have occurred in many other 
western countries, the results may be generalisable to and tested in other regions in which 
comparable increases in support for gender egalitarianism have been observed. In sum, 
the following research questions are addressed: How has support for gender egalitarianism 
developed among men and women in the Netherlands between 1979 and 2012? And to what 
extent are these trends due to important societal changes in the Dutch population, i.e., a) 
cohort replacement, b) educational expansion, c) secularisation, and d) rising labour force 
participation?
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3.2 Theory and hypotheses
3.2.1 Demographic change: cohort replacement
According to theories of social change, demographic shifts are a driving force behind 
changes in public opinions in society (Firebaugh, 1992; Ryder, 1965). The composition of 
the population partly changes due to the gradual replacement of older cohorts by younger 
cohorts. Each birth cohort consists of individuals with similar formative experiences, 
socialised in specific historical and cultural circumstances which, according to Mannheim 
(1952) and Inglehart (1997), crystallise into normative orientations and values that are 
largely stable over the life course. These historical and cultural circumstances include 
normative conceptions of appropriate behaviour and activities for women and men. Due 
to societal modernisation, younger cohorts are generally socialised in times in which 
more liberal gender norms prevail (Brewster & Padavic, 2000; Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; 
Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Consequently, we expect each new cohort to 
support gender egalitarianism more than the previous. 
The adoption of more liberal gender norms among subsequent cohorts may, however, 
differ between men and women. According to an interest-based perspective, individuals 
adopt and maintain attitudes that are in line with their interests (Bolzendahl & Myers, 
2004; Kroska & Elman, 2009). Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) argued that women have 
stronger interests in gender egalitarianism than men because they benefit more from 
gender equality. In addition, girls’ socialisation into gendered behaviours and activities 
has likely changed more strongly than boys’. Changes in the historical and cultural context 
towards more liberal gender norms mainly concerned the emancipation of women. 
Women’s movements were first and foremost aimed at improving women’s position 
in society. Welfare reforms have been aimed at encouraging women’s employment and 
participation in male dominated educational subjects and occupations, while there have 
been fewer economic, cultural, and institutional incentives for men to enter traditionally 
“female” jobs or to cut down working hours to be involved with the family (England, 2010). 
Young female birth cohorts may therefore be more inclined to challenge existing gender 
structures and to adopt gender egalitarianism. 
Indeed, previous research has found a growing gender gap in support for gender 
egalitarianism across cohorts, with women born after the 1950s being more egalitarian 
than men (Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Pampel, 2011; Schnabel, 2016). Hence, we predict 
a stronger effect of birth cohort on gender egalitarianism among women and we 
subsequently expect the contribution of cohort replacement to be stronger among women 
as compared to men. We therefore hypothesise that the process of cohort replacement has 
contributed to an increase in support for gender egalitarianism in the Netherlands over time, 
and this contribution was stronger for women than for men (H1).
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3.2.2 Social, cultural, and economic changes
Educational expansion
The structure of the population has also changed due to several other important 
developments. Since the second half of the 20th century, the educational level has 
increased rapidly among the Dutch population (Bar Haim & Shavit, 2013; Tolsma & Wolbers, 
2014). Many scholars have argued that education has a “liberalising” influence on people’s 
values (Vogt, 1997), because the educational system transmits liberal gender norms and 
challenges essentialist assumptions. The longer students are socialised into these norms 
during their formative years through education, the more they will support these norms 
throughout their lives (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). Indeed, previous research has repeatedly 
shown that higher educated people support gender egalitarianism more strongly than 
lower educated individuals (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Thornton et al., 1983; Thornton & 
Freedman, 1979). Hence, the increased proportion of higher educated individuals in society 
may have contributed to the rise in support for gender egalitarianism.
The rise in the average education level in the Dutch population has not developed similarly 
for men and women. Since the 1950s, higher education has expanded more rapidly 
among women than men (Tolsma & Wolbers, 2014; Van Hek et al., 2015). Consequently, 
the proportion of women exposed to liberal values taught through formal education has 
grown stronger than the proportion of men exposed to these norms. In addition, the 
liberalising influence of education on gender role opinions may be stronger for women. 
From an interest-based perspective, women have a stronger interest in the egalitarian 
gender norms that are transmitted through formal education; particularly women in 
non-traditional positions (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Kroska & Elman, 2009). Higher 
education increases women’s occupational opportunities, economic independence and 
non-traditional family arrangements. It is therefore argued that higher educated women 
benefit most from gender egalitarianism (Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Pampel, 2011), such 
as the equal responsibility for care of little children, because it may reduce restrictions 
such as gender discrimination in the workplace and the double burden of paid work and 
family responsibilities (Van der Lippe & Van Dijk, 2001). 
Men may also have an interest in gender egalitarianism because they attach value to 
taking care of the children themselves or because they want equal opportunities for 
their wives and daughters (Ciabattari, 2001). However, given that (full-time) work still is 
the dominant norm for most men – in particular among the lower educated – supporting 
gender egalitarianism often contradicts men’s social position and the benefits they gain 
from maintaining a traditional gender division (Poortman & Van der Lippe, 2009).
Previous studies have shown that differences in educational levels across time explained 
more of women’s over time variation in support for gender egalitarianism than men’s (Lee 
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et al., 2007; Neve, 1995; Pampel, 2011). Yet, these studies could not quantify whether this 
was due to stronger educational effects or due to stronger educational expansion among 
women than men. Thus, given the expected gender dependent educational effect and 
differential rates of educational expansion among men and women, we hypothesise that 
the process of educational expansion has contributed to an increase in support for gender 
egalitarianism in the Netherlands over time, and this contribution was stronger for women 
than for men (H2).
Secularisation
People are also socialised through religious organisations and communities (Scheepers, 
Te Grotenhuis, et al., 2002). In general, Christian churches advocate a traditional division 
of gendered roles based on a notion of separate spheres and religious organisations 
have long tried to sustain the social norms of women as caregivers and men as providers 
(Inglehart & Norris, 2003). The stronger people are integrated in a religious community, 
the more they are exposed to traditional norms and the less they will support gender 
egalitarianism. Previous studies found that individuals who are affiliated to a religion and 
people who frequently attend church indeed support gender egalitarianism less than non-
religious individuals (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Schnabel, 2016; Thornton & Freedman, 
1979). The share of Dutch individuals belonging to a religious denomination and attending 
church has dropped substantially over the past decades (De Graaf & Te Grotenhuis, 2008). 
Consequently, the decline in the proportion of religiously integrated people has likely 
contributed to an increase in support for gender egalitarianism. 
In general, women are more religious than men (Norris & Inglehart, 2011; Voas et al., 2013), 
and secularisation first affected men before women (Trezebiatowska & Bruce, 2012), also 
in the Netherlands (Becker & De Hart, 2006). Since the 1970s, however, church attendance 
declined more strongly among women than among men (Becker & De Hart, 2006). In 
addition, the traditional gender norms of the religious community mainly affect the 
position of women, restricting their opportunities to participate in the public domain 
while reinforcing men’s dominant position in society. We thus expect the influence of 
church attendance on support for gender egalitarianism to be stronger for women than 
for men. The differential shifts in the proportion of church attendees, together with the 
expected gender dependent influence of church attendance on gender egalitarianism 
leads us to hypothesise that the process of secularisation has contributed to an increase in 
support for gender egalitarianism in the Netherlands over time, and this contribution was 
stronger for women than for men (H3). 
Feminisation of the labour force
A third important development that has changed the composition of the Dutch population 
is the rise of female labour force participation. In recent decades, the proportion of women 
participating in the labour market has increased considerably (OECD, 2016b). Working 
women are argued to have more interests in supporting gender egalitarianism because 
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they often experience a double burden of paid work and family responsibilities (Van der 
Lippe & Van Dijk, 2001), which likely increases their support for egalitarian child care 
responsibilities. Based on the exposure perspective, Bolzendahl and Myers (2004) argued 
that labour force participation exposes women to gender discrimination and inequality in 
the work place as well as to their own capabilities to perform outside the household, and 
allows them to build social networks of other working women. These factors would also 
increase support for gender egalitarianism among working women. 
Previous research has indeed found a positive influence of women’s employment on 
their support for gender egalitarianism (Cunningham, Beutel, Barber, & Thornton, 
2005). We expect no such effect of men’s labour force participation on their support for 
gender egalitarianism. Indeed, men with full-time employment may support gender 
egalitarianism even less than part-time and non-working men, because they benefit 
more from a gendered breadwinner-homemaker division of paid and unpaid labour 
(Ciabattari, 2001). In addition, even though men’s participation in the Dutch labour 
market has changed as the proportion of part-time working men has risen (OECD, 2016b), 
this development remains limited when compared to the rise in the proportion of working 
women. Hence, we expect that the changes in labour force participation have contributed 
to an increase in support for gender egalitarianism in the Netherlands over time, and this 
contribution was stronger for women than for men (H4).
3.3 Data and measurements
To test our hypotheses, we used repeated cross-sectional data from 16 national samples 
of the Cultural Changes in the Netherlands surveys (CV), collected between 1979 and 2012 
(The Netherlands Institute for Social Research, 2016). Each wave consists of a nationally 
representative sample from the Dutch population of around 2000 individuals who are 
interviewed face-to-face. Response rates varied between 52 percent (in 2008) and 80 
percent (in 1983). The sampling procedure and measurements are highly comparable 
across the waves. We combined all 16 cross-sectional waves into one pooled data set, 
containing 31,668 respondents aged between 16 and 74 at the time of the interview.
3.3.1 Dependent variable
We measured our dependent variable support for gender egalitarianism with the question: 
“A woman is more suited to raise little children than a man”. Response categories ranged 
from (1) strongly agree to (5) strongly disagree. The data contained more questions on 
gender egalitarianism such as the division of paid labour, which have often been used 
in previous research (Davis & Greenstein, 2009), but these items were only available in a 
limited number of waves. The measurement of our dependent variable not only reflects 
beliefs about preferred gendered roles but may also capture “gender essentialist” 
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assumptions of men and women having innately different interests and skills, such as the 
ability to raise little children. This idea of gender essentialism can be used to justify gender 
stereotypes and a gendered division of roles (Charles, 2011; England, 2010). We therefore 
believe that this measure lies at the basis of gender egalitarianism. Moreover, the measure 
is frequently used in Dutch studies (e.g., Poortman & Van der Lippe, 2009), and relates to 
questions on gendered separate spheres that have been widely used in previous research 
(Ciabattari, 2001; Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Norris & Inglehart, 2011). We consider a higher 
score on the dependent variable as indicating more support for gender egalitarianism. 
Missing values on the dependent variable (1.5%) were deleted listwise.
3.3.2 Independent variables
The independent variable birth cohort was measured as the respondent’s year of birth. We 
excluded the oldest and youngest cohorts (born before 1907 and after 1992) in which the 
number of respondents was lower than 50 to avoid unreliable estimates.
Educational attainment was measured as the respondents’ highest educational level 
followed.1 We harmonised the educational categories over the waves, resulting in seven 
categories of educational attainment ranging from primary to university education. Over 
time, the share of men who obtained primary education dropped from 17.6 percent in 1979 
to 5.3 percent in 2012 (see Figure A3.1, Appendix Chapter 3). The share of men with tertiary 
education increased from 8.2 to 11.4 percent in this period. The share of women with 
primary education decreased from 21.4 to 5.9 percent between 1979 and 2012. The share 
of tertiary educated women rose substantively from 3.5 to 11.2 percent. Thus, educational 
expansion between 1979 and 2012 was stronger among women.2
Church attendance was measured by a question on how often the respondent had attended 
a church in the past half year, ranging from attending church once a week or more to never 
going to church. Between 1979 and 2012, the share of men never attending church rose 
from 52.8 percent to 62.6 percent. The share of women who do not attend church increased 
from 52.0 percent in 1979 to 58.3 percent in 2012 (see Figure A3.2, Appendix Chapter 3). 
Thus, secularisation has continued over time, albeit somewhat stronger among men (c.f. 
Becker & De Hart, 2006).
1     Educational attainment was measured as the respondents’ highest educational level followed, because 
the respondents’ highest education completed was not available in each survey year or suffered from 
too many missing answers.
2   Note that the share of higher educated individuals was larger in 2002. This is possibly due to an 
overrepresentation of younger respondents in the survey of 2002 (Verhagen, 2007). Hence, the results 
in 2002 should be interpreted with care. However, this overrepresentation cannot explain the drop in 
support for egalitarian attitudes between 1996 and 2002 (see Figure 3.2), as younger people generally 
show more support for gender egalitarianism than older people.
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Labour force participation was in most survey years only available as measured in three 
categories: full-time working (more than 35 hours a week), part-time working (12-35 hours 
working per week) and non-working (0-12 hours a week) based on the commonly used 
Statistics Netherlands definition (Janssen & Dirven, 2015; Kraaykamp, 2012). In 1979, 69.6 
percent of the men worked full-time and 2.9 percent worked part-time. By 2012, the share 
of full-time working men had dropped to 57.8 percent while the share of part-time working 
men had risen to 11.2 percent. Among women, 13 percent worked full-time and 12.5 percent 
part-time in 1979, which increased to 14.8 percent full-time working and 45.7 percent part-
time working in 2012 (see Figure A3.3, Appendix Chapter 3). These changes indicate that 
feminisation of the labour force in the Netherlands mainly comes down to an increase in 
women’s part-time work. Among men, part-time work has also risen whereas the share of 
full-time working men decreased.
We control for age as measured in years and period as measured with year of survey. 
Missing values on the independent variables and control variables (1.9 percent of the cases) 
were deleted listwise, resulting in a sample size to be analysed of 30,852 respondents. See 
Table 3.1 for descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables.
3.4 Methods
We followed a two-step strategy to estimate 1) the individual-level effects of cohort, 
education, church attendance, and labour force participation, and 2) the relative 
contribution of the societal processes of cohort replacement, educational expansion, 
secularisation, and the feminisation of the labour force to the trend in support for gender 
egalitarianism among men and women. 
3.4.1 Multivariate regression analysis
First, we determined the effect sizes of cohort, education, church attendance, and 
labour force participation, while controlling for period and age effects. For this purpose, 
we performed an age-period-cohort regression analysis for men and women separately, 
including the effects of education, church attendance and labour force participation. 
However, the effects of cohort, period and age are generally difficult to estimate in 
statistical models because of the linear dependency between these measures (i.e., cohort 
+ age = period). Although a completely appropriate solution to this problem has not yet 
been found, one accepted way of dealing with this conundrum is to impose a grounded 
restriction on one of the measurements of age, period, or cohort (Glenn, 2005; Mason 
et al., 1973). Because our dependent variable is related to the care for children, we expect 
that younger men and women who are not yet confronted with raising little children 
may show comparable levels of support for this item, while more variation is expected 
among older men and women. Previous studies indeed showed that entry into marriage 
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and birth of the first child decrease support for gender egalitarianism among male and 
female adolescents (Baxter, Buchler, Perales, & Western, 2015; Corrigall & Konrad, 2007; Fan 
& Marini, 2000; Kaufman, Bernhardt, & Goldscheider, 2016). This would theoretically allow 
a restriction on the effect of age. 
 
Table 3.1 | Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables 
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979-2012; N = 30,852.
To determine whether such a restriction can be statistically supported, we examined the 
bivariate age effect on support for gender egalitarianism in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.1 shows lower 
levels of support for gender egalitarianism among older men and women than among younger 
individuals. In addition, men and women aged 16 to 29 seem to hold largely similar levels of 
support for gender egalitarianism while there is more variation among people aged 30 years 
and older. Multiple t-tests revealed no significant differences within the age group of 16 to 29 
years in all survey years separately as well as combined, among both men and women.3 
Men
(N = 14,616)
Women
(N = 16,236)
Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD
Support for gender egalitarianism 1 5 2.75 1.16 1 5 3.19 1.18
Period 1979 2012 1994.41 10.35 1979 2012 1993.90 10.09
Cohort 1907 1992 1951.45 17.88 1907 1992 1951.61 17.44
Age 16 74 42.96 15.79 16 74 42.29 15.48
Educational attainment
  Primary 0 1 0.09 0 1 0.11
  Primary vocational 0 1 0.22 0 1 0.24
  Lower secondary 0 1 0.08 0 1 0.13
  Secondary vocational 0 1 0.22 0 1 0.21
  Upper secondary 0 1 0.09 0 1 0.10
  Bachelor’s or equivalent 0 1 0.15 0 1 0.13
  Master’s or equivalent 0 1 0.14 0 1 0.08
Church attendance
  Once a week 0 1 0.14 0 1 0.14
  Once a fortnight 0 1 0.04 0 1 0.05
  Once a month 0 1 0.05 0 1 0.06
  Less than once a month 0 1 0.17 0 1 0.19
  Never 0 1 0.59 0 1 0.56
Labour force participation
  Non-working 0 1 0.36 0 1 0.63
  Part-time working 0 1 0.07 0 1 0.24
  Full-time working 0 1 0.57 0 1 0.13
3     We performed post-hoc Bonferroni tests for each combination of age within the category 16-29 years, 
in each survey year and in all survey years combined, for men and women separately. We found no 
significant differences in mean levels of support for gender egalitarianism (p < .05).
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Although the effects of age may be confounded with cohort and period effects, this finding 
seems theoretically plausible, for younger men and women mostly find themselves in a 
specific life phase with a higher likelihood to be single and – more important – childless 
as compared to older people, who have divergent experiences and life trajectories. This 
resembles a watered-down version of a “natural experiment” in which certain categories 
of age, cohort, or period are set equal by exogenous processes, such as the limited voting 
rights for women in the late 19th century (Firebaugh & Chen, 1995). 
Figure 3.1 | Mean levels of support for gender egalitarianism by age
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979-2012; N = 30,852.
Additional analyses revealed that the share of unmarried and childless people is considerably 
lower among individuals aged 30 and older. We found similar results when we analysed a 
different representative Dutch dataset (SOCON). Based on these arguments, we imposed 
a theoretically driven and statistically supported restriction on the effects of individuals 
aged from 16 to 29, i.e., we constrained these effects to be equal for all respondents aged 16 
to 29.4 This allowed to obtain stable estimates for the effects of cohort, period and age using 
constrained generalised linear regression models (CGLIM) (Mason et al., 1973). 
We used dummy variables for each birth cohort and survey year to control for their 
potentially non-linear relationships with the dependent variable. We included age as 
a ratio scaled variable (including the aforementioned restriction) in the model because 
it is close to linearly related to the dependent variable for people aged 30 and over.5 We 
4     We performed a robustness check by analysing models with variations of the restrictions imposed on 
the effect of age. These analyses led to similar conclusions.
5    We tested whether age was linearly related to the dependent variable. We found no significant difference 
between a model with age as dummies and age as a linear variable (including the age restriction).
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controlled for changes in the effects of education, church attendance, and labour force 
participation over time by including interaction terms of these variables with year of 
survey (mean centred).6 Because our models may suffer from multicollinearity, we checked 
collinearity statistics, which were acceptable (see Table A3.1, Appendix Chapter 3).7
3.4.2 Counterfactual simulation analyses
The impact of compositional shifts results from a combination of the effect size of a 
variable and its distributional shift. Therefore, estimating individual-level effects is not 
sufficient to draw conclusions on the actual contribution of compositional shifts to the 
trend in support for gender egalitarianism. So once we determined the effects sizes of 
cohort, education, church attendance, and labour force participation on the individual 
level, we analysed to what extent shifts in the distribution of these characteristics have 
contributed to the trends in support for gender egalitarianism among men and women. 
For this purpose, we simulated a counterfactual situation in which the composition of the 
Dutch population had not changed since the beginning of the surveys, i.e., as if the existing 
cohorts in 1979 had not been replaced by younger cohorts, and as if there had been no 
educational expansion, secularisation, and changes in labour force participation between 
1979 and 2012. We used the survey year 1979 as a reference point because these processes 
were then on their lowest in the period under study. This analysis technically comes 
down to imposing the frequency distributions found in the 1979 sample to all subsequent 
samples and estimating a new mean level of support for gender egalitarianism in each 
survey year under this condition, thereby using the estimates of the effect sizes from our 
multivariate regression analyses obtained in the first step. As a result, we could measure 
the unique contribution of longitudinal shifts in the composition of the population due 
to cohort replacement, educational expansion, secularisation, and changes in labour 
force participation to the trend in support for gender egalitarianism. For a straightforward 
example of the counterfactual simulation method, see the Appendix of Chapter 1. Standard 
errors for each contribution were obtained with a bootstrap procedure.8
6     As a robustness check, we analysed a model including additional individual-level characteristics that 
possible confound the relationship with the dependent variable, such as marital status and whether 
the respondent has children. The results did not alter our main conclusions. We therefore decided to 
estimate a more parsimonious model.
7    Although the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was rather high for the age effect, the estimate remains 
significant for both men and women, so multicollinearity does not seem harmful here.
8    The sampling distribution of the differences between the observed and the simulated means is 
unknown and depends on the estimated and simulated effects, on the observed distributions, and 
the co-variances between all variables. Therefore, we used a bootstrapping procedure to empirically 
determine the shape of the sample distribution for each estimated difference between the observed 
and simulated means (see Table A3.3 and A3.4, Appendix Chapter 3). For each survey year, we drew 
1,000 bootstrap samples with replacement from the original sample. Based on these samples we could 
determine the lower and upper boundaries of the 95% confidence interval to test the significance of the 
difference between the observed means and our simulated means.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 The trend in support for gender egalitarianism for men and women
To answer our first research question, we examined the trend in support for gender 
egalitarianism for men and women. Figure 3.2 shows that the mean levels of support for 
gender egalitarianism increased between 1979 and 2012, albeit somewhat stronger among 
women. The mean level increased from 2.50 to 2.94 among men and from 2.78 to 3.43 
among women. Between 1996 and 2002, there was a temporary drop for both men and 
women, which stabilised from 2002 onwards.9 
Figure 3.2 | Trends in support for gender egalitarianism for men and women, 1979-2012
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979-2012; N = 30,852.
3.5.2 Results from multivariate regression analysis
Table 3.2 shows the individual-level effects of birth cohort, educational attainment, 
church attendance, and labour force participation, controlled for period and age, for men 
and women separately.10 Because we used dummy variables for each category of birth 
9     The increase in support for gender egalitarianism was significant between 1979 and 2012 as tested 
with ANOVA (men: F = 30.30, women: F = 13.76, p < .001). Interactions between sex and year of survey in 
regression analyses showed that the increase in support for gender egalitarianism between 1979 and 
2012 was significantly stronger for women than for men. Post-hoc Bonferroni tests showed that the 
mean level of support for gender egalitarianism dropped significantly between 1996 and 2002 among 
both men and women (p < .05).
10    Because our dependent variable is an ordinal outcome measure, we also analysed the model using an 
ordinal logistic regression analysis (polytomous universal models or PLUM) in SPSS as a robustness 
check. The results are highly similar to the outcomes of our linear regression model.
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cohort and survey year, we obtained a large number of cohort and period estimates. We 
therefore only displayed the standardised sheaf coefficients (Heise, 1972) in Table 3.2, 
summarising the effects of all dummies for cohort and for period. 
Table 3.2 |  Unstandardised and standardised regression coefficients of birth cohort, 
educational attainment, church attendance, labour force participation on 
support for gender egalitarianism for men and women, controlled for age 
(constrained) and period
Men
(N = 14,616)
Women
(N = 16,236)
B Betaa B Betaa
Intercept 2.77*** 2.53***
Birth cohort (1951 = ref.)b .11*** .37***
Period (1993 = ref.)b .10*** .10***
Age (16 to 29 years = ref.) -.02*** -.19*** .01** .13***
Educational attainment (primary = ref.) .13*** .19***
   Primary vocational  .01 .19***
   Lower secondary  .17* .34***
   Secondary vocational  .15* .46***
   Upper secondary  .30*** .52***
   Bachelor’s or equivalent  .34*** .63***
   Master’s or equivalent  .43*** .75***
Church attendance (once a week = ref.) .10*** .12***
   Once a fortnight .12* .26***
   Once a month .21*** .14***
   Less than once a month .19*** .21***
   Never .33*** .39***
Labour force participation (non-working = ref.) .03* .06***
   Part-time working .08 .15***
   Full-time working -.06* .10***
Variance explained 12.6% 16.6%
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979-2012; N = 30,852.
Note. The model is controlled for the interaction terms of educational attainment, church attendance, 
and labour force participation with period (ratio scaled) (see Table A3.2, Appendix Chapter 3 for 
all interaction coefficients). For this purpose, we mean centred the period variable, which roughly 
corresponds to the survey year 1993. The main effects in the table therefore represent the effects around 
1993. 
a   Standardised sheaf coefficients in bold indicate a significant difference (p < .05, two-tailed) between 
men and women (Paternoster et al., 1998).
b   To save space, we do not present the coefficients for each dummy category but instead calculated one 
standardised coefficient (beta) summarising the effect for all dummy categories (Heise, 1972).
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed).
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The standardised coefficients for birth cohort in Table 3.2 show a significant influence of 
birth cohort on support for gender egalitarianism, all other things being equal, which is 
about three times stronger for women (beta = 0.37) than for men (beta = 0.11). This gender 
difference in the cohort effect is significant as tested with a z-test derived from the work 
of Paternoster and colleagues (1998). The strong cohort effect suggests that the process of 
cohort replacement may have contributed to the rise in support for gender egalitarianism, 
particularly among women. Controlled for cohort and age, the period effect is small 
and equal for men and women (beta = 0.10). The controlled effect of age is significantly 
different for men and women, with older men supporting gender egalitarianism less than 
younger men (b = -0.01) and older women being somewhat more egalitarian than younger 
women (b = 0.01).
Table 3.2 also demonstrates that the higher men and women are educated, the more they 
support gender egalitarianism. The influence of educational attainment on support for 
gender egalitarianism is stronger for women (beta = 0.19) than for men (beta = 0.13), yet the 
difference is not significant. Men and women who attend church less than once a week 
support gender egalitarianism significantly more than those attending church weekly. The 
influence of church attendance on support for gender egalitarianism is again stronger for 
women (beta = 0.12) than for men (beta = 0.10), albeit not significantly. Full-time working 
men support gender egalitarianism significantly less than non-working men (b = -0.06), 
whereas part-time working men do not differ from the latter (b = 0.08, not significant). 
Both part-time and full-time working women show significantly more support for gender 
egalitarianism than non-working women (b = 0.15 respectively 0.10). However, the overall 
effect of labour force participation on support for gender egalitarianism is weak (beta = 
0.03 respectively 0.06) and not significantly different for men and women. Due to these 
relatively small effects, shifts in the distribution of these characteristics should have been 
considerable in order to have propelled support for gender egalitarianism over time. 
We controlled for changes in the effects of educational attainment, church attendance 
and labour force participation over time by including interaction terms (coefficients are 
displayed in Table A3.2, Appendix Chapter 3). The effects of these individual characteristics 
hardly changed over time.
Because the standardised coefficients of period and cohort in Table 3.2 tell little about 
either the direction of the effects (i.e., the sheaf-coefficient is always positive) or their 
non-linear relation with support for gender egalitarianism, we graphically presented the 
predicted mean levels of support for gender egalitarianism over the survey years and across 
birth cohorts in Figure 3.3, based on the controlled regression coefficients of all period 
dummies (a) and all birth cohort dummies (b). Figure 3.3a shows that men’s and women’s 
support for gender egalitarianism increased between 1979 and 1996, controlled for all other 
factors. Between 1996 and 2002 there was a small drop, after which the trend recovered 
again. Figure 3.3b shows the estimated mean level of support for gender egalitarianism 
Societal change and rising gender egalitarianism in the Netherlands 83
across birth cohorts. With all other characteristics held equal, the rise of support for gender 
egalitarianism across cohorts appears to be much stronger for women than for men, which 
was also indicated by the standardised coefficients for birth cohort in Table 3.2 (beta = 0.37 
respectively 0.11). Older female cohorts support gender egalitarianism less than their male 
counterparts, but the gender gap reversed among cohorts born after 1950. As birth cohort is 
the strongest predictor for women’s level of support for gender egalitarianism, replacement 
of more traditional cohorts by the more egalitarian cohorts born between the 1950s and 
1970s is likely to have contributed to the upward trend among women in particular.
Figure 3.3 |  Predicted mean levels of support for gender egalitarianism for men and women 
by period (a) and cohort (b) based on multivariate regression analyses
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979-2012; N = 30,852.
Note: Estimates are controlled for educational attainment, church attendance, labour force participation, 
and age. The predicted means per year and birth cohort are expressed as the controlled deviations from 
the sample mean levels of support for gender egalitarianism. 
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3.5.3 Results from counterfactual analysis
Once we determined the influence of birth cohort, educational attainment, church 
attendance, and labour force participation on the individual level, controlled for period 
and age, we analysed the actual contribution of cohort replacement and shifts in the 
distribution of the individual characteristics over time to the longitudinal rise in support 
for gender egalitarianism. This allows us to answer our second research question. 
Given the cohort effect size as shown in Table 3.2, we expected the trend towards more 
gender egalitarianism to be mainly due to the replacement of older cohorts by younger 
cohorts, and particularly so for women. Given the effects of educational attainment, 
church attendance, and labour force participation, we expected additional yet weaker 
contributions of shifts therein over time. 
Based on our multivariate regression estimates (Table 3.2), we simulated trends in support 
for gender egalitarianism as if a) the cohorts that were present in the sample of 1979 had 
not been replaced by younger cohorts, and the distribution of b) educational attainment, 
c) church attendance, and d) labour force participation had not changed in our sample 
since 1979. 
Figure 3.4 presents the trends resulting from these counterfactual simulations for men 
and women separately. The dotted line shows the observed trend in support for gender 
egalitarianism over time (taken from Figure 3.2). The differences between the observed 
mean and the simulated means in each survey year indicate the contribution of cohort 
replacement and shifts in the distribution of educational attainment, church attendance, 
and labour force participation in the population since 1979. The larger these differences, 
the stronger the relative contribution of compositional shifts to the rise in support 
for gender egalitarianism. To test whether the differences between the observed and 
simulated means are significant, we calculated 95% confidence intervals per survey year. 
For the calculated differences and corresponding confidence intervals we refer to Table 
A3.3 (men) and A3.4 (women) in the Appendix of Chapter 3.
Line (a) in Figure 3.4 shows the simulated trend with cohorts in the sample of 1979 
constant over the years (i.e., as if no cohort replacement had taken place). For men, the 
simulated trend only marginally deviates from the observed trend and the difference is 
not significant. This is due to the fairly small differences in mean levels of support for 
gender egalitarianism between older and younger male cohorts (see Figure 3.3b) that were 
used to calculate the simulated trend. By contrast, the simulated trend among women 
suggests that the longitudinal increase in support for gender egalitarianism would have 
been significantly less strong if the cohorts in the sample of 1979 (who were born between 
1907 and 1963) would not have been (partly) replaced by younger cohorts. If older female 
birth cohorts had not been replaced by more egalitarian female cohorts, then support for 
gender egalitarianism would even have declined over time. Based on these results, cohort 
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replacement mainly accounted for the rise in support for gender egalitarianism among 
women, supporting hypothesis 1.
Figure 3.4 |  Observed and simulated trends in support for gender egalitarianism based 
on the distribution of cohorts, educational attainment, church attendance, 
and labour force participation within the sample of 1979, for men and women 
separately
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979-2012; N = 30,852.
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Line (b) shows the simulated trend with the sample distribution of educational attainment 
among men and women held constant since 1979 (i.e., as if no educational expansion had 
taken place). Under this condition, men’s rise in support for gender egalitarianism would 
have been slightly less strong than observed. The differences between the observed and 
simulated means are small yet significant in each survey year (except in 1980). For women, 
the differences between the observed and simulated means are larger, indicating that 
educational expansion has contributed more to the rise in support for gender egalitarianism 
among women than among men. Between 1979 and 2002, the difference between the 
observed and the simulated trend increases over time as educational expansion advances. 
Between 2002 and 2008, however, the difference between the observed and simulated 
means decreases, which can be attributed to the temporary slowdown of the process of 
educational expansion in our sample during this period (see Figure A3.1, Appendix Chapter 
3). These results provide support for hypothesis 2: educational expansion has contributed 
to the observed rise in support for gender egalitarianism in the Netherlands over time, and 
this contribution was stronger among women than among men. We should note, however, 
that the contribution of educational expansion is rather small.
Line (c) shows the simulated trend with the sample distribution of church attendance 
constant since 1979 (i.e., as if no secularisation had taken place). For both men and women, 
the simulated trend indicates that the rise in support for gender egalitarianism would have 
been slightly less strong than observed if secularisation had not taken place in the period 
under study. Although the differences between the observed and the simulated means 
are minimal, the contribution of secularisation is significant (except between 1980 and 
1987 for women) and stronger for men, corresponding to the somewhat stronger process 
of secularisation among men than among women (see Figure A3.2, Appendix Chapter 3). 
Thus, secularisation has indeed contributed to the rise in gender egalitarianism, albeit 
only slightly, and stronger for men than for women, which contradicts hypothesis 3.
Line (d) shows the simulated trend with the distribution of labour force participation in 
the sample constant since 1979 (i.e., as if no changes in labour force participation had 
taken place). The simulated trend among men hardly deviates from the observed trend 
(yet significantly from 1996 onwards). Shifts in the male distribution of labour force 
participation mainly came down to an increase in the share of part-time working men. 
This shift has contributed little to the rise in support for gender egalitarianism. Also for 
women, we find marginal differences between the observed and simulated means (albeit 
significant from 1993 onwards). Thus, although we found a considerably increase in the 
proportion of – mainly part-time – working women between 1979 and 2012 (see Figure A3.3, 
Appendix Chapter 3), the contribution of the rise in female labour force participation to the 
trend was limited because the effect of labour force participation on support for gender 
egalitarianism is rather small (see Table 3.2). Thus, we found some support for hypothesis 
4 that the feminisation of the labour force has contributed to the trend in support for 
gender egalitarianism, but its impact is minimal.
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Line (e) shows the total simulated trend with cohorts and the distribution of education, 
church attendance and labour force participation in the 1979 sample constant over the 
survey years. For men, the simulated trend suggests that cohort replacement and shifts 
in the distribution of characteristics have had a modest influence on the trend in support 
for gender egalitarianism. The difference between the observed and simulated means 
is small but significant (except in 2008 and 2012). For women, the total simulated trend 
indicates that the observed trend would be largely absent, and that women would even 
be less egalitarian after the turn of the century compared to 1979, if the existing cohorts 
in 1979 had not been replaced by younger cohorts, and, to a lesser extent, if there had 
been no educational expansion. Secularisation and changes in the share of women in the 
labour force between 1979 and 2012 hardly played a role in explaining the rise in support for 
gender egalitarianism.
3.6 Conclusion and discussion
In this research, we aimed to provide insight in the rise in support for gender 
egalitarianism among men and women and the extent to which important societal shifts 
in the demographic structure of the Dutch population could explain these trends. We used 
16 waves of nationally representative cross-sectional data from the Netherlands between 
1979 and 2012. The answer to our first research question is in line with previous research 
on gender egalitarianism: we found that both men’s and women’s support for gender 
egalitarianism concerning the care for children has increased during this period, with a 
temporary decline between 1996 and 2002. Women support gender egalitarianism more 
than men, and the development of these opinions over time was stronger for women than 
for men. 
We found birth cohort to be a strong determinant of support for gender egalitarianism, 
especially among women. The oldest female cohorts in our study were least supportive 
of the idea that men and women are equally suited to raise children, even less than men 
born in the same birth cohorts. As each subsequent female cohort supports gender 
egalitarianism more, women have gradually caught up with and even by-passed men’s 
support for gender egalitarianism. The gender gap reversed with the cohorts born after 
the Second World War, who were socialised during the “cultural revolution” of the 1960s 
and 1970s. These findings support Mannheim’s (1952) notion, followed up by Inglehart 
(1997), that cohorts (generations) differ from each other because they have had different 
formative experiences which were specific for the historical and cultural situation in 
which they grew up. However, we found that this holds more strongly for women. As a 
consequence, changes in the female demographic composition could well explain the 
observed trend among women, as previously proposed (Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Cotter 
et al., 2011; Pampel, 2011). 
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We answered our second research question by actually showing that the rise in support 
for gender egalitarianism was mainly due to the replacement of older female cohorts 
by the younger, more egalitarian female cohorts born between the 1950s and 1990s, 
taking advantage of counterfactual simulation analyses to fill this lacuna in the 
existing knowledge. However, only a small part of men’s increase in support for gender 
egalitarianism could be attributed to shifts in the demographic composition, as the 
differences between older and younger male cohorts in their mean levels of support for 
gender egalitarianism were fairly small. Recent female cohorts indeed seem to have more 
interest in challenging the existing gender structures than male cohorts (Bolzendahl & 
Myers, 2004). Moreover, women may have benefited more from changes in the cultural 
and institutional discourse in which they were socialised. In the Netherlands, for example, 
several policies and media campaigns have been designed to encourage girls and women 
to enter male dominated educational subjects and occupations, such as science and 
technology (Wilson & Dekkers, 2013), while it has been less accepted and certainly not 
encouraged for men to take on female jobs or activities.
The increase of the share of higher educated women has also contributed somewhat to 
the trend, while the impact of secularisation and the feminisation of the labour market 
was marginal. This implies that the effect sizes of these characteristics and/or shifts 
in their distribution in the population were not strong enough to make a substantive 
impact on support for gender egalitarianism. Although we found that female church 
attendees differ significantly from non-attendees, Dutch women’s secularisation was 
seemingly not substantial enough to change support for gender egalitarianism at the 
societal level. Likewise, the increase in the share of (mainly part-time) working women 
has not contributed to the rise in gender egalitarianism, contrary to what has been 
widely theorised (e.g., Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004), because the effect size of labour force 
participation was rather small.
This study contributed to our understanding of the rise in support for gender egalitarianism 
in the Netherlands by showing that cohort replacement could well explain the trend among 
women, whereas it only explained a minor part of the observed trend among men. We 
showed that the strength of demographic compositional changes as an explanation for the 
rise in support for gender egalitarianism is a combination of the effect size of demographic 
characteristics and their distributional shifts in the population, which differ between 
men and women. We added to previous propositions by quantifying the often theorised 
relationship between important social, cultural, economic, and demographic societal 
changes and men’s and women’s rising support for gender egalitarianism. In addition, we 
demonstrated that the explanations for these trends are gender-specific. Hence, future 
research is advised to consider differential explanatory models for men and women. 
Several limitations of this study should be addressed. First, gender egalitarianism consists 
of different dimensions (Davis & Greenstein, 2009), but we could only measure a specific 
Societal change and rising gender egalitarianism in the Netherlands 89
aspect of support for gender egalitarianism based on one question concerning care for 
little children. This item was the best measure at hand, because we needed as many time 
points as possible to perform a counterfactual analysis and other measures in the data 
were only available in a limited number of waves. One could argue that the question 
whether a woman is more suited to raise little children not only measures preferences for 
gendered child care responsibilities but also captures gender essentialist beliefs of women 
having an inherently greater ability of caregiving and nurturing. Such gender essentialist 
assumptions of men and women having equal but essentially different natures may be 
used to justify role specialisation and may reproduce gender stereotypes and existing 
inequalities in the household and in society at large (Charles, 2011; England, 2010; Epstein, 
2007). For example, England (2010) and Charles (2011) have argued that, even (or particularly) 
in countries in which women have formally or legally gained equal opportunities and 
support for gender equality is widespread, men and women often work in traditionally 
male and female jobs. Also in the Netherlands, sex segregation in educational fields 
and on the labour market is considerably high, and women still allocate more time to 
household tasks than men (Portegijs & Van den Brakel, 2016). Although gender essentialist 
notions seem to persist, our findings indicate that more and more people have moved 
away from the belief that women are better suited to raise little children than men, which 
would contribute to greater gender equality. Disentangling various forms of gender 
egalitarianism in future research may add to a better understanding of changes in gender 
ideology. Notwithstanding, our findings are highly comparable to other studies using 
different measures of gender egalitarianism in different contexts (e.g., Cotter et al., 2011; 
Donnelly et al., 2015; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Schnabel, 2016; Shorrocks, 2016).
Second, due to the cross-sectional nature of our data, we cannot rule out the possibility 
of a reversed relationship between labour force participation and support for gender 
egalitarianism; higher levels of support for gender egalitarianism may have driven more 
women to enter the labour force. The use of panel data in future research may shed light 
on this issue. Yet, we consider cohort replacement to have actually influenced the rise in 
support for gender egalitarianism, as the reverse is highly unlikely.
Third, we could fairly well explain the rise in women’s support for gender egalitarianism, 
but the smaller rise in men’s support for gender egalitarianism remains largely 
unexplained. Certain periodic societal events or developments, such as female labour 
force participation, emancipation policies or governmental measures concerning child 
care may have directly influenced men’s support for gender egalitarianism, but we were 
not able to include these contextual measures in our study. Besides, men have likely 
adopted support for gender egalitarianism at a slower pace than women because of their 
stronger interests in protecting the traditional gender hierarchy. With advanced gender 
equality, support for gender egalitarianism will possibly diffuse from young female 
cohorts to male cohorts. 
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Finally, we found a temporary decline between 1996 and 2002 which remained unexplained. 
Yet, the downturn in support for gender egalitarianism was not limited to the Dutch case, 
as a similar drop was found in other contexts (Cotter et al., 2011; Donnelly et al., 2015; 
Schnabel, 2016). This suggests that certain societal or even broader events may play a role 
in explaining periodic fluctuations in the trend towards support for gender egalitarianism. 
Although this study is confined to the Netherlands, similar social, cultural, economic and 
demographic societal changes have taken place in other western countries. Therefore, this 
study provides general insights in explaining the rise in support for gender egalitarianism 
and may inspire theory driven hypotheses on gender-specific period and cohort events 
affecting the rise in support for gender egalitarianism.


CHAPTER 4
Cohort and period explanations for  
the upward trend in support for gender 
egalitarianism in the Netherlands,  
1979-2006
A slightly different version of this chapter is currently under review at an 
international journal. Paula Thijs wrote the main part of the manuscript 
and conducted the analyses. Te Grotenhuis, Scheepers, and Van den 
Brink substantially contributed to the manuscript. An earlier version 
of this study was presented at the Day of Sociology (Brussels, Belgium, 
2017), and at the European Consortium for Sociological Research (ECSR) 
General Conference “Institutions, Inequality and Social Dynamics” 
(Milan, Italy, 2017).
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4.1 Introduction
Although gender equality has improved throughout the world, considerable gender based 
inequality, discrimination, and exclusion persist (World Economic Forum, 2015). Public 
support for gender egalitarianism may be an important factor in achieving gender equality, 
because it contributes to a more egalitarian division of work and family responsibilities 
between partners, and increases women’s opportunities, political participation, and 
labour market outcomes (Corrigall & Konrad, 2007; Fortin, 2005; Inglehart & Norris, 2003). 
Since the 1960s, a liberalising trend towards greater public support for gender 
egalitarianism has been found in a wide range of countries, including the United States 
(Cotter et al., 2011; Mason & Lu, 1988; Thornton et al., 1983), Western Europe (Kraaykamp, 
2012; Lee et al., 2007; Scott et al., 1996), Australia (Van Egmond, Baxter, Buchler, & Western, 
2010), as well as in non-western countries (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). 
Theoretically, it is argued that structural and cultural developments, such as increasing 
levels of education, declining religiosity and the rise of women’s employment have 
propelled support for gender egalitarianism (Brewster & Padavic, 2000; Cotter et al., 2011; 
Mason & Lu, 1988; Pampel, 2011; Scott et al., 1996). These developments have supposedly 
transformed the dominant societal discourse, exposing all individuals, and particularly 
those in their formative years, to more egalitarian ideas (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Instead 
of testing these explanations directly, however, previous research has mainly compared 
levels of support for gender egalitarianism over time and across different birth cohorts 
(so-called period and cohort effects) (Brewster & Padavic, 2000; Brooks & Bolzendahl, 
2004; Cotter et al., 2011; Firebaugh, 1992; Kraaykamp, 2012; Mason & Lu, 1988; Neve, 
1995). By using temporal measures of birth cohort and survey year as broad indicators of 
historical and contemporary developments, these studies leave unexplained why people 
living and growing up in times of different societal circumstances vary in their support 
for gender egalitarianism. For example, in their literature review, Davis and Greenstein 
(2009) concluded that “several researchers have found period effects, but the impetus for 
change continues to be unclear” (p. 91). Hence, a lacuna remains in the existing literature 
with regard to the underlying determinants of the well-documented trends in support for 
gender egalitarianism. 
More recently, scholarly attention has been directed to an apparent slowdown of the trend 
towards gender egalitarianism in the mid-1990s, also referred to as the “stalled gender 
revolution” (Cotter et al., 2011; England, 2010; Pepin & Cotter, 2018; Shu & Meagher, 2017). 
These studies have started to take the societal context into account to explain this stall in 
gender egalitarianism. For example, Shu and Meagher (2017) found that increased gender 
equality in the labour force partly accounted for the rise in gender attitudes in the U.S. in 
the 1980s, whereas the rise of men’s overwork appeared to explain part of the slowdown 
in gender attitudes in the 1990s as well as a “restart” of liberal gender attitudes from 2004 
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onwards. Pepin and Cotter (2018), by contrast, found that contextual increases in mothers’ 
education and employment played a minimal role in explaining American high school 
students’ gender attitudes about work and family. Based on cross-national comparisons, 
Dotti Sani and Quaranta (2017) found that adolescents’ gender attitudes are influenced 
by the dominant societal discourse on gender inequality. However, still surprisingly little 
is known about the underlying determinants of the upward trend in support for gender 
egalitarianism in the past decennia. To our knowledge, no prior study has yet tested the 
widely theorised contribution of important structural and cultural developments in the 
societal context during people’s formative years to the upward trend in public support for 
gender egalitarianism.
In this research, we aim to contribute to the existing literature by empirically analysing 
the influence of three theoretically relevant societal developments, i.e., educational 
expansion, secularisation, and the rise of women’s labour force participation on the 
trend towards stronger support for gender egalitarianism among women and men in 
the Netherlands. Gender egalitarianism is referred to as a belief system that advocates 
equal rights, roles, and responsibilities for men and women; and, vice versa, opposes the 
notion that men and women have innately different roles, for example that women are 
essentially more suited for care taking and home making whereas men’s ‘natural’ role is 
that of the breadwinner (Davis & Greenstein, 2009). 
In the Netherlands, public support for gender egalitarianism has risen substantially to one 
of the highest levels in Europe (Merens & Van den Brakel, 2014). Notwithstanding, views on 
child care arrangements and responsibilities seem more ambivalent, since women are still 
being held primarily responsible for the children and they spend more time on caregiving 
than men (Knijn, 1994; Merens & Van den Brakel, 2014; Wiesmann, Boeije, Doorne-huiskes, 
& Den Dulk, 2008). We therefore focus on one aspect of support for gender egalitarianism 
that seems of particular interest in the Netherlands as well as in many other western 
countries, i.e., whether women are more suited to raise little children than men. 
Moreover, the Netherlands provides an interesting case as the Dutch societal and cultural 
context has vastly changed since the 1960s. As compared to many other countries, the 
Netherlands has been in the vanguard of educational expansion (Bar Haim & Shavit, 2013) 
and secularisation (Becker & De Hart, 2006). In addition, Dutch women’s labour force 
participation has increased rapidly, shifting from one of the lowest in Europe to one of the 
highest in only a few decades (although the majority of women works part-time) (Merens 
& Van den Brakel, 2014; Pott-Buter, 1993).
To analyse whether these societal developments explain changes in support for gender 
egalitarianism, we replace the temporal effects of time period and birth cohort with 
theoretically relevant indicators of period- and cohort-specific structural and cultural 
circumstances (Menard, 1991), while controlling for age effects and differences in 
Explaining trends in gender egalitarianism in the Netherlands 97
the composition of the population. We add to the emerging literature on contextual 
explanations of trends in gender egalitarianism by providing more a thorough test of 
previously developed theoretical arguments, and we contribute to the interpretation of 
changes in support for gender egalitarianism over time and across cohorts. In addition, 
we analyse whether the influence of structural and cultural developments is gender-
specific, as men and women have different interests in gender equality and may respond 
differently to questions about gender egalitarianism (Ciabattari, 2001; Jennings, 2006). 
We address the following research question: To what extent can the trend towards stronger 
support for gender egalitarianism among men and women in the Netherlands since 1979 be 
explained with historical and contemporary contextual characteristics?
We use nationally representative cross-sectional data from the Cultural Changes in the 
Netherlands (CV) surveys between 1979 and 2006. We complement these data with historic 
and contemporary indicators of educational expansion, secularisation, and female 
labour force participation collected from the Dutch population censuses and labour force 
surveys, covering a timespan of about 100 cohort years and about 25 survey years.
4.2 Theory and hypotheses
4.2.1 From micro-level theories to macro-level explanations
Two theoretical approaches are mainly used to explain individual variation in support 
for gender egalitarianism: the interest-based approach and the socialisation or exposure 
approach. The interest-based perspective argues that people adopt and maintain attitudes 
that are in line with their personal goals and interests (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). 
According to theories of socialisation and exposure, people adopt egalitarian beliefs 
when socialised into liberal gender norms or when exposed to egalitarian ideas about 
gender (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Inglehart & Norris, 2003). These perspectives are often 
employed to explain why women support gender egalitarianism more than men (Davis & 
Greenstein, 2009). Since women in general continue to have a deprived position in society 
as compared to men (Epstein, 2007; World Economic Forum, 2015), promoting gender 
equality benefits their interests best (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). Men, by contrast, gain 
less from supporting gender egalitarianism because it may undermine their dominant 
position or because they are simply unaware of their favourable position (Baxter & Kane, 
1995; Ciabattari, 2001). In addition, childhood socialisation in, and exposure to egalitarian 
ideas and contexts are supposed to impact women more than men (Bolzendahl & Myers, 
2004; Dotti Sani & Quaranta, 2017), resulting in stronger support for gender egalitarianism 
among women.
These individual-level theoretical perspectives, however, cannot explain changes in 
support for gender egalitarianism over time. Previous studies have therefore argued that 
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people’s interest in, and exposure to gender egalitarianism may have changed due to 
societal developments that have taken place during the past decades. For example, it is 
argued that women’s interest in gender egalitarianism in society has increased due to their 
rising educational levels, their declining religiosity and their increasing labour market 
participation, which makes them more likely to adopt gender egalitarian views (Brooks 
& Bolzendahl, 2004; Pampel, 2011). Yet, the influence of these societal developments may 
even spill over to other people by shifting the normative societal climate to which all 
individuals – including men – are exposed (Inglehart & Norris, 2003).
4.2.2 Historical and contemporary societal developments
Building on theories of social change, societal developments could have influenced 
support for gender egalitarianism in two ways. According to socialisation theories, 
historical circumstances and events shape the experiences that people have during their 
formative years (Mannheim, 1952). These so-called cohort effects are supposed to have 
a lasting influence on people’s attitudes throughout the life course (Inglehart, 1997). 
People who are socialised under societal circumstances in which egalitarian gender 
norms prevail, may therefore support gender egalitarianism more, even at later stages 
in life. 
Alternatively, it is assumed that people are open to change throughout the life course and 
that they alter their attitudes in response to certain events and developments (Alwin & 
McCammon, 2003). Contemporary societal circumstances at a certain period in time, also 
referred to as period effects, may expose the entire population equally and simultaneously 
to a certain cultural discourse of gender egalitarianism, resulting in a broad shift in 
aggregate support for gender egalitarianism from one period to another (Inglehart & 
Norris, 2003). 
Drawing on these theoretical notions of socialisation and exposure, we derive 
predictions on cohort- and period-specific societal developments in the Netherlands 
that may play a role in explaining the upward trend towards gender egalitarianism. 
Given the greater interest of women in supporting gender egalitarianism due to their 
relatively disadvantaged position, as well as their supposedly stronger socialisation 
in and exposure to egalitarian beliefs (Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004), we expect the 
influence of these societal circumstances to be consistently stronger for women than 
for men. Adopting egalitarian gender norms could benefit women’s educational and 
occupational opportunities and may reduce the “double burden” of paid labour and 
family responsibilities that women often experience (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Van der 
Lippe & Van Dijk, 2001). Dotti Sani and Quaranta (2017) indeed found that the dominant 
societal discourse on gender equality had a strong influence on young women’s gender 
egalitarianism, but not on young men’s. 
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Educational expansion
The educational level of the Dutch population has increased substantially in the last 
century (Bar Haim & Shavit, 2013). It is argued that education has a “liberalising” influence, 
transmitting ideas about diversity and equality, countering gender stereotypes, and 
increasing individuals’ openness to alternative perspectives on the role of women and 
men in the public and private sphere (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Vogt, 1997). Previous 
research has consistently shown that obtaining a higher educational level is related to 
more support for gender egalitarianism (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Brewster & Padavic, 
2000). When educational levels rise in society, the likelihood of interacting with people 
who endorse more egalitarian gender attitudes increases. Moreover, educational 
expansion may shift the dominant societal discourse regarding gendered roles, signalling 
a cultural shift towards more opportunities for women. As a consequence, people in their 
formative years have become socialised into an increasingly egalitarian societal context, 
instilling stronger support for gender egalitarianism in these cohorts. Although Pepin 
and Cotter (2018) found that increases in mother’s educational levels in the U.S. played a 
minimal role in explaining changes in adolescents’ gender attitudes, a stronger influence 
of rising educational levels may be found when comparing gender egalitarianism across 
a larger number of generations. Hence, we derive that: the higher the level of education 
in society that people are exposed to during their formative years, the stronger people will 
support gender egalitarianism, and this effect will be stronger for women than for men (H1a).
Contemporary exposure to a highly educated societal context, characterised by a more 
egalitarian discourse, may also spill over to other individuals in such context, inducing 
support for gender egalitarianism regardless of people’s social positions. For example, 
Banaszak and Plutzer (1993) found stronger support for gender egalitarianism in U.S. 
regions where women’s educational attainment approached that of men. To investigate 
whether this also applies when comparing different time points instead of regions, we 
formulate the following hypothesis: the higher the level of education that people are exposed 
to in contemporary society, the stronger people will support gender egalitarianism, and this 
effect will be stronger for women than for men (H1b).
Secularisation
Traditional religious institutions have for long prescribed and actively enforced social 
norms regarding which activities and behaviours are considered appropriate for men and 
women. These traditional norms assign a subordinate position to women that is confined 
to the care for children and household chores (Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Peek, Lowe, 
& Williams, 1991). According to Voas et al. (2013), “[t]he conservative ethos of religious 
organisations validates and reinforces the choice [of a woman] to be a home-maker” 
(p.264). Over the past decades, the Netherlands has witnessed a dramatic decline in 
church membership, church attendance, and religious beliefs (De Graaf & Te Grotenhuis, 
2008). This process of secularisation is supposed to have weakened the strength of 
traditional gender norms, leading people to dissociate themselves from their prescribed 
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roles as homemakers or breadwinners (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Previous studies 
indeed found higher levels of support for gender egalitarianism among non-religious 
individuals (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Thornton et al., 1983; Voicu, 2009). With advancing 
secularisation, people in their formative years are likely socialised into an increasingly 
egalitarian cultural climate, which may have instilled higher levels of support for gender 
egalitarianism in these cohorts. We thus expect that the higher the level of secularisation 
in society that people are exposed to during their formative years, the stronger people will 
support gender egalitarianism, and this effect will be stronger for women than for men (H2a). 
Exposure to a context with higher shares of non-religious people may not only influence 
support for gender egalitarianism among people in their formative years, but may affect 
all individuals in such context. Comparing differences in gender attitudes between 
U.S. states, Moore and Vanneman (2003) found that people living in states with higher 
proportions of religious fundamentalists hold less egalitarian beliefs. Hence, we expect 
that the decline of religiosity in society exposes both religious and non-religious people to 
increasingly egalitarian gender norms. We expect that the higher the level of secularisation 
that people are exposed to in contemporary society, the stronger people will support gender 
egalitarianism, and this effect will be stronger for women than for men (H2b).
The feminisation of the labour force
The rise of women’s labour force participation is one of the most frequently mentioned 
explanations for the increase in support for gender egalitarianism (e.g., Banaszak & Plutzer, 
1993; Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Cotter et al., 2011; Mason & Lu, 1988). In the Netherlands, 
women’s participation in the labour force increased considerably over the past decades 
(Merens & Van den Brakel, 2014; Pott-Buter, 1993). As a consequence, people are more likely 
to interact with working women as family, friends, neighbours, and colleagues. Such 
interactions may challenge ideas about a traditional division of paid and unpaid labour, 
and women’s dependency on men, in turn legitimising alternative family and child care 
arrangements. It is argued that exposure to working women’s ability to be self-reliant and 
to perform in the labour market induces higher levels of gender egalitarianism (Meuleman, 
Kraaykamp, & Verbakel, 2016). Moreover, societal norms on women’s capability to work 
outside the home may be more widespread when female labour force participation is 
higher. Particularly for people during their formative years, socialisation in such normative 
climate may have a lasting influence on their support for gender egalitarianism. Dotti Sani 
and Quaranta (2017), for example, showed that adolescents (especially young women) are 
more likely to internalise gender egalitarian attitudes in countries where women are more 
emancipated and visible in the public sphere. To analyse whether this also holds within 
one country over time, we formulate the following hypothesis: the higher the level of 
female labour force participation in society that people are exposed to during their formative 
years, the stronger people will support gender egalitarianism, and this effect will be stronger 
for women than for men (H3a). 
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Increased female labour force participation may also influence people who are not in 
their formative years, exposing the entire population to a more egalitarian normative 
climate. In addition, employed women’s viewpoints may spill over to other individuals 
in society, inducing more support for gender egalitarianism independent from people’s 
own employment status. In a cross-national study, André, Gesthuizen and Scheepers 
(2013) indeed found stronger support for gender egalitarianism in countries with higher 
female labour force participation, particularly among women. By contrast, Meuleman and 
colleagues (2016) found no such effect, whereas Banaszak and Plutzer (1993) found regional 
rates of labour force participation in the United States to be related to lower gender 
egalitarianism among non-working women. Focusing on changes over time instead of 
differences between countries or regions, Shu and Meagher (2017) found that contextual 
changes in women’s labour force participation in the U.S. indeed partly accounted for the 
rise in support for gender egalitarianism, as well as for the mid-1990s slowdown. Hence, 
we expect that: the higher the level of female labour force participation that people are 
exposed to in contemporary society, the stronger people will support gender egalitarianism, 
and this effect will be stronger for women than for men (H3b).
Figure 4.1 presents our theoretical expectations in a conceptual model. 
Figure 4.1 |  The influence of individual and contextual characteristics on support for gender 
egalitarianism in interaction with sex
Exposure to:
– Higher level of education in society (H1)
– Higher level of secularism in society (H2)
– Higher level of female labour force participation in society (H3)
a) During the formative years (cohort)
b) Later in life (period)
Age
Educational attainment
Religious affiliation and attendance
Socio-economic position
Children
Support for gender egalitarianism
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+
+
+
+
CONTEXTUAL CHARACTERISTICS
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
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4.3 Data and measurements
To test our hypotheses, we employed repeated cross-sectional data from 14 waves of the 
Cultural Changes in the Netherlands surveys (CV). These data were collected in face-to-face 
interviews between 1979 and 2006 by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research and 
Statistics Netherlands (SCP & CBS, 2016) to monitor opinions about society and culture 
among the Dutch population. Each wave consists of a representative national sample of 
around 2,000 individuals between 16 and 74 years old. We combined all 14 waves into one 
pooled data set, containing 28,091 respondents. We enriched these data with contextual 
data to measure period- and cohort-specific societal circumstances.
4.3.1 Dependent variable
Support for gender egalitarianism was measured with the question: “A woman is more 
suited to raise little children than a man”. Response categories ranged from (1) strongly 
agree to (5) strongly disagree. This question is related to a specific aspect of the private 
dimension of gender egalitarianism (Wilcox & Jelen, 1991) and captures a “gender 
essentialist” notion of women and men having innately different interests and skills, 
which may guide preferences for a sex-typed division of roles (Charles, 2011). Although 
gender egalitarianism consists of various dimensions (Davis & Greenstein, 2009), other 
questions on gender egalitarianism in the data were only available in fewer waves. A 
higher score on the dependent variable indicates more support for gender egalitarianism. 
We excluded individuals with a missing value on the dependent variable (2.7 percent). 
4.3.2 Individual characteristics
The respondents’ sex was measured as (0) male or (1) female. We operationalised 
educational attainment as the respondents’ highest educational level followed. We 
harmonised the educational categories over the waves, resulting in seven categories of 
educational attainment ranging from primary education to university education. To 
measure church attendance, respondents were asked how often they had attended church 
in the past half year, ranging from once a week or more to never. In addition, respondents 
indicated whether or not they considered themselves a member of any church or religious 
community. To measure people’s socio-economic position, we combined information 
about the respondents’ employment position and working hours, based on the commonly 
used definition of Statistics Netherlands (Janssen & Dirven, 2015; Kraaykamp, 2012), 
which distinguishes between full-time employment (more than 35 hours a week), part-
time employment (12-35 hours working per week), and non-working (0-12 hours a week). 
We grouped respondents in the latter category into four additional categories based 
on information about their socio-economic position (e.g., unemployed or household 
labour). We included a variable indicating whether or not there are any children in the 
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household. Because people may become more conservative as they age, we included age 
of the respondent as a control variable. We excluded missing values on the individual 
characteristics (3 percent). 
4.3.3 Historical and contemporary contextual characteristics
To measure historical and contemporary societal circumstances, we complemented the 
data with contextual information on the average educational level, the share of non-
religious people, and women’s participation in the labour force at the province level. The 
Netherlands is divided into 12 provinces, with on average about 1.5 million inhabitants per 
province. Considerable differences exist in the levels and rates of educational expansion, 
secularisation, and rising female labour force participation between these provinces. 
We propose that (formative) circumstances at the province level provide a more direct 
measurement of socialisation or exposure than national-level circumstances. Moreover, 
contextual characteristics on the national level show far less variation. For each birth 
cohort, born between 1905 and 1990, we calculated a five-year average of these indicators 
for the period when the respondent was aged between 16 and 20 years (i.e., an important 
part of people’s formative years). Period characteristics were measured using the average 
values on the indicators from the year preceding the survey year (i.e., lagged by one year) 
per province.
We measured educational expansion by calculating per province the average educational 
level of the cohort that entered the labour market, derived from the Dutch population 
census 1960 (Statistics Netherlands, 1999) and the Dutch labour force surveys 1992, 1994, 
1996, and 2016 (Statistics Netherlands, 1987, 2016). We used the Dutch Standard Education 
Classification (SOI), which ranges from 1 (primary education) to 5 (tertiary education). In 
1900 the average educational level of people who entered the labour market amounted 
to 1.06 (1.04 among women and 1.07 among men), which is just above primary education 
level (see Figure A4.1, Appendix Chapter 4). By 2006, the Dutch educational level had risen 
to 3.44 (3.55 among women and 3.33 among men), corresponding to (upper) secondary 
education. In the early 1990s, women’s educational level surpassed that of men.
Secularisation was measured as the percentage of individuals not belonging to any 
religious denomination per province, derived from the Dutch population censuses from 
1899, 1909, 1920, 1930, 1947, 1960, and 1971 (Statistics Netherlands, 1999), the Cultural 
Changes in the Netherlands surveys (CV) 1970-2006 (SCP & CBS, 2016), and the Socio-
Cultural Developments in the Netherlands surveys (SOCON) 1979-2011 (Eisinga et al., 2012). 
Between 1900 and 2006, the share of non-religious individuals increased from 2.6 percent 
(2.5 among women and 2.3 among men) to 63.0 percent (59.2 among women and 67.4 
among men) (see Figure A4.2, Appendix Chapter 4).
104 Chapter 4
Female labour force participation was measured as the percentage women above 14 years 
of age who were active in paid labour in each province, derived from the Dutch population 
censuses from 1899, 1909, 1920, 1930, 1947, 1956, 1960, and 1971 (Statistics Netherlands, 
1999) and the Dutch labour force surveys 1981-2013 (Statistics Netherlands, 2014). The share 
of women participating in the labour force more than doubled between 1900 and 2006, 
from 16.7 to 35.4 percent (see Figure A4.3, Appendix Chapter 4). However, female labour 
force participation only slightly increased in the years before the Second World War, and 
even dropped below 15 percent afterwards. From the late 1950s, women’s participation on 
the labour market increased again, but it was not until the second half of the 1980s that 
women’s employment really took off.
Missing values on the contextual measures were replaced using linear interpolation. 
Because one of the Dutch provinces (Flevoland) was established only in 1986, we lacked 
information on cohort-specific circumstances for people in this province. We excluded 
respondents living in Flevoland from our analyses (1.2 percent), resulting in a sample 
size of 26,004 individuals (12,146 men and 13,858 women). Descriptive statistics for the 
individual and contextual variables are presented in Table 4.1.
4.4 Methods
To test our hypotheses, we estimated OLS regression models for men and women 
separately, using historical and contemporary contextual characteristics as proxies for 
cohort and period effects (Menard, 1991). This method allowed us to estimate the separate 
influences of three indicators of important societal circumstances, and, moreover, to 
provide a more meaningful interpretation of previously proposed theoretical explanations 
of the rise of public support for gender egalitarianism over time. All cohort- and period-
specific contextual characteristics were mean centred and the values of the percentage 
non-religious people and percentage employed women were divided by ten to facilitate 
interpretation of the unstandardised coefficients. All control variables, including age, 
were entered as dummy variables to allow for possible non-linear relationships with the 
dependent variable. Because we expected the influence of all contextual characteristics to 
differ between men and women, we analysed models for men and women separately. To 
assess whether the effects for men and women are significantly different, we used a z-test 
for the difference between two regression coefficients, based on the work of Paternoster 
et al. (1998).
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Table 4.1 | Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables 
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979-2006; N = 26,004.
Men
(N = 12,146)
Women
(N = 13,858)
Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD
Support for gender egalitarianism 1 5 2.74 1.17 1 5 3.16 1.19
Individual characteristics
Age 16 74 42.66 15.85 16 74 41.85 15.46
Educational attainment
 Primary 0 1 0.10 0 1 0.11
 Primary vocational 0 1 0.24 0 1 0.26
 Lower secondary 0 1 0.09 0 1 0.14
 Secondary vocational 0 1 0.20 0 1 0.20
 Upper secondary 0 1 0.09 0 1 0.11
 Bachelor’s or equivalent 0 1 0.14 0 1 0.12
 Master’s or equivalent 0 1 0.15 0 1 0.08
Church attendance
 Once a week 0 1 0.15 0 1 0.15
 Once a fortnight 0 1 0.04 0 1 0.05
 Once a month 0 1 0.06 0 1 0.06
 Less than once a month 0 1 0.17 0 1 0.18
 Never 0 1 0.58 0 1 0.56
Church membership (no) 0 1 0.58 0 1 0.55
Socio-economic position
 Full-time employment 0 1 0.57 0 1 0.13
 Part-time employment 0 1 0.06 0 1 0.21
 Unemployed 0 1 0.04 0 1 0.02
 Household labour 0 1 0.01 0 1 0.47
 Pensioned 0 1 0.21 0 1 0.07
 In education 0 1 0.09 0 1 0.07
 Other position 0 1 0.02 0 1 0.03
Children (yes) 0 1 0.54 0 1 0.58
Contextual characteristics
Cohort-specific educational expansion 1.17 3.78 2.58 0.57 1.17 3.78 2.61 0.55
Cohort-specific secularisation 0.64 76.87 34.60 19.70 0.70 76.87 35.28 19.36
Cohort-specific female LFP 11.85 41.42 20.05 4.29 11.85 41.42 20.04 4.29
Period-specific educational expansion 2.82 3.85 3.26 0.22 2.82 3.85 3.26 0.21
Period-specific secularisation 15.12 77.39 54.96 13.63 15.12 77.39 55.01 13.63
Period-specific female LFP 16.56 38.72 26.99 5.60 16.56 38.72 26.92 5.52
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First, we analysed the influence of cohort- and period-specific educational expansion, 
secularisation, and feminisation of the labour force separately, while controlling for a 
dummified age variable (see Table A4.1, Appendix Chapter 4). To analyse the influence of 
each of these developments net of one another, we subsequently included all contextual 
characteristics simultaneously in one model. We could, however, not obtain reliable 
estimates due to harmful multicollinearity resulting from the confounding of the contextual 
characteristics with age. One solution to this conundrum is to impose a restriction on 
the effect of age, i.e., we constrained the effects for all respondents between 16-29 years 
to be equal (following the approach of Firebaugh & Chen, 1995). This restriction can be 
theoretically justified because younger men and women, who are not yet confronted with 
the care for little children, are likely to respond similarly to the question whether women 
and men are equally suited to raise little children, whereas older people may respond 
differently depending on their experiences regarding family formation and parenthood. 
In the Netherlands, the average age at which couples expect their first child lies around 
29 years (Statistics Netherlands, 2017). Previous studies indeed showed that support for 
gender egalitarianism decreases after marriage, and after the birth of the first child (Baxter 
et al., 2015; Corrigall & Konrad, 2007). Moreover, models in which we separately analysed 
the influence of cohort- and period-specific educational expansion, secularisation, and 
feminisation of the labour force, while controlling for age (see Table A4.1, Appendix Chapter 
4), showed that the older people are, the less they support gender egalitarianism, starting 
from their mid-thirties. People aged 16 to 29 years seem not to differ in their support for 
gender egalitarianism (see Figure A4.4, Appendix Chapter 4), providing statistical support 
for a restriction on age. We therefore analysed the influence of all period- and cohort-
specific characteristics simultaneously, and controlled for a dummified age variable with 
respondents aged 16 to 29 collapsed into one reference category in Model 1a and 1b. 
Because the structure of the population may change with respect to individual 
characteristics that disposition people towards more support for gender egalitarianism, 
we included the individual characteristics in Model 2a and 2b to account for compositional 
differences. 
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Support for gender egalitarianism over time
Figure 4.2 shows the trend in support for gender egalitarianism for men and women in the 
Netherlands over time. The average level of support for gender egalitarianism among men 
increased from 2.5 in 1979 to almost 2.8 in 1996 (on a scale from 1-5). Women’s support for 
gender egalitarianism was higher and increased somewhat stronger from 2.8 in 1979 to 3.4 in 
1996. Between 1997 and 2002, however, the trend reversed slightly and stabilised after 2002.
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Figure 4.2 | Trends in support for gender egalitarianism for men and women, 1979-2006
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979-2006; N = 26,004.
4.5.2 Explaining the upward trend in support for gender egalitarianism
Table 4.2 shows the multivariate results from regression analyses including period- and 
cohort-specific contextual characteristics simultaneously, controlled for age. Models 1a 
and 1b demonstrate that socialisation in times of a higher average educational level in the 
population during people’s formative years exerts a substantial positive and significant 
influence on men’s and women’s support for gender egalitarianism (b = 0.42 respectively 
b = 0.92). For example, women socialised in times of the highest average level of education 
in Dutch society (3.78) score on average 2.40 points higher (on a scale from 1-5) on the 
measure of gender egalitarianism than women socialised when the average educational 
level in the Netherlands was at its lowest (1.17) (calculation: (3.78 - 1.17) * 0.92 = 2.40). 
The influence of cohort-specific educational expansion is twice as strong for women as 
for men (beta = 0.43 vs. 0.21) and the difference between the coefficients is significant 
(p < .05). This provides preliminary support for hypothesis 1a. 
Contemporary exposure to a higher average educational level in society has an additional 
positive influence on both men’s (b = 0.26, beta = 0.05) and women’s (b = 0.44, beta = 0.08) 
support for gender egalitarianism, although the effects are less strong than the influence 
of educational expansion during the formative years. The effect is not significantly 
stronger for women than for men (p < .05). Thus, we find partial support for hypothesis 1b.
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Models 1a and 1b show that socialisation in times of higher shares of non-religious people 
during people’s formative years has a small, yet significant influence on men’s support 
for gender egalitarianism (b = 0.05, beta = 0.09), whereas such effect is absent for women. 
This suggests that hypothesis 2a is only partially supported. Contemporary exposure to 
higher shares of non-religious people in society exerts a small significant influence on 
women’s support for gender egalitarianism (b = 0.07, beta = 0.08), but not on men’s. 
Hence, hypothesis 2b also seems only partially supported. 
Contrary to our expectation, socialisation in times of higher female labour force 
participation during the formative years is related to significantly lower levels of support 
for gender egalitarianism among men (b = -0.12, beta = -0.04) and women (b = -0.20, beta 
= -0.07). This would lead to a rejection of hypothesis 3a. Yet, Dutch women’s participation 
on the labour market remained rather stable for a long period, and even declined during 
the first half of the 1950s. Only since then, people in the Netherlands started to be 
exposed to rising female labour force participation. Hence, we do expect an influence of 
contemporary exposure to rising female labour force participation. 
Model 1a and 1b show a negative effect of period-specific female labour force participation 
for both men (b = -0.16, beta = -0.08) and women (b = -0.31, beta = -0.14), indicating that 
contemporary exposure to working women in society reduces people’s support for gender 
egalitarianism. Additional analyses showed that this effect of period-specific labour force 
participation was positive when analysed in a model without educational expansion 
(see also Table A4.1, Appendix Chapter 4), but the effect turned negative (but remained 
significant) once the level of educational expansion was taken into account. Lastly, the 
results show that the older men are, the less they support gender egalitarianism, whereas 
there is no significant age effect for women.
In Models 2a and 2b in Table 4.2, the individual characteristics are taken into account to 
control for compositional differences in the structure of the population. The results show 
that the influences of historical and contemporary societal circumstances on gender 
egalitarianism remain present once accounted for people’s structural positions in society. 
The estimates of educational expansion and secularisation becomes slightly smaller, 
indicating that a small part of these contextual effects is due to changes in the composition 
of the population with respect to the individual characteristics. The negative influence of 
period-specific female labour force participation becomes somewhat stronger for both 
men and women, once the individual characteristics are taken into account. This suggests 
that shifts in the population composition for a small part counterbalance the negative 
influence of exposure to women on the labour market. The individual characteristics in 
Model 2a and 2b indicate that support for gender egalitarianism is stronger among higher 
educated people, people who attend church less than once a week, non-religious people, 
full-time and part-time working men and women, men working in the household, and 
when there are no children present in the household. 
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Table 4.2 |  Unstandardised and standardised regression coefficients of period- and cohort-
specific contextual characteristics on support for gender egalitarianism, controlled 
for age (constrained) (Model 1) and individual characteristics (Model 2)
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979-2006; N = 26,004.
a   Coefficients in bold indicate a significant difference (p < .05, two-tailed) between men and women (see 
Paternoster et al., 1998). 
b   To save space, we calculated one standardised coefficient (beta) summarising the effect for all dummy 
categories of age, with age categories 16-29 collapsed into one category (Heise, 1972).
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed).
Men
(N = 12,146)
Women
(N = 13,858)
Model 1a Model 2a Model 1b Model 2b
Ba Beta Ba Beta Ba Beta Ba Beta
Intercept 2.83*** 2.40*** 3.15*** 2.52***
Cohort-specific
 Educational expansion .42*** .21 .38*** .18 .92*** .43 .78*** .36
 Secularisation (/10) .05*** .09 .04*** .08 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.03
 Female LFP (/10) -.12** -.04 -.09* -.03 -.20*** -.07 -.17*** -.06
Period-specific
 Educational expansion .26** .05 .20* .04 .44*** .08 .41*** .07
 Secularisation (/10) .01 .01 -.01 -.01 .07*** .08 .04** .05
 Female LFP (/10) -.16** -.08 -.21*** -.10 -.31*** -.14 -.39*** -.18
Age (16 to 29 years = ref.)b 1.00** -.10 1.00** -.10 1.00 .06 1.00 .08
Individual controls
Educational attainment (primary = ref.) .12 .17
 Primary vocational .03 .20***
 Lower secondary .17*** .35***
 Secondary vocational .14*** .47***
 Upper secondary .31*** .53***
 Bachelor’s or equivalent .31*** .62***
 Master’s or equivalent .40*** .69***
Church attendance (once a week = ref.) .05 .06
 Once a fortnight .13* .24***
 Once a month .20*** .14***
 Less than once a month .14*** .15***
 Never .15*** .20***
No church member (yes = ref.) .20*** .08 .21*** .09
Socio-economic position (full-time = ref.) .04 .06
 Part-time employment .14** .07*
 Unemployed .00 .01
 Household labour .26* -.10**
 Pensioned .06 -.08 
 In education .07 .02
 Other employment position .11 -.05 
Children (no children = ref.) -.11*** .05 -.09*** .04
Variance explained 10.7% 13.7% 12.5% 17.5%
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To summarise, people who are exposed to a higher average educational level in 
society, particularly during their formative years, support gender egalitarianism more, 
independent of their own social position. The latter influence is stronger for women than 
for men, supporting hypothesis 1a. Being socialised in a more secular society increases 
men’s, but not women’s support for gender egalitarianism, which only partly supports 
hypothesis 2a. On the contrary, women who were exposed to higher shares of non-
religious people in a specific time period show more support for gender egalitarianism, 
over and above their own level of religiosity, but this was not found among men. This 
confirms hypothesis 2b, albeit for women only. Finally, once accounted for the level of 
educational expansion in society, people who have been exposed to larger shares of 
employed women in society seem to support gender egalitarianism less. This contradicts 
hypothesis 3a and 3b.
We also analysed the contextual influence of sex-specific educational expansion and 
secularisation on men’s and women’s support for gender egalitarianism. For example, 
we analysed whether the rise of men’s educational levels in society influenced women’s 
support for gender egalitarianism, and vice versa. These analyses do not alter our 
conclusions based on the influence of educational expansion and secularisation in the 
general population, with the exception that contemporary exposure to higher educated 
women in society has no significant influence on men’s support for gender egalitarianism.
4.6 Conclusion and discussion
In this study, we aimed to answer the question to what extent the trend towards stronger 
support for gender egalitarianism among men and women in the Netherlands could be 
explained by changes in the historical and contemporary societal context. This study 
makes several contributions to the current literature in this particular domain of research. 
First, using data from 16 waves of nationally representative surveys collected in the 
Netherlands between 1979 and 2006, we showed that the liberalising trend towards 
greater gender egalitarianism that has been found in a wide range of countries (e.g., Cotter 
et al., 2011; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Lee et al., 2007) was also present in the Netherlands. 
Moreover, a temporary reversal of the trend in support for gender egalitarianism has taken 
place in the Netherlands during the late 1990s, which appears very similar to the downward 
trend in the United States (e.g., Cotter et al., 2011; Shu & Meagher, 2017) and Australia (Van 
Egmond et al., 2010) during the same period, in particular with regard to attitudes about 
the role of men and women in the family (Pepin & Cotter, 2018). This suggests that a rather 
universal development, that is not limited to a specific national context, may explain 
the “stalled gender revolution” in the 1990s. For example, Shu and Meagher (2017) found 
that a rise of men’s overwork partially accounted for the stagnation in Americans’ gender 
attitudes. It remains to be seen whether this explanation also holds in the Dutch context.
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Second, we empirically tested the influence of three important, and widely theorised 
societal developments that have taken place in many countries over the past decades, 
including the Netherlands: educational expansion, secularisation, and the rise of female 
labour force participation. By substituting cohort and period effects with relevant 
contextual indicators, we were able to test the separate influence of societal explanations 
for the rise in support for gender egalitarianism. In this way, we offered a closer look into 
the “black box” of cohort and period effects that drive the upward trend towards gender 
egalitarianism. We showed that changes in the societal context in which people have 
grown up and live partly explain the upward trend in support for gender egalitarianism. 
Of the three explanations we tested, educational expansion proved the most important 
societal development that has contributed to the upward trend. The cohort-specific effect 
of educational expansion was particularly strong, which suggests that people in their 
formative years are especially susceptible to the societal climate, providing support for 
the socialisation perspective (Mannheim, 1952). That is, due to educational expansion, 
subsequent cohorts have been socialised in a more egalitarian normative climate, which 
has induced support for egalitarianism regarding the care for little children among men, 
and especially among women. Exposure to such a climate exerts an additional influence 
on people’s support for gender egalitarianism, independent of their own social position 
(Alwin & McCammon, 2003). Although the contribution of secularisation is modest, 
increased shares of secular individuals in Dutch society during the formative years have 
promoted some support for gender egalitarianism among men, whereas contemporary 
exposure to higher shares of secular individuals positively influenced women’s support 
for gender egalitarianism. A possible explanation for this differential finding is that men 
are, in general, less religious than women and leave the church at younger ages. Moreover, 
it is argued that religious socialisation differs between men and women (Trzebiatowska 
and Bruce 2012). As a consequence, boys may be more susceptible to secular influences in 
the social context during their formative years than girls.
In contrast to the theoretical expectation, we found that exposure to the rise of female 
labour force participation could not in itself explain the upward trend in support for 
gender egalitarianism. Given that women’s labour force participation in the Netherlands 
remained stable at a rather low level during the first half of the 20th century and only 
started to rise substantially since the late 1980s, many Dutch cohorts have been exposed 
to low levels of female labour force participation during their formative years. Kraaykamp 
(2002) also observed high levels of female labour force participation in people’s pre-adult 
years to be related to more conservative attitudes towards premarital and extramarital 
sexuality in the Netherlands. 
Moreover, we found that people who are exposed to higher rates of female labour force 
participation during later periods also support gender egalitarianism less, once accounted 
for the level of educational expansion. Possibly, the increased participation of women 
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on the labour market has evoked a discussion in society about motherhood and raised 
concerns about who should care for the children when women work (Damaske, 2013). 
This explanation might well apply to the Dutch context. Although support for mothers’ 
employment is high in the Netherlands (Merens & Van den Brakel, 2014), and views 
towards men’s and women’s (“natural”) roles concerning the care for little children have 
become increasingly egalitarian, a strong motherhood ideology – with the mother seen as 
primarily responsible for the child’s well-being – has long been present in the Netherlands, 
originating from the strong Christian tradition and emphasised by the government as 
women’s contribution to the rebuilding of the country after the Second World War (Knijn, 
1994). This motherhood ideology may have become more culturally salient as women 
entered the workforce (Douglas & Michaels, 2005; Hays, 1996). For example, Damaske (2013) 
argued that “the tension between rising workforce participation and intensive mothering, 
(…), appears resolved not through a reduction in mothering efforts, but through a 
discourse that emphasises conformity to good mothering ideals.” (p. 441). In a context 
in which women’s employment becomes more common, women (and especially working 
mothers) may adopt more traditional views on child care responsibilities as a strategy to 
legitimise their lower commitment to their careers and/or their higher involvement with 
child care and household tasks relative to men (Johnston & Swanson, 2006). 
Moreover, increased labour force participation in the Netherlands does not necessarily 
reflect an increasingly egalitarian societal discourse. About three-quarters of Dutch 
women work part-time, and the majority works in traditionally female sectors, such as 
education and care. In addition, full-time working women in the Netherlands generally 
spend more time on household tasks and childcare than men (Merens & Van den Brakel, 
2014). Hence, women’s increased participation in the labour force has not yet been 
met with symmetrical changes in men’s position in the public and private domain 
(England, 2010). Notwithstanding, the results regarding the rise of female labour force 
participation should be interpreted with caution, as our contextual measures may not 
provide a complete picture of changes in the societal context to which individuals have 
been exposed. Future research should further explore the role of female labour force 
participation – and mother’s employment in particular – in explaining trends in public 
support for gender egalitarianism, taking into account occupational segregation and 
part-time employment.
Lastly, in line with previous research (Dotti Sani & Quaranta, 2017), we found that the 
influence of changes in the societal context was generally stronger for women than 
for men. Young women appear the forerunners in the process towards more gender 
egalitarianism, which signifies their greater interest in promoting gender equality 
(Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). But also men’s support for gender egalitarianism has 
benefited from the rise of societal educational levels and secularism during their 
formative years. 
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Notwithstanding the contributions of this study, several limitations and directions for 
future research should be discussed. First, only one item in the data was suited to indicate 
changes in support for gender egalitarianism in the Netherlands over a longer period of 
time. Although gender egalitarianism consists of various dimensions (Davis & Greenstein, 
2009), we could only study one dimension related to the raising of little children. The 
picture we have sketched of changes in gender ideology in the Netherlands may therefore 
be incomplete. 
Second, we could not explain why support for gender egalitarianism temporarily reversed 
in the Netherlands, despite continuing educational expansion, secularisation and rising 
female labour force participation. Nevertheless, this finding is highly consistent with a 
reversal of the trend in other parts of the world during the same period (e.g., Cotter et 
al., 2011; Shu & Meagher, 2017; Van Egmond et al., 2010). Rising female labour force 
participation has possibly induced an essentialist counter-reaction in the family domain, 
but whether progress of women’s positions in the public domain indeed produces 
resistance to egalitarianism in the private domain (Pepin & Cotter, 2018) needs further 
investigation. 
Third, absence of information on which province respondents lived in after 2006 hindered 
the inclusion of contextual data for more recently interviewed respondents. We also 
lacked information on the employment status of the respondents’ mother and partner, 
which may either affect people’s support for gender egalitarianism. In addition, fathers’ 
part-time work and involvement in the family during people’s – and especially men’s – 
formative years may also influence their support for the statement that women and men 
are equally suited to raise little children. 
Lastly, our study is limited to three measures of contextual developments due to the lack 
of other contextual measures going back to the formative years of the older cohorts in 
the data. Previous studies have argued that, among others, rising employment of married 
mothers, increased divorce rates, declining fertility, and the emergence of women’s 
movements may have advanced public support for gender egalitarianism (Brewster & 
Padavic, 2000; Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Cotter et al., 2011; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; 
Lee et al., 2007; Pampel, 2011). Moreover, family policies may play a role in changing 
public views on gender egalitarianism. Future research could take more historical and 
contemporary contextual factors into account, although such data are scarce, if available 
at all. 
To conclude, this study highlights that the societal normative climate people are exposed 
to, especially during their formative years, plays an important role in shaping their current 
views on gender egalitarianism. Promoting educational levels seems to have far-reaching 
benefits for advancing support for gender equality, not only for men and women who 
obtain higher educational levels themselves, but also for society at large.
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5.1 Introduction
Authoritarian values are related to a wide range of social and political attitudes and 
behaviours, such as nationalism and nativism; opposition to individual freedom, gay 
rights and gender equality; negative attitudes towards ethnic out-groups; and voting for 
populist radical (right) parties (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Lubbers 
& Coenders, 2017; Mudde, 2007; Rooduijn, 2014; Scheepers et al., 1990; Vasilopoulos & 
Lachat, 2017). Changes in Europeans’ support for authoritarian values may therefore have 
important consequences for the acceptance of differences and for the future of democracy 
in European societies.
There are several reasons to expect changes in support for authoritarian values over 
time. Over the past decades, European countries have seen considerable economic and 
demographic developments, such as economic growth, the rise of educational levels, and 
secularisation (Brenner, 2016; OECD, 2017; Reitsma, Pelzer, Scheepers, & Schilderman, 2012; 
Schofer & Meyer, 2005). According to modernisation theory, such developments have 
induced shifts in advanced industrialised societies in the importance people attach to 
absolute rules, order, and traditional authority, towards values of individual autonomy, 
self-expression, and acceptance of difference (Inglehart, 1990, 1997). As a result of these 
developments, support for authoritarian values should have decreased over time. 
By contrast, Europe recently witnessed an economic and financial crisis and mass 
immigration. These developments may have given rise to a greater need for order, 
stability and strong authority to protect national security, which may have increased 
people’s support for authoritarian values (De Jonquières, 2017; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; 
Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Inglehart & Norris, 2017). However, a knowledge gap remains 
regarding to what extent support for authoritarian values in Europe has risen over time as 
a result of these developments.
Moreover, there are considerable differences between Western and Eastern European 
countries with respect to economic and demographic developments. For example, 
whereas the populations of most Western European countries have become increasingly 
secular, this trend is far less clear in Eastern European countries and has even reversed in 
some of these countries (Brenner, 2016; Reitsma et al., 2012). And while Eastern European 
economies were booming after the fall of communism as compared to Western Europe, 
the economic crisis hit both Western and Eastern European countries, although to 
different degrees (European Commission, 2009). Hence, the development of support 
for authoritarian values over time likely differs between Western and Eastern European 
countries. 
In this study, we aim to investigate whether Europeans’ support for authoritarian 
values has changed over time due to economic and demographic developments. In 
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addition, we analyse whether differences in these developments between Western and 
Eastern European countries have resulted in differential trends in people’s support for 
authoritarian values. 
We contribute to previous research in several ways. First, we shed light on the relationship 
between changes in the societal context and trends in support for authoritarian values. 
Concerned with the rise of fascism and submission to authoritarian leaders, early scholars 
in the field of authoritarianism focused on the authoritarian personality type (Adorno, 
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). Whereas these scholars deemed the social 
situation of the 1930s – characterised by a severe economic and political crisis – to be 
the main source of this authoritarian personality type (Baars & Scheepers, 1993), most 
research has regarded authoritarianism as a predisposition that is stable over time and 
has therefore mainly focused on individual determinants (Adorno et al., 1950; Dekker & 
Ester, 1987; Lipset, 1959; Van Snippenburg & Scheepers, 1991). Even though authoritarian 
predispositions may be stable within individuals, the average level of support for 
authoritarian values in society may change as a result of changing societal conditions 
(Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Inglehart, 1997). As yet, it remains largely unclear whether 
developments in the societal context over the past decades have contributed to changes 
in support for authoritarian values. 
Second, we aim to test the generalisability of modernisation theory by analysing both 
upward and downward trends in the societal context, as well as differences between 
Western and Eastern Europe. Previous research has indeed shown that support for 
authoritarian values varies between Western and Eastern Europe (Schwartz & Bardi, 
1997), but few studies have analysed whether changes in authoritarian values and its 
determinants differ between Western and Eastern Europe. 
Third, it is argued that sudden changes or “shocks” in contextual indicators may have a 
stronger influence on people’s attitudes and behaviour than customary levels of these 
same indicators (Olzak, 1992). We therefore empirically analyse the effects of both levels 
and sudden changes in economic and demographic indicators on people’s support for 
authoritarian values in Europe.
We aim to answer the following research questions: What is the over time variation in 
support for authoritarian values between 2002-2014 within European countries and does 
this over time variation differ between Western European countries and Eastern European 
countries? To what extent can this variation within Western European countries and Eastern 
European countries be explained by differential trends in economic indicators (economic 
development, unemployment, and national debt) and demographic indicators (educational 
expansion, secularisation, and immigration)?
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To answer these questions, we use seven rounds of the European Social Surveys covering 
the period between 2002-2014, which we complemented with national-level indicators. 
We conceptualise authoritarian values as the importance individuals attach to tradition 
and customs, obedience, living in a safe and secure surrounding, and a strong government 
that ensures safety. These values correspond to elements of classical measures of 
(right-wing) authoritarianism, such as conventionalism, obedience to authority, and 
the preservation of social order by deferring to legal and moral authority (Adorno et 
al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981). We employ multilevel regression analyses with individuals 
nested in country-year combinations to analyse the relationship between economic 
and demographic developments, and changes in support for authoritarian values within 
Western and Eastern European countries over time.
5.2 Theory and hypotheses
According to modernisation theory, economic development and demographic changes 
have shifted the importance people attach to absolute rules, order, and traditional 
authority, towards values of individual autonomy, self-expression, and acceptance of 
difference in advanced industrialised societies (Inglehart, 1990, 1997, 2008). One of the 
basic assumptions of this version of modernisation theory is the scarcity hypothesis, which 
proposes that, under conditions of existential insecurity, people are willing to submit to 
absolute rules and seek strong authority to protect them from danger (Inglehart, 1997). 
This sense of existential insecurity may arise from events or circumstances in the societal 
context, such as threat of invasion, internal disorder or economic collapse. Conversely, 
conditions of existential security may reduce deference to all forms of external authority 
(Inglehart, 1997). Over the past decades, Europe has witnessed several economic and 
demographic developments that may have increased, as well as decreased people’s sense 
of existential security. Hence, we expect changes in the national contexts in European 
societies to be associated with changes in people’s support for authoritarian values. 
5.2.1 Economic development and crisis
Modernisation theory’s central claim is that economic growth and the accompanying 
increase of existential security in advanced industrialised societies after the Second 
World War has induced a de-emphasis of all forms of authority (Inglehart, 1997). Previous 
research indeed found lower support for authoritarian values in more industrialised, 
wealthier western countries, as well as among younger birth cohorts (Inglehart, 1997; 
Schwartz & Bardi, 1997; Tilley, 2005). If modernisation theory holds true, the substantial 
economic development that characterised European countries over the past decades 
(OECD, 2017) should have resulted in a decline in support for authoritarian values. We 
therefore formulate the following hypothesis: support for authoritarian values among 
Europeans is less strong in times of economic prosperity (H1a). 
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More recently, Europe has witnessed an economic and financial crisis, accompanied 
by increasing unemployment rates and rising national debts. Following the scarcity 
hypothesis, conditions of economic decline induce (perceptions of) economic insecurity 
among the population. If people fail to achieve the means from which they subjectively 
derive status, or if people are uncertain whether they are able to achieve these means in 
the future, feelings of status-frustration and -anxiety arise, which may in turn increase 
people’s willingness to submit to strong authorities or to strong traditional norms 
(Scheepers et al., 1990). Moreover, under conditions of a worsening economy, people 
may be more inclined to submit themselves to authorities that promise to tackle the 
economic malaise. Comparing archival data from two periods in time, Sales (1973) indeed 
found that aggregate levels of authoritarianism were higher in a period characterised by 
high levels of macro-economic threat, a finding that was replicated by Doty, Peterson and 
Winter (1991). More recently, Miller (2017) showed that an increase in a composite measure 
of economic threat coincided with an increase in support for strong leaders, support 
for military rule, and a greater belief that having a democracy is bad for one’s country. 
By contrast, Tormos et al. (2017) found no significant influence of changes in economic 
development and unemployment on support for authoritarian values in European 
countries. 
In addition, it is argued that sudden changes in the social and economic context may 
exert a stronger influence on people’s attitudes and behaviour, because sudden changes 
or shocks generally occur faster than people in society can absorb and often receive 
media attention (Meuleman et al., 2009; Olzak, 1992). Sudden economic decline and 
abrupt increases in unemployment rates are therefore more likely to be noticed by the 
general public. Hence, rapid changes in economic conditions may lead to more severe 
(perceptions of) insecurity than gradual developments, giving rise to a stronger need 
for authority, order, and firm actions by a strong leader or government. We expect that: 
support for authoritarian values among Europeans is stronger in times of sudden economic 
decline (H1b).
Yet, the rates of economic development and decline differ between European countries. 
After the collapse of the communist regimes, Eastern Europe has seen unprecedented 
economic growth, which replaced the uncertainty and insecurity of the transformation 
to a market economy with a record of performance (Mishler & Rose, 2002). Based on 
modernisation theory, we therefore expect a stronger decline in support for authoritarian 
values in Eastern European countries. The economic and financial crisis also affected 
Western and Eastern European countries differently. We explore to what extent different 
rates of economic development and decline have resulted in different trends in support for 
authoritarian values in Western and Eastern Europe.
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5.2.2 Demographic developments
Educational expansion
Another argument for a potential decline in support for authoritarian values can be 
found in the rationalisation of worldviews (Weber, 1920). Education is argued to broaden 
and diversify people’s socio-cultural perspective, and to expand people’s awareness 
of alternative viewpoints, which reduces their transcendent faith in authorities and 
rigid social norms (Gabennesch, 1972; Hello et al., 2002). Theoretical perspectives of 
liberalisation and socialisation argue that education as an institution transmits liberal 
democratic values and norms of tolerance and equality (Stubager, 2008; Surridge, 2016; 
Vogt, 1997). Over the past decades, educational opportunities have increased for large 
segments of European populations, giving rise to an ongoing expansion of education 
in European countries. For example, the percentage of Europeans between 25-64 years 
old with tertiary education has increased from 20 percent in 2002 to 30 percent in 
2016 (Eurostat, 2017c). As a consequence, not only the higher educated, but the entire 
population has likely become exposed to increasingly liberal democratic values, which 
may have reduced support for authoritarian values. 
However, the effect of rising educational levels may differ across Europe, depending on 
the democratic history of a country and the dominant values that are transmitted in 
the educational system (Weil, 1985). According to Weil (1985) “the impact of education 
on liberal values is weaker, non-existent, or sometimes even reversed in non-liberal 
democracies or countries which did not have liberal democratic regimes in earlier decades” 
(p.470). Under the former communist regimes in Eastern Europe, citizens were controlled 
and demanded to conform to superiors in all spheres of life (Mishler & Rose, 2002). Hence, 
we expect that educational institutions in authoritarian communist regimes transmitted 
values of conformity and obedience to authority for the purpose of indoctrination and 
political repression (Dobbins & Kwiek, 2017). The educational systems in Eastern European 
countries have been reformed after the collapse of communism, but not without problems 
(Dobbins & Kwiek, 2017). We therefore expect the influence of educational expansion to 
be less strong in countries with an authoritarian communist legacy. We formulate the 
following hypotheses: support for authoritarian values among Europeans is less strong in 
times of educational expansion (H2a), and this negative relationship is stronger in Western 
Europe than in Eastern Europe (H2b).
Secularisation
According to theories of rationalisation and secularisation, technological and scientific 
advances have presented alternatives to the dominance of theological and supernatural 
explanations to provide people with a sense of security and meaning in life. Consequently, 
religious institutions have lost their influence and authority over people’s beliefs and 
moral principles (Wilson, 1966). According to Chaves (1994), people therefore search 
elsewhere than the established churches and religious traditions to derive their values 
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and moral standards from. Moreover, due to declining church attendance, people are less 
strongly integrated into a religious environment, which makes them less likely to comply 
with the (traditional) norms of the religious community. We expect that individuals show 
lower support for authoritarian values when they are exposed to a more secular societal 
climate in which conformity to religious prescriptions is no longer the rule. We formulate 
the following hypothesis: support for authoritarian values among Europeans is less strong in 
times of secularisation (H3).
Over the past decades, religious affiliation and church attendance have indeed dropped 
substantially in a majority of European countries (Brenner, 2016), although evidence for this 
process in former communist countries is less clear. For example, Reitsma et al. (2012) found 
that religious affiliation and church attendance increased, rather than decreased in Eastern 
Europe after the collapse of communist regimes, whereas Brenner (2016) argued that, more 
recently, attendance rates are overall stable or declining in most of these countries. We 
therefore explore to what extent different rates of secularisation have resulted in varying 
trends in support for authoritarian values between Western and Eastern Europe.
Rising ethnic diversity
In the last few years, several armed conflicts and humanitarian crises have unleashed 
large numbers of refugees and other immigrants from non-western parts of the world 
to move to European countries (OECD, 2016a). This has raised major concerns all over 
Europe, for example about threats to national order, security and identity, and the erosion 
of shared norms and values. People in countries that experienced strong increases in 
the inflow and presence of immigrants may develop stronger perceptions of normative 
insecurity and threat, inducing a stronger need for order, security, and strong leaders that 
protect borders and national identity. Previous research argued that (the perception of) 
cultural and normative threat activates authoritarian reactions, either among people with 
an authoritarian predisposition (Feldman & Stenner, 1997), or among those still low in 
authoritarianism (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Other studies 
have shown that perceived cultural threat arising from changes in the size of the minority 
population heightens exclusionary reactions towards immigrants (Coenders et al., 2008; 
Meuleman et al., 2009), and support for radical right parties (Lubbers & Coenders, 2017; 
Rydgren, 2007). Hence, we expect that: support for authoritarian values among Europeans is 
stronger in times of increasing ethnic diversity (H4).
There are considerable differences between European countries with regard to the actual 
inflow and settlement of immigrants and asylum seekers. While Western European 
countries have seen considerable fluctuations in the numbers of asylum seekers, 
immigration to Eastern European countries remained low and has only taken off since 2012 
(OECD, 2016a). Hence, we explore to what extent these differences in immigration between 
Western and Eastern European countries have resulted in different trends in support for 
authoritarian values.
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5.3 Data and measurements
We use data from seven rounds of the European Social Surveys (ESS), collected in 2002, 
2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. The ESS is a cross-national survey conducted every 
two years across Europe, to monitor and interpret changing public attitudes and values 
within Europe. Data are collected through face-to-face interviews among representative 
samples of all persons aged 15 years and over living within private households in one 
of the participating countries. To ensure high quality data that are comparable across 
the participating countries, the survey implements high standards with regard to the 
sampling procedure, response rates, questionnaire design, translation, and fieldwork 
process (more information about the ESS and country-specific methodology is available 
at www.europeansocialsurvey.org). We selected countries that participated in at least six 
out of seven rounds (i.e., thirteen Western European and five Eastern European countries), 
because participation in the survey likely depends on a country’s economic situation, i.e., 
wealthier countries are more likely to be surveyed across all rounds whereas less wealthy 
countries are more likely to participate in recent rounds. The pooled dataset consists of 
216,611 individuals in 124 country-year combinations.
5.3.1 Dependent variable
To measure support for authoritarian values, we used five questions asking about the 
importance people attach to: living in a secure surrounding, following rules, having a 
strong government that ensures safety and defends its citizens, behaving properly, and 
following customs and traditions, derived from the Schwarz value orientation scale (for 
exact wording of the questions, see Table A5.1, Appendix Chapter 5). Respondents could 
answer these questions on a scale ranging from 1 to 6. Factor analyses showed that these 
items constitute one factor (see Table A5.1, Appendix 5 for factor loadings and Cronbach’s 
alphas per survey year).1 We constructed a scale based on the mean scores of respondents 
with at least four valid answers on the five questions (overall Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70 in 
Western Europe and 0.69 in Eastern Europe). We reversed the answering categories so that 
a higher score on the scale indicates stronger support for authoritarian values. Missing 
values on the dependent variable were deleted listwise (4.5 percent).
5.3.2 Contextual characteristics
Economic development was measured with GDP, deficit or surplus on the national balance, 
and unemployment level. We took a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
1   Removing the item with the lowest factor loading (“important to do what is told and to follow rules”) 
from the scale did not alter the results. In addition, the item “important to live in a safe and secure 
surrounding” may seem conceptually different from the other items, but removing this item from the 
scale did not alter the results. 
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(divided by 1000) in U.S. dollars (OECD, 2017).2 National balance was measured as the net 
government borrowing (-) or lending (+) of the general government as a percentage of GDP 
(Eurostat, 2017b). Unemployment rate was measured as the annual average unemployment 
rate as a percentage of the active population (Eurostat, 2017d). Educational expansion was 
measured as the percentage of the population aged 25-74 years that obtained tertiary 
education (ISCED 5-8) (Eurostat, 2017c).3 To measure the level of secularisation in a country, 
we aggregated per country and survey year the percentage of people who never attend 
church and those who attend less often than on special holy days based on the variable 
“How often do you attend religious services apart from special occasions?”. Immigration 
was measured as the percentage asylum applicants of the total population (Eurostat, 2015, 
2017a).4 Abrupt changes in GDP, national balance, unemployment rate, and immigration 
were calculated by taking the difference between the level of these characteristics in the 
survey year and the preceding year.5 All contextual characteristics were centred on the 
grand mean.
Figure A5.1 in the Appendix of Chapter 5 shows the trends in economic and demographic 
indicators in Western and Eastern European countries over time. Figure A5.1a shows an 
increase in GDP between 2002 and 2014 in both Western and Eastern Europe. Between 2008 
and 2009, the economic crisis can be observed as a reduction in GDP, which appeared to 
be somewhat stronger in Western Europe. In addition, Figure A5.1b shows a deterioration 
of the national balance (increase in government debt) since 2007, after a few years of 
improvement. Government debt increased more strongly in Western Europe and even 
surpassed the debt in Eastern Europe in 2010. After that, the national balance improved 
again in either part of Europe. Figure A5.1c shows a decline of unemployment rates from 
10 percent to 6 percent in Eastern European countries between 2001 and 2008, while 
unemployment rates remained around 6 percent in Western Europe in this period. Since 
the economic crisis in 2008, however, unemployment rates increased in both Western 
and Eastern Europe. Whereas unemployment has declined again in Eastern Europe since 
2010, it continued to rise in Western Europe until 2013. Figure A5.1d shows an increase 
in the percentage tertiary educated people from 25.3 percent to 35.9 percent in Western 
Europe, and from 16.3 percent to 27.6 percent in Eastern European countries. Figure 
A5.1e shows that the percentage secular individuals in Western Europe remained rather 
stable between 2002 and 2014 at around 60 percent, whereas the percentage individuals 
not attending church rose from about 39.6 to 51.9 in Eastern Europe. Figure A5.1f shows 
2   We also performed the analyses using a logarithmic function of GDP, but this did not change the results.
3   Information about the percentage tertiary educated individuals in Austria was missing between 2000 and 
2003. We replaced the missing values using linear interpolation based on the values in 1999 and 2004.
4   The number of asylum applicants is not a perfect representation of immigration because not all 
immigrants apply for asylum. However, information on the number of immigrants was lacking for 
France in several waves.
5   Different lags for the contextual characteristics were tested. These did not alter our conclusions.
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that the percentage asylum applications declined in Western Europe between 2002 and 
2006, followed by an increase. In Eastern European countries, the percentage of asylum 
applications declined until 2012, with a sharp increase since 2012.
5.3.3 Individual characteristics
To account for shifts in the composition of the population within European countries, we 
included several individual characteristics which have been shown to relate to support 
for authoritarian values. To measure individuals’ educational attainment, we used the 
highest level of education respondents have achieved. For reasons of comparison between 
countries and over time, we collapsed responses in four categories based on ISCED levels: 
(1) primary education, (2) lower secondary education, (3) upper secondary education, and 
(4) tertiary education. We excluded people who indicated to have had other education, 
because of the relatively low number of respondents in this category (0.2 percent). 
Socio-economic position was based on the EGP class scheme (Erikson, Goldthorpe, & 
Portocarero, 1979), collapsed into two categories: non-manual workers and manual 
workers, supplemented with the categories unemployed, in education, and ‘other’, 
which includes people who are disabled, retired or working in the household. Because 
the influence of contextual economic conditions may be confounded with individual 
perceptions of economic strain, we included a measure of perceived economic strain based 
on the respondents’ feeling about their household’s income. Response categories were 
(1) living comfortably on present income, (2) coping on present income, (3) finding it 
difficult on present income, and (4) finding it very difficult on present income. To measure 
religiosity, respondents could indicate how religious they are on a scale between 0 (not at 
all religious) and 10 (very religious). To measure church attendance, we used the question 
“How often do you attend religious services apart from special occasions?”. Response 
categories were: everyday, more than once a week, once a week, at least once a month, 
only on special holy days, less often and never. We reversed these categories so that a 
higher score represents more frequent church attendance. To distinguish between older 
and younger people, we included people’s year of birth.6 Community size was based on 
respondents’ description of their domicile, ranging from (1) big city to (5) farm or home in 
countryside. We included respondents’ sex (0 = men, 1 = women) and ethnic minority status 
(0 = no, 1 = yes). In addition, we included dummies for the country in which people live to 
account for unobserved country differences. Missing values (6 percent) on the individual 
characteristics were deleted listwise. Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the 
dependent and independent variables.
6   Birth year was linearly related to the dependent variable. As the model fit of a model including dummies 
for each birth year only slightly improved as compared to a model including a linear measure for birth 
year, we chose a more parsimonious model.
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Table 5.1 | Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables 
 
Source: ESS round 1-7; N level 1 = 216,611; N level 2 = 124.
Western Europe
(N = 165,279)
Eastern Europe
(N = 51,332)
  Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD
Support for authoritarian values 1 6 4.23 0.88 1 6 4.56 0.79
Contextual characteristics
GDP (/1000) 20.37 65.79 38.68 8.88 11.78 32.36 22.42 5.45
National balance (-/+) -32.10 19.73 -1.75 6.26 -9.30 2.90 -3.15 2.71
Unemployment rate (%) 2.50 24.80 7.81 3.96 4.40 20.00 9.07 3.88
% tertiary educated 9.40 42.30 30.55 6.52 11.90 37.60 22.46 7.62
Secularisation 18.68 75.40 60.63 12.05 7.99 78.24 49.36 23.92
Asylum applicants (%) 0.00 0.84 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.43 0.03 0.07
∆ GDP (/1000) -2.51 6.33 1.54 1.23 0.10 2.75 1.15 0.57
∆ National balance (-/+) -18.36 4.61 -0.31 2.77 -3.82 9.96 0.51 1.91
∆ Unemployment rate (%) -2.30 3.40 0.16 0.93 -4.00 3.20 -0.23 1.44
∆ Asylum applicants (%) -0.18 0.27 0.01 0.06 -0.09 0.24 0.00 0.05
Individual characteristics
Education
 Primary 0 1 0.17 0 1 0.03
 Lower secondary 0 1 0.18 0 1 0.22
 Upper secondary 0 1 0.42 0 1 0.59
 Tertiary 0 1 0.23 0 1 0.16
Socio-economic position
 Manual workers 0 1 0.36 0 1 0.28
 Non-manual workers 0 1 0.14 0 1 0.19
 In education 0 1 0.08 0 1 0.10
 Unemployed 0 1 0.05 0 1 0.06
 Other 0 1 0.36 0 1 0.37
Perceived economic strain  
(living on present income)
 Comfortably 0 1 0.39 0 1 0.14
 Coping 0 1 0.44 0 1 0.52
 Difficult 0 1 0.13 0 1 0.26
 Very difficult 0 1 0.04 0 1 0.08
Religiosity (not at all - very) 0 10 4.51 2.94 0 10 4.30 3.13
Church attendance (never - every day) 0 7 5.60 1.49 0 7 5.31 1.55
Birth year 1900 2000 1960.01 18.68 1907 2000 1961.57 18.84
Sex (women) 0 1 0.53 0 1 0.55
Ethnic minority (yes) 0 1 0.04 0 1 0.07
Community type
 Big city 0 1 0.16 0 1 0.23
 Suburbs 0 1 0.15 0 1 0.06
 Town or small city 0 1 0.31 0 1 0.34
 Country village 0 1 0.29 0 1 0.33
 Farm or countryside 0 1 0.09 0 1 0.03
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5.4 Methods
Since individuals in our data are observed at one point in time and the same countries 
are observed multiple times, the data are cross-sectional in nature at the individual 
level and have a panel structure at the contextual level. In order to test our hypotheses, 
we estimated multilevel regression models with individuals nested in country-year 
combinations for Western and Eastern Europe separately. We started with a null-model, 
estimating the amount of variation in support for authoritarian values at the country-year 
level. In Western Europe, 4.9 percent of the total variance is can be found at the country-
year level; in Eastern Europe this amounts to 5.2 percent. 
Because we are interested in the within-country relationships between changing 
contextual characteristics and changes in support for authoritarian values, we included 
country dummies to account for unobserved country characteristics rather than 
measuring country variation at a third level. As a consequence, all variance that is left 
unexplained at the country-year level cannot be attributed to country differences (Te 
Grotenhuis et al., 2015). Once we included the country dummies, the variance at the 
country-year level dropped to a meagre 0.5 percent in Western Europe and to 1.0 percent 
in Eastern Europe. Differences between countries thus explain most of the country-year 
variation. 
When we subsequently included the individual characteristics, the proportion of the total 
variance explained at the country-year level increased from 0.5 to 1.0 percent in Western 
Europe and from 1.0 to 1.9 percent in Eastern Europe. This indicates that a part of the true 
underlying variance in support for authoritarian values within countries is masked due 
to changes in the composition of the population. That is, the actual change in support 
for authoritarian values within countries is larger when accounted for the individual 
characteristics, because the distribution of these characteristics within European 
populations has changed in an opposite direction.7
Next, we included the contextual characteristics in the model, using a stepwise procedure. 
First, we estimated the relationship between each of the contextual characteristics and 
our dependent variable for Western and Eastern Europe separately, controlled for country 
dummies and individual characteristics (see Table A5.2 and A5.3, Appendix Chapter 5). In 
each subsequent step, we entered to the equation the variable with the smallest p-value, 
until the criterion (p < .10) was exceeded. This resulted in two final models for Western and 
Eastern Europe, including those contextual characteristics that significantly contributed 
to the within-country variation in support for authoritarian values, controlled for relevant 
individual characteristics and country dummy variables.
7   Additional analyses showed that the largest compositional effect comes from cohort replacement: 
younger people are less supportive of authoritarian values than older people; the replacement of older 
people by younger less authoritarian people has therefore resulted in lower aggregate levels of support 
for authoritarian values over time. 
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5.5 Results
5.5.1 Descriptive results
The first part of our research question focused on the extent to which there is over time 
variation in support for authoritarian values within European countries and to what extent 
this variation differs between Eastern and Western Europe. Figure 5.1 shows the trend in 
support for authoritarian values in Western and Eastern countries over time. Between 
2002 and 2014, the overall trend seems rather stable (given that the scale ranges from 
1-6). In Eastern Europe, however, support for authoritarian values declined significantly 
between 2002 and 2008.8 Between 2008 and 2012, there has been a slight, yet significant 
increase in support for authoritarian values in both Western and Eastern Europe, which 
was significantly stronger in the latter.9 Between 2012 and 2014, this upsurge stabilised in 
Eastern Europe, and reversed significantly in Western Europe.
Figure 5.1 |  Trends in support for authoritarian values in Western and Eastern Europe, 2002-
2014
Source: ESS round 1-7; N = 216,611.
8   We tested the significance of the differences in the mean level of support for authoritarian values 
between the survey years using a post hoc Bonferroni test (p < .05).
9   We tested whether the increase in support for authoritarian values between 2008 and 2014 differed 
significantly (p < .01) between Western and Eastern Europe in a non-hierarchical linear regression model 
including interaction terms between dummy variables for survey year and a dummy for Western/Eastern 
Europe.
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5.5.2 Multivariate results
Table 5.2 and 5.3 show the multivariate results from the stepwise multilevel regression 
analyses of the contextual characteristics for Western and Eastern Europe respectively, 
controlled for relevant individual characteristics and country dummies (for regression 
estimates of the country dummy variables, see Table A5.4 and A5.5, Appendix Chapter 5). 
Table 5.2 shows a significant positive effect of GDP on Western Europeans’ support for 
authoritarian values (b = 0.01, p < .001).10
Although we found an influence of unemployment in Western Europe in a model 
analysing this variable separately from the other contextual indicators (see Table A5.2, 
Appendix Chapter 5), it disappeared when accounted for GDP. This finding contradicts 
hypothesis 1a in Western Europe: in times of economic prosperity, Western Europeans 
even showed more support for authoritarian values rather than less. In Eastern Europe, 
levels of GDP did not significantly influence support for authoritarian values. Although 
GDP also has a positive effect in Eastern Europe when analysed separately from the other 
contextual characteristics (see Table A5.3, Appendix Chapter 5), this effect disappeared 
when educational expansion was taken into account. Table 5.3 shows that support 
for authoritarian values in Eastern Europe was significantly stronger in times of higher 
unemployment rates (b = 0.01, p < .001). This partly supports hypothesis 1a that support for 
authoritarian values is lower in times of economic prosperity, but only in Eastern Europe, 
and only when measured as a country’s unemployment rate. 
Table 5.2 and 5.3 show that support for authoritarian values was less strong in times of 
sudden increases in GDP in both Western and Eastern European countries (b = -0.01, p < .10 
respectively b = -0.04, p < .05). This finding support hypothesis 1b that people attach more 
importance to authoritarian values in times of sudden economic decline, when measured 
as changes in GDP. Moreover, Table 5.2 indicates that in times of sudden increases in the 
unemployment rate, Western Europeans showed more support for authoritarian values 
(b = 0.01, p < .10). The sudden rise in unemployment rates due to the economic recession 
in Western Europe since 200811 (see Figure A5.1c, Appendix Chapter 5) therefore seems to 
have contributed to the slight increase in support for authoritarian values since 2008. 
We found no significant influence of government debt and sudden changes herein on 
people’s support for authoritarian values.
With regard to developments in the demographic context, Table 5.3 presents a positive 
effect of educational expansion in Eastern Europe (b = 0.02, p < .001), which indicates that 
10  To assess whether the positive effect of GDP is driven by any particular country, we analysed the model 
excluding the countries in the model one by one. These analyses revealed that the positive effect of GDP 
in Western Europe is robust.
11  Additional analyses revealed that individual perceptions of economic strain do not mediate the 
relationships between the contextual characteristics and support for authoritarian values.
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Eastern Europeans supported authoritarian values more in times of higher percentages 
of tertiary educated individuals in their country, accounted for the other contextual 
indicators in the model. In Western Europe, we found a positive effect of the percentage 
tertiary educated in society when analysed separately from the other contextual 
characteristics (see Table A5.2, Appendix Chapter 5), but this influence disappeared once 
GDP was taken into account. Thus, although educational levels have continued to rise in 
both Western and Eastern Europe, we found no evidence for hypothesis 2a that support for 
authoritarian values was less strong in times of a higher percentage of tertiary educated 
individuals in society. Educational expansion even seems to have increased rather than 
decreased people’s support for authoritarian values in Eastern European countries, 
leading us to reject hypothesis 2a and 2b. Yet, this may not be very surprising given that 
higher educated Eastern Europeans do not show less support for authoritarian values in 
the first place (see the individual-level effect of education in Table 5.3).
Table 5.2 shows that Western Europeans’ support authoritarian values was lower in times 
of higher rates of secularisation (b = -0.01, p < .05), accounted for the other contextual 
characteristics in the model. This supports hypothesis 3. The ongoing process of 
secularisation thus seems to have contributed to slightly lower aggregate support for 
authoritarian values in Western Europe, thereby counterbalancing the influence of 
adverse economic conditions. In Eastern Europe, secularisation had a significant positive 
influence on support for authoritarian values when analysed separately (see Table A5.3, 
Appendix Chapter 5), but this effect disappeared when educational expansion was 
taken into account in Table 5.3. Hence, we find no support for hypothesis 3 in Eastern 
Europe. Although Eastern European countries have become more secular (see Figure 
A5.1e, Appendix Chapter 5), this development did not contribute to lower support for 
authoritarian values in these countries.
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Table 5.2 |  Stepwise multilevel regression coefficients of contextual characteristics on 
support for authoritarian values in Western Europe, controlled for country 
dummies and individual characteristics
 
Source: ESS round 1-7; N level 1 = 165,279; N level 2 = 91.
a  We centred the birth year variable on the mean, so that the reference category represents respondents in 
the average birth year.
~ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed).
B SE
Time-varying effects (level 2)
GDP (/1000) .01*** .00
∆ GDP (/1000) -.01~ .01
∆ Unemployment rate (%) .01~ .01
Secularisation -.01* .00
Fixed effects (level 1)
Educational attainment (primary = ref.)
 Lower secondary -.03*** .01
 Upper secondary -.07*** .01
 Tertiary -.24*** .01
Socio-economic position (non-manual workers = ref.)   
 Manual workers .09*** .01
 In education -.05*** .01
 Unemployed .00 .01
 Other .10*** .01
Perceived economic strain (living comfortably  
on present income = ref.)
  
 Coping on present income .01* .00
 Difficult on present income .01 .01
 Very difficult on present income .01 .01
Church attendance (never – every day) .04*** .00
Religiosity (not at all – very) .05*** .00
Birth yeara -.01*** .00
Sex (men = ref.)   
 Women .02*** .00
Ethnic minority (no = ref.)   
 Yes .20*** .01
Community type (big city = ref.)   
 Suburbs .01~ .01
 Town or small city .04*** .01
 Country village .04*** .01
 Farm or countryside .00 .01
Intercept 3.65*** .04
Variance components
Individual (level 1) .64*** .00
Country-years (level 2) .00*** .00
ICC (%) 0.48
-2LL 395563.51
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Table 5.3 |  Stepwise multilevel regression coefficients of contextual characteristics on 
support for authoritarian values in Eastern Europe, controlled for country 
dummies and individual characteristics
 
Source: ESS round 1-7; N level 1 = 51,332; N level 2 = 35.
a  We centred the birth year variable on the mean, so that the reference category represents respondents in 
the average birth year.
~ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***  p < .001 (two-tailed).
B SE
Time-varying effects (level 2)
∆ GDP (/1000) -.04* .01
Unemployment rate .01*** .00
% tertiary educated .02*** .00
Fixed effects (level 1)
Educational attainment (primary = ref.)
 Lower secondary .05* .02
 Upper secondary .07*** .02
 Tertiary .03 .02
Socio-economic position (non-manual workers = ref.)   
 Manual workers .03* .01
 In education -.07*** .01
 Unemployed -.06*** .02
 Other .02* .01
Perceived economic strain (living comfortably on 
present income = ref.)
  
 Coping on present income .06*** .01
 Difficult on present income .06*** .01
 Very difficult on present income .07*** .02
Church attendance (never – every day) .05*** .00
Religiosity (not at all – very) .02*** .00
Birth yeara -.01*** .00
Sex (men = ref.)   
 Women .11*** .01
Ethnic minority (no = ref.)   
 Yes .12*** .01
Community type (big city = ref.)   
 Suburbs .01 .01
 Town or small city .00 .01
 Country village .02 .01
 Farm or countryside .03 .02
Intercept 4.30*** .03
Variance components
Individual (level 1) .53*** .00
Country-years (level 2) .00*** .00
ICC (%) 0.28
-2LL 112746.77
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Lastly, Table 5.2 and 5.3 indicate that there is no significant influence of the percentage 
asylum applicants in a country, nor of sudden changes therein, once controlled for 
the other contextual characteristics in the model. In a bivariate analysis, we found 
significantly stronger support for authoritarian values in Western Europe in times of 
higher percentages of asylum seekers and in times of sudden changes therein (see Table 
A5.2, Appendix Chapter 5). The rise in the percentage asylum seekers in Western Europe 
since 2006 thus seems related to the rise in support for authoritarianism, but this 
relationship disappeared when accounted for the rise in GDP and the sudden increase in 
unemployment that took place in the same period. In Eastern Europe, we found stronger 
support for authoritarian values in times of a sudden increase in the percentage of asylum 
seekers (see Table A5.3, Appendix Chapter 5), which has indeed increased as from 2012, 
but this reduced to a non-significant effect when educational expansion was taken into 
account. This leads us to reject hypothesis 4: Europeans’ support for authoritarian values 
was not significantly stronger in times of increasing ethnic diversity, once accounted for 
other contextual conditions. As a robustness check, we analysed the models presented in 
Table 5.2 and 5.3 again, excluding the countries one by one. These analyses did not lead to 
different conclusions. 
The individual characteristics in Table 5.2 show that support for authoritarian values in 
Western Europe is stronger among lower educated individuals, non-manual workers, 
people who frequently attend church and those who consider themselves as religious, 
older people, women, people belonging to an ethnic minority group, and people living 
in small cities and country villages. We find little evidence that being unemployed and 
perceiving economic strain is significantly associated with more support for authoritarian 
values in Western Europe, but this appeared largely due to the inclusion of educational 
attainment in the model.
Table 5.3 shows that lower and upper secondary educated Eastern Europeans show more 
support for authoritarian values than the lower educated, whereas tertiary educated 
individuals are as supportive of authoritarian values as lower educated individuals. In 
Eastern Europe, support for authoritarian values is stronger among manual workers, 
people who perceive economic strain, people who frequently attend church, people who 
consider themselves religious, older people, women, and people belonging to an ethnic 
minority group. We find no significant difference in support for authoritarian values 
between Eastern Europeans living in different community types.
5.6 Conclusion and discussion
In this study, we investigated changes in support for authoritarian values over time in 
Western and Eastern Europe. In addition, we examined whether the over time variation 
could be explained by differential economic and demographic developments that have 
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characterised European countries over the past decades. Building on modernisation 
theory, we expected that economic development, educational expansion, and 
secularisation would have reduced Europeans’ support for authoritarian values. On the 
other hand, we expected the economic crisis and rising immigration to have increased 
support for authoritarian values in Europe.
Based on data from seven waves of the European Social Surveys, covering 18 European 
countries in the period between 2002-2014, we found that people’s support for 
authoritarian values remained rather stable between 2002 and 2014 in both Western 
and Eastern European countries. In line with previous research (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997), 
support for authoritarian values was more widespread in Eastern European countries than 
in Western European countries. Although variation in support for authoritarian values 
within countries was minimal, we found that changes over time could be partly explained 
by counterbalancing economic and demographic developments in national contexts. 
In contrast to modernisation theory, rising economic prosperity in both Western and 
Eastern European countries has not evidently decreased support for authoritarian values. 
Surprisingly, in Western Europe, economic development even contributed to a slight 
increase in support for authoritarian values. In Eastern Europe, an improvement of the 
labour market seemed to lower people’s support for authoritarian values. The reduction of 
the unemployment rate by half between 2002 and 2008 seemed partly responsible for the 
slight decline in support for authoritarian values in this period.
The result of this study (at least partly) support the scarcity thesis. We showed that 
economic insecurity arising from sudden drops in GDP and (sudden) increases in 
unemployment rates, have induced stronger support for authoritarian values, even over 
and above individual perceptions of economic strain. The economic recession has been 
partly responsible for the slight increase in Europeans’ support for authoritarian values 
since 2008. The basic assumption of modernisation theory that people are more inclined to 
support authoritarian values under conditions of economic decline (Inglehart, 1997) thus 
seems to hold. In line with Olzak (1992), especially sudden changes in economic conditions 
affect people’s support for authoritarian values, presumably because such “shocks” are 
most likely to be noticed by the general public, for example through the media.
We also expected that educational expansion and secularisation would have decreased 
people’s support for authoritarian values, whereas rising ethnic diversity due to 
immigration would increase the importance people attach to these values. We found no 
support for a liberalising effect of educational expansion at the country level on people’s 
support for authoritarian values (Vogt, 1997). In Eastern Europe, educational expansion 
even contributed to a slight increase in support for authoritarian values. This supports 
Weil’s argument that the influence of education on liberal values is conditional on which 
values are transmitted in schools (Weil, 1985). Apparently, educational institutions in 
Eastern Europe have socialised people into more authoritarian values (although we could 
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not rule out the possibility that people get promoted to higher educational levels, because 
they demonstrate more conformity and obedience). As a consequence, in times of higher 
educational expansion, Eastern Europeans seem more exposed to values of conformity 
and obedience to authority, echoing the legacy of authoritarian communist regimes 
(Mishler & Rose, 2002).
Continuing secularisation has contributed to a decline in support for authoritarian values 
in Western Europe only, which has possibly counterbalanced the negative influence 
of adverse economic conditions. In line with secularisation theories (Chaves, 1994; 
Wilson, 1966), secularisation indeed seems to have reduced the dominance of religious 
institutions in determining people’s beliefs and opened up alternatives to compliance to 
religious norms and authorities – at least in Western Europe. Although church attendance 
also decreased in Eastern European countries between 2002 and 2014, this has not resulted 
in a decline in Eastern Europeans’ support for authoritarian values.
Lastly, we found no influence of increases in ethnic diversity as measured by the 
percentage of asylum applicants in a country, despite recent increases in immigration. 
Other (economic) societal conditions proved more important. One could argue that the 
percentage of asylum applicants does not adequately measure rising ethnic diversity in 
society as this measure may depend on application procedures. However, we found no 
influence of other measures of rising ethnic diversity, such as the percentage foreign born 
people or immigrants in a country (although these measures were not available for each 
country). Another explanation could be that it is not rising ethnic diversity or immigration 
itself, but perceptions of ethnic threat that influence support for authoritarian values, 
regardless of actual immigration. Previous research has shown that perceptions of ethnic 
threat explain negative out-group attitudes (e.g., Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010; Schneider, 
2008), and radical right-wing voting (e.g., Lubbers & Coenders, 2017; Lucassen & Lubbers, 
2012). Such explanation may also hold for rising support for authoritarian values.
Our study has several implications for future research. In the media and in the rapidly 
expanding literature on the rise of populism, the supposed rise in European’s support 
for authoritarian values has been advanced as a popular explanation for the increasing 
electoral success of populist parties and authoritarian leaders in Europe. However, we 
found that support for authoritarian values has hardly become more widespread in Europe 
over the past two decades. This suggests that an explanation for the rise of populist 
voting may not directly be found in a rise of support for authoritarian values. In addition, 
it raises questions about the legitimacy of the increasingly authoritarian governments in 
for example Hungary and Poland. Nevertheless, those supportive of authoritarian values 
may have become more inclined to support populist radical right parties over time, either 
because they feel increasingly threatened by certain economic or cultural conditions 
(Feldman & Stenner, 1997), or because populist parties increasingly managed to attract 
their votes. This remains an interesting direction for future research.
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Unfortunately, we could analyse support for authoritarian values over a relatively short 
time period only. We may have found a decrease in support for authoritarian values due to 
modernisation if we had been able to analyse data covering a longer time span. Moreover, 
since 2015, more than a million refugees and asylum seekers crossed into Europe, triggering 
a crisis on how to deal with the influx and creating sharp divides in the EU regarding the 
relocation of migrants. In this period, Europe has also suffered from a series of terrorist 
attacks. These developments may have aggravated perceptions of societal threat and 
insecurity, possibly giving rise to stronger support for authoritarian values after 2014.
We conclude that the process of modernisation is not as unidirectional and universal as 
initially suggested. Economic growth, secularisation and educational expansion have 
not necessarily reduced support for authoritarian values among all individuals in society 
who have been exposed to these changes. These developments have also had a different 
influence in Western and Eastern European countries. Although modernisation processes 
may have diminished Europeans’ support for authoritarian values in the long run because 
subsequent generations have been socialised under more secure societal circumstances, 
we were unable to directly test this socialisation hypothesis due to the lack of contextual 
data for each birth cohort in each of the European countries that allow to measure 
exposure to modernisation processes during people’s formative years. We consider it 
plausible that beyond a certain level of existential security, economic development may 
not further contribute to a de-emphasis of authoritarian values. In addition, although 
economic prosperity continues to rise in Western Europe, people may have become more 
aware that economic growth has its limits and limitations. The global financial crisis has 
likely induced perceptions that stability and security cannot be taken for granted (Mols & 
Jetten, 2017).
Moreover, even a counter-reaction to modernisation may have taken place in Western 
Europe. According to the losers of modernisation theory, modernisation has left behind 
a group of people who are unable to cope with the acceleration of economic, social, and 
cultural modernisation because they are stuck in the lowest social strata and risk to 
become superfluous and useless for society (Betz, 1994). Similar arguments have been 
made by Norris and Inglehart (2017), who recently argued that modernisation has triggered 
a cultural backlash among the older and less-secure individuals in society. The growing 
emphasis on the individual, increasing civil liberties for ethnic and cultural minorities, 
the breakdown of communities, and the erosion of once dominant traditional norms, may 
have induced perceptions of threat, anxiety and resentment. These developments may 
even have induced a feeling that people have become “strangers in their own lands”, left 
behind by the increased emphasis on values they do not share (Hochschild, 2016). Whether 
support for authoritarian values has indeed increased more strongly among the groups 
that suffered from modernisation remains a question for future research.
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Example counterfactual analysis
In this Appendix, I explain counterfactual analysis in a straightforward example, based on a 
sample of the Dutch population from the Socio-Cultural Developments in the Netherlands 
surveys (SOCON) of 1985 and 2011 (Eisinga et al., 2012; Felling, Peters, & Schreuder, 1985). As 
the outcome variable, I use people’s responses on a measurement of ethnic prejudice in 
two survey waves. The independent variable is education, divided in two categories: low/
middle education and high education. 
Table A1.1 shows the association between education and ethnic prejudice in 1985. In the 
column totals it can be seen that, in this example, 68.4 percent of the Dutch had a low or 
middle education and 31.6 percent had a high education in 1985. The inner cells (grey area) 
show that within the category of lower educated respondents, the percentage holding 
ethnic prejudice was 51.6 and among the higher educated it was 22.5. In total, 42.2 percent 
of the sample gave an answer indicating ethnic prejudice. 
Table A1.2 shows the association between education and ethnic prejudice in 2011. The 
educational distribution of the sample had changed considerably compared to 1985: 
looking at the column totals, the share of lower or middle educated Dutch decreased 
to 53.9 percent and the percentage higher educated increased to 46.1 percent. The inner 
cells (grey area) show that the relative share supporting ethnic prejudice increased to 68.5 
percent among the low/middle educated respondents (compared to 51.6 percent in 1985) 
and to 51.7 percent among the higher educated respondents (compared to 22.5 percent 
in 2011). The statistical association therefore dropped with 0.05 between 1985 and 2011 
(Cramér’s V = 0.27 in 1985 and 0.22 in 2011). In total, the percentage holding ethnic prejudice 
increased from 42.2 percent in 1985 to 60.8 percent in 2011.  
Table A1.1 |  The association between education and ethnic prejudice in the Netherlands in 1985
Year: 1985 low/middle  
education
high
education
row totals
no ethnic prejudice 419
48.4%
310
77.5%
729
57.6%
ethnic prejudice 446
51.6%
90
22.5%
536
42.2%
column totals 865
68.4%
400
31.6%
1,265
100%
Source: SOCON 1985, 2011; N = 1,265.
Note. Strength of association in Cramér’s V = 0.27.
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Table A1.2 |  The association between education and ethnic prejudice in the Netherlands in 2011
Year: 2011 low/middle  
education
high
education
row totals
no ethnic prejudice 119
31.5%
156
48.3%
275
39.2%
ethnic prejudice 259
68.5%
167
51.7%
426
60.8%
column totals 378
53.9%
323
46.1%
701
100%
Source: SOCON 1985, 2011; N = 701.
Note. Strength of association in Cramér’s V = 0.22.
Simulating a fixed association
The observed increase in ethnic prejudice between 1985 and 2011 may be due to changes 
in the association between education and ethnic prejudice, i.e., shifts in the relative 
percentage of respondents that supports prejudice within each category of education. To 
estimate the actual contribution of such associational changes in explaining the increase 
in ethnic prejudice, we can simulate a counterfactual situation in which the association 
had not changed between 1985 and 2011, and calculate a new percentage of respondents 
with ethnic prejudice. In other words, we impose the 1985 association on the sample of 
2011. To do so, we need the association in 1985 from Table A1.1 together with the sample of 
2011 and the distribution in the 2011 sample from Table A1.2. 
Table A1.3 shows the simulated association between education and ethnic prejudice in 
2011. The column totals show the sample size and the distribution of education in the 
sample in 2011. The inner cell percentages, on which the association between education 
and prejudice is based, are from 1985. With these inner cell percentages from 1985 and 
the absolute numbers in the column totals from the 2011 sample, we can calculate the 
new “simulated” absolute numbers in the inner cells. In the simulated situation, there 
are 195 respondents with prejudiced attitudes in the category with low/middle education 
(.516 * 378) and only 73 in the category with higher education (.225 * 323). Now we can 
sum the absolute numbers to obtain the simulated number of respondents that holds 
ethnic prejudice, which amounts to 38.2 percent of the sample ((195 + 73) / 701)). Thus, if the 
association between education and ethnic prejudice had not changed since 1985, then the 
percentage prejudiced individuals in 2011 would amount to 38.2, instead of the observed 
60.8 percent. The difference of 22 percent points between the observed and simulated 
situation (60.8 - 38.2) represents the actual contribution of shifts in the association 
between education and ethnic prejudice to the observed increase in ethnic prejudice 
between 1985 and 2011.
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Table A1.3 |  The simulated association between education and ethnic prejudice, with the 
1985 association and the 2011 distribution of education and sample size
Year: 2011 low/middle  
education
high
education
row totals
no ethnic prejudice 183
48.4%
250
77.5%
433
61.8%
ethnic prejudice 195
51.6%
73
22.5%
268
38.2%
column totals 378
53.9%
323
46.1%
701
100%
Source: SOCON 1985, 2011; own calculations.
Table A1.4 |  The simulated association between education and ethnic prejudice, with the 
1985 distribution of education and the 2011 association and sample size
Year: 2011 low/middle  
education
high
education
row totals
no ethnic prejudice 151
31.5%
107
48.3%
258
36.8%
ethnic prejudice 328
68.5%
115
51.7%
443
63.2%
column totals 479
68.4%
222
31.6%
701
100%
Source: SOCON 1985, 2011; own calculations.
Simulating a fixed distribution
The observed increase in ethnic prejudice between 1985 and 2011 may also be due to shifts 
in the distribution of education across the sample. To estimate the actual contribution 
of such compositional shifts to the increase in ethnic prejudice, we can simulate a 
counterfactual situation in which the distribution of education had not changed between 
1985 and 2011, and calculate a new percentage of respondents with ethnic prejudice. In 
this example, we impose the 1985 distribution on the sample of 2011. Now we need the 
distribution of education in 1985 from Table A1.1, together with the sample of 2011 and the 
association between education and ethnic prejudice in 2011 from Table A1.2. 
Table A1.4 shows the simulated association between education and ethnic prejudice in 
2011, with the distribution of education fixed on the situation of 1985. The column totals 
show the sample size in 2011 and the relative distribution of education as it was in 1985. 
The inner cell percentages, on which the association between education and prejudice is 
based, are from 2011. Based on the sample size and the percentages in the column totals, 
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we can calculate the number of respondents in each category of education. With the 
distribution of education from 1985, there would be 479 low/middle educated respondents 
(.684 * 701) and 222 respondents with high education (.361 * 701). With these numbers 
and the inner cell percentages from 2011, the number of respondents that holds ethnic 
prejudice within each educational category is calculated: 328 (.685 * 479) among the low/
middle educated and 115 (.517 * 222) among the higher educated. Summing these numbers 
gives a simulated number of respondents with ethnic prejudice, which amounts to 63.2 
percent of the sample ((328 + 115) / 701). This means that support for ethnic prejudice in 2011 
would be slightly higher than observed if the distribution of education in the sample had 
not changed between 1985 and 2011. The shift in the educational distribution appears to 
have reduced ethnic prejudice with about 2.4 percent points. 
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Table A2.1 |  Factor scores, eigenvalues and Cronbach’s alphas of ethnic prejudice items per 
survey year and in total
1985 1995 2000 2005 2011 Total
With Moroccans you never know for 
certain whether they are going to be 
aggressive or not
.731 .607 .682 .651 .652 .715
Most people from Surinam work quite 
slowly
.691 .754 .640 .620 .591 .674
Gypsies are never to be trusted .757 .713 .754 .650 .621 .668
Turks are backward .602 .424 .586 .462 .594 .604
When you do business with Jews, you 
have to be extra careful
.706 .500 .631 .564 .609 .518
Eigenvalue 2.949 2.453 2.738 2.395 2.506 2.622
Cronbach’s alpha .825 .735 .793 .727 .751 .772
N 1,606 800 831 1,165 827 5,229
Source: SOCON 1985-2011.
Figure A2.1 |  The distribution of educational attainment in the Netherlands, 1985-2011
Source: SOCON 1985-2011.
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Figure A2.2 |  The distribution of church membership in the Netherlands, 1985-2011
Source: SOCON 1985-2011.
Figure A2.3 |  The distribution of church attendance in the Netherlands, 1985-2011
Source: SOCON 1985-2011.
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Figure A3.1 |  The distribution of educational attainment for men and women in the 
Netherlands, 1979-2012
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979-2012.
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Figure A3.2 |  The distribution of church attendance for men and women in the Netherlands, 
1979-2012
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979-2012.
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Figure A3.3 |  The distribution of labour force participation for men and women in the 
Netherlands, 1979-2012
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979-2012.
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Table A3.1 | Collinearity statistics
Men
(N = 14,616)
Women
(N = 16,236)
Variables VIF VIF
Period (1993 = ref.)a 12.83 10.91
Birth cohort (1951 = ref.)a 2.83 2.57
Age (16 to 29 years = ref.) 45.85 37.81
Educational attainment (primary education = ref.)
 Primary vocational 2.86 2.96
 Lower secondary 1.83 2.20
 Secondary vocational 3.04 3.00
 Upper secondary 2.01 2.10
 Bachelor’s or equivalent 2.57 2.51
 Master’s or equivalent 2.50 2.19
Church attendance (once a week = ref.)
 Once a fortnight 1.28 1.30
 Once a month 1.35 1.40
 Less than once a month 2.03 2.07
 Never 2.28 2.33
Labour force participation (non-working = ref.)
 Part-time working 1.56 1.42
 Full-time working 1.95 1.23
Interactions educational attainment * period 
(primary education = ref.)
 Primary vocational * period 3.20 3.18
 Lower secondary * period 1.73 2.11
 Secondary vocational * period 4.24 3.84
 Upper secondary * period 1.97 1.90
 Bachelor’s or equivalent * period 3.18 2.94
 Master’s or equivalent * period 2.52 2.22
Interactions church attendance * period 
(once a week = ref.)
 Once a fortnight * period 1.32 1.36
 Once a month * period 1.43 1.49
 Less than once a month * period 2.52 2.63
 Never * period 5.69 5.34
Interactions labour force participation * period
(non-working = ref.)
 Part-time working * period 4.04 2.05
 Full-time working * period 1.69 1.51
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979-2012; N = 30,852.
a Lowest tolerance value and highest VIF value are reported
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Table A3.2 |  Unstandardised regression coefficients of educational attainment, church 
attendance, and labour force participation interacted with survey year 
(extension of Table 3.2)
Men
(N = 14,616)
Women
(N = 16,236)
B B
Interactions educational attainment * period 
(primary education = ref.)
 Primary vocational * period .001 .003
 Lower secondary * period .001 .000
 Secondary vocational * period .002 -.005
 Upper secondary * period -.005 -.010
 Bachelor’s or equivalent * period .000 -.003
 Master’s or equivalent * period -.005 -.008
Interactions church attendance * period 
(once a week = ref.)
 Once a fortnight * period .005 .003
 Once a month * period .003 .003
 Less than once a month * period .012*** .005
 Never * period .005 .000
Interactions labour force participation * period
(non-working = ref.)
 Part-time working * period .002 -.001
 Full-time working * period .000 .009**
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979-2012; N = 30,852.
Note: For the interactions, period was measured as ratio variable (each unit increase corresponding to the 
next survey year) centred on the survey year 1993. 
* p < .05,   ** p < .01,   *** p < .001 (two-tailed).
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Table A3.3 |  Estimated differences between observed and simulated mean levels of gender 
egalitarianism and corresponding 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for 
men
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979-2012; N = 30,852.
* significant with α = .05 (two-tailed).
Year cohort -
observed (a)
education -  
observed (b)
church atten-
dance -  
observed (c)
labour force 
participation - 
observed (d)
total -
observed (e)
∆ 95% CI ∆ 95% CI ∆ 95% CI ∆ 95% CI ∆ 95% CI
1979 0 0 0 0 0
1980 -.01 -.03, .01 -.02 -.03, .00 -.01* -.03, -.01 .00 -.01, .00 -.05* -.09, -.06
1981 -.02 -.05, .00 -.03* -.05, -.02 -.01* -.02, .00 -.01 -.01, .00 -.08* -.12, -.04
1985 -.04 -.09, .01 -.03* -.05, -.02 -.01* -.02, .00 -.01 -.02, .00 -.09* -.15, -.04
1986 -.03 -.08, .02 -.05* -.06, -.03 -.01* -.02, .00 -.01 -.02, .00 -.08* -.14, -.02
1987 -.04 -.10, .02 -.06* -.07, -.04 -.02* -.03, -.01 -.01 -.02, .00 -.12* -.19, -.06
1991 -.05 -.13, .03 -.05* -.07, -.04 -.02* -.04, -.01 -.01* -.02,-.01 -.13* -.21, -.04
1992 -.06 -.15, .03 -.05* -.06, -.03 -.03* -.04, -.02 -.01 -.02, .00 -.14* -.23, -.04
1993 -.06 -.16, .03 -.06* -.07, -.04 -.03* -.05, -.02 -.01 -.02, .00 -.15* -.26, -.05
1996 -.06 -.17, .04 -.07* -.09, -.06 -.04* -.05, -.02 -.02* -.02, -.01 -.15* -.27, -.03
1997 -.07 -.19, .04 -.06* -.07, -.04 -.04* -.05, -.03 -.01* -.02, -.01 -.16* -.28, -.03
2002 -.08 -.23, .06 -.11* -.13, -.09 -.05* -.07, -.04 -.01* -.02, -.01 -.23* -.40, -.07
2004 -.08 -.23, .06 -.07* -.09, -.05 -.05* -.07, -.04 -.01* -.02, -.01 -.17* -.35, -.00
2006 -.09 -.25, .07 -.08* -.10, -.06 -.06* -.08, -.04 -.01* -.02, -.01 -.20* -.38, -.01
2008 -.08 -.26, .10 -.04* -.06, -.02 -.07* -.09, -.05 -.02* -.03, -.01 -.16 -.36, .05
2012 -.09 -.27, .09 -.08* -.11, -.05 -.07* -.10, -.05 -.02* -.03, -.01 -.18 -.41, .05
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Table A3.4 |  Estimated differences between observed and simulated mean levels of gender 
egalitarianism and corresponding 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for 
women
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979-2012; N = 30,852.
* significant with α = .05 (two-tailed).
Year cohort -
observed (a)
education -  
observed (b)
church atten-
dance -  
observed (c)
labour force 
participation - 
observed (d)
total -
observed (e)
∆ 95% CI ∆ 95% CI ∆ 95% CI ∆ 95% CI ∆ 95% CI
1979 0 0 0 0 0
1980 -.04 -.07, .00 -.04* -.06, -.02 -.02 -.03, .00 -.01 -.01, .00 -.09* -.13, -.05
1981 -.04 -.08, .00 -.03* -.05, -.02 -.01 -.03, .00 .00 -.01, .00 -.10* -.14, -.05
1985 -.15* -.20, -.11 -.06* -.08, -.04 -.02 -.03, .00 .00 -.01, .00 -.23* -.28, -.18
1986 -.16* -.20, -.11 -.05* -.07, -.04 -.01 -.02, .00 .00 -.01, .00 -.23* -.28, -.17
1987 -.21* -.27, -.16 -.08* -.10, -.07 -.02* -.04, -.01 .00 .00, .01 -.32* -.37, -.26
1991 -.31* -.39, -.24 -.11* -.13, -.09 -.03* -.04, -.02 -.01* -.02, -.01 -.46* -.53, -.38
1992 -.32* -.40, -.24 -.10* -.11, -.08 -.03* -.04, -.02 -.01 -.01, .00 -.46* -.54, -.38
1993 -.34* -.43, -.26 -.11* -.13, -.09 -.03* -.04, -.02 -.01* -.02, -.01 -.49* -.58, -.41
1996 -.37* -.46, -.28 -.12* -.14, -.11 -.02* -.03, -.01 -.01* -.02, -.01 -.55* -.65, -.45
1997 -.40* -.49, -.30 -.12* -.14, -.10 -.03* -.05, -.02 -.02* -.03, -.01 -.58* -.69, -.48
2002 -.48* -.59, -.36 -.17* -.20, -.15 -.04* -.05, -.03 -.04* -.05, -.03 -.75* -.88, -.62
2004 -.48* -.60, -.36 -.14* -.16, -.11 -.04* -.05, -.03 -.03* -.05, -.02 -.73* -.87, -.58
2006 -.49* -.61, -.36 -.13* -.15, -.10 -.04* -.05, -.02 -.03* -.05, -.02 -.73* -.88, -.58
2008 -.56* -.70, -.41 -.08* -.10, -.06 -.04* -.06, -.03 -.04* -.06, -.02 -.75* -.92, -.59
2012 -.57* -.72, -.42 -.13* -.17, -.10 -.05* -.07, -.03 -.05* -.07, -.02 -.87* -1.06, -.68
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Appendix Chapter 4
Figure A4.1 | Average educational levels in the Netherlands, 1900-2010
Source: Dutch labour force surveys 1992, 1994, 1996, and 2016 (Statistics Netherlands, 1987, 2016); Te 
Grotenhuis (1999).
Figure A4.2 |  Percentage of the total population without a religious affiliation in the 
Netherlands, 1900-2010
Source: Dutch population census 1899, 1909, 1920, 1930, 1947, 1960, and 1971 (Statistics Netherlands, 1999); 
CV 1970-2006 (SCP & CBS, 2016); SOCON 1979-2011 (Eisinga et al., 2012).
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Figure A4.3 | Percentage women in paid labour in the Netherlands, 1900-2010
Source: Dutch population census 1899, 1909, 1920, 1930, 1947, 1956, 1960, and 1971 (Statistics Netherlands, 
1999); Dutch labour force surveys 1981-2013 (Statistics Netherlands, 2014). 
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Table A4.1 |  Unstandardised and standardised regression coefficients of period- and 
cohort-specific contextual characteristics on support for gender egalitarianism, 
controlled for age
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Figure A4.4 | B-coefficients of the age dummies from Model I-III
Source: Cultural Changes in the Netherlands 1979-2006; N = 26,004.
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Appendix Chapter 5
Table A5.1 |  Factor scores, eigenvalues and Cronbach’s alphas of support for authoritarian 
values items per survey year in Western and Eastern Europe
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Figure A5.1 |  Economic and demographic developments in Western and Eastern Europe 
2002-2014
Source: Eurostat (2015, 2017a, 2017b, 2017d); OECD (2017).
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Table A5.2 |  Multilevel regression coefficients of contextual characteristics on support for 
authoritarian values in Western Europe, controlled for country dummies and 
individual characteristics
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Table A5.3 |  Multilevel regression coefficients of contextual characteristics on support for 
authoritarian values in Eastern Europe, controlled for country dummies and 
individual characteristics
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Table A5.4 |  Multilevel regression coefficients of countries in Western Europe  
(extension of Table 5.2)
B SE
Intercept 3.65 .04
Country dummies (Sweden = ref.)
 Belgium .42*** .03
 Switzerland .01 .06
 Germany .29*** .04
 Denmark .26*** .04
 Spain .65*** .05
 Finland .32*** .04
 France .14*** .03
 Great-Britain .42*** .03
 Ireland .23* .11
 Netherlands .22*** .03
 Norway .16*** .04
 Portugal .12 .07
Source: ESS round 1-7; N level 1 = 165,279; N level 2 = 91.
~ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed)
Table A5.5 |  Multilevel regression coefficients of countries in Eastern Europe 
(extension of Table 5.3)
B SE
Intercept 4.30 .03
Country dummies (Czech Republic = ref.)
 Belgium -.69*** .05
 Switzerland -.04 .03
 Germany -.00 .03
 Denmark -.11*** .03
Source: ESS round 1-7; N level 1 = 51,332; N level 2 = 35.
~ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed).
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Inleiding
In de afgelopen eeuw hebben Europese samenlevingen veelomvattende sociale, 
demografische, economische, politieke en culturele veranderingen doorgemaakt. Deze 
ontwikkelingen hebben de bevolkingssamenstelling van deze samenlevingen aanzienlijk 
veranderd. Zo hebben steeds meer mensen een hoger opleidingsniveau weten te bereiken 
en is het  aantal mensen dat lid is van een (Christelijke) geloofsgemeenschap, naar de kerk 
gaat of in God gelooft aanzienlijk gedaald. Ook in Nederland hebben deze ontwikkelingen 
zich in sterke mate voorgedaan. 
In dit proefschrift bestudeer ik de relatie van deze ontwikkelingen met veranderingen van 
opvattingen in de samenleving. Daarbij richt ik mij in het bijzonder op drie sociaal-culturele 
thema’s die volgens gevestigde theoretische inzichten deel uitmaken van een progressief-
conservatief tegenstelling, waaraan de basiswaarde van culturele vrijheid ten grondslag ligt. 
‘Cultureel conservatisme’ verwijst daarbij naar opvattingen die gericht zijn op het afwijzen 
of inperken van culturele vrijheden, aangezien deze de traditionele normen van de eigen 
groep zouden kunnen aantasten. Daartegenover staan opvattingen die terugvoeren op de 
gedachte dat iedereen vrij zou moeten zijn om het leven naar eigen inzicht in te richten. 
Concreet bestudeer ik houdingen ten aanzien van etnische minderheden, opvattingen over 
de rol van mannen en vrouwen en het belang dat mensen hechten aan autoritaire waarden. 
Publieke steun voor zulke opvattingen kan belangrijke gevolgen hebben voor de sociale 
samenhang en ongelijkheid tussen groepen in de samenleving.
Sociale wetenschappers houden zich al geruime tijd bezig met het bestuderen van 
veranderingen in cultureel conservatieve opvattingen. Verschillende onderzoekers 
hebben geconstateerd dat mensen in westerse samenlevingen in de loop van de 20e eeuw 
steeds minder conservatief zijn geworden en steeds meer waarde zijn gaan toekennen 
aan culturele vrijheid. Deze grootschalige verschuiving in publieke opvattingen is vaak 
toegeschreven aan een voortschrijdende modernisering, zoals toenemende welvaart, 
een stijging van het opleidingsniveau van de bevolking en ontkerkelijking. Veel studies 
naar sociale veranderingen zijn echter voornamelijk beschrijvend van aard. Daarmee blijft 
het de vraag of deze maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen ook daadwerkelijk met elkaar 
verband houden of slechts toevallig tegelijkertijd plaatsvonden. Er zijn maar weinig 
onderzoeken waarin de specifieke bijdrage van onderwijsexpansie, ontkerkelijking en 
andere ontwikkelingen wordt getoetst aan de hand van gegevens over individuen. Met 
dit proefschrift heb ik daarom als doel om meer inzicht te krijgen in hoeverre en op welke 
manier deze ontwikkelingen invloed hebben gehad op trends in cultureel conservatisme. 
Er zijn verschillende manieren waarop de relatie tussen ontwikkelingen als onderwijs-
expansie en ontkerkelijking enerzijds en veranderingen in cultureel conservatisme ander-
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zijds, tot stand kan komen. Ten eerste heeft onderzoek keer op keer aangetoond dat de 
opleiding die individuen hebben genoten en hun kerkelijkheid belangrijke voorspellers 
zijn voor de mate van cultureel conservatisme. Zo blijken mensen die een hoger 
opleidingsniveau hebben genoten en mensen die niet naar de kerk gaan steevast meer 
‘liberaal’ in hun culturele opvattingen, terwijl mensen met een lager opleidingsniveau 
en kerkgangers meer conservatief zijn in hun opvattingen omtrent culturele thema’s. 
Gegeven het feit dat steeds meer mensen een hoger opleidingsniveau behalen alsook 
de kerk verlaten, verwachten we logischerwijs een afname van cultureel conservatieve 
opvattingen in de samenleving. Daarnaast kunnen onderwijsexpansie en ontkerkelijking 
ook een invloed hebben op de opvattingen van alle mensen in de samenleving, ongeacht 
hun opleidingsniveau of kerkelijkheid. Wanneer een groeiend aantal mensen een hogere 
opleiding behaalt of de kerk verlaat, dan zal het minder conservatieve gedachtegoed van 
dit deel van de bevolking steeds wijder verbreid raken, ook onder hen die zelf een lagere 
opleiding hebben of kerkelijk zijn. Tot slot hebben zich nog andere ontwikkelingen in 
Europese samenlevingen voorgedaan die de rol van onderwijsexpansie en ontkerkelijking 
kunnen hebben afgezwakt of tegengewerkt. Deze verschillende verklaringen onderzoek ik 
in vier empirische studies, die hieronder worden beschreven.
Hoofdstuk 2
In Hoofdstuk 2 richt ik mij op veranderingen in de mate waarin Nederlanders negatieve 
vooroordelen hebben ten aanzien van etnische minderheden. Ondanks onderwijsexpansie 
en ontkerkelijking lijken etnische vooroordelen in de afgelopen decennia toch in opmars te 
zijn. Dit is verrassend, gegeven het feit dat mensen naarmate zij hoger opgeleid en minder 
religieus zijn over het algemeen juist minder weerstand tegen etnische minderheden 
hebben. In deze studie onderzoek ik waarom de toename van het aantal mensen met een 
hogere opleiding en het aantal onkerkelijke mensen in Nederland niet het veronderstelde 
‘liberaliserende’ effect op publieke steun voor etnische vooroordelen heeft gehad. 
Om dit te onderzoeken maak ik gebruik van gegevens die zijn verzameld in het kader van 
het grootschalige Sociaal-Culturele Ontwikkelingen in Nederland onderzoek (SOCON). Voor 
dit onderzoek is op vijf momenten tussen 1985 en 2011 een representatieve doorsnede van 
de Nederlandse bevolking tussen de 18 en 70 jaar ondervraagd. Vooroordelen over etnische 
minderheden worden gemeten aan de hand van een vijftal stellingen, die gebaseerd zijn op 
negatieve opinies over verschillende etnische groepen in Nederland: Marokkanen, Turken, 
Surinamers, zigeuners en Joden. De antwoorden op deze stellingen geven tezamen een 
indicatie voor de mate van negatieve vooroordelen ten aanzien van deze etnische groepen. 
Een vergelijking van de antwoorden tussen 1985 en 2011 laat zien dat de gemiddelde steun 
voor etnische vooroordelen inderdaad is toegenomen. Bovendien was deze toename 
over het algemeen sterker onder hogeropgeleiden dan onder mensen met een ander 
opleidingsniveau. Juist de groep van wie we de minste vooroordelen zouden verwachten, 
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is zich dus negatiever gaan uitlaten over etnische minderheden. De bevindingen van deze 
studie tonen aan dat de toename van publieke steun voor etnische vooroordelen minder 
sterk zou zijn geweest als deze groep zich niet negatiever was gaan uitlaten over etnische 
minderheden. De stijging van het aantal mensen met een hoger opleidingsniveau in 
Nederland is daarom niet vanzelfsprekend gepaard gegaan met een afname van negatieve 
vooroordelen. 
Daarnaast blijken er maar weinig verschillen in vooroordelen te bestaan tussen mensen 
die naar de kerk gaan en hen die dit niet doen. De veronderstelling dat de ontkerkelijking in 
Nederland tot een afname van etnische vooroordelen onder de bevolking zou leiden, gaat 
daarom niet op. Tot slot worden negatieve uitlatingen over etnische minderheden steeds 
breder gedeeld in de Nederlandse samenleving. Deze algehele stijging van weerstand 
tegen etnische minderheden in de samenleving heeft de veronderstelde ‘liberaliserende’ 
werking van onderwijsexpansie en ontkerkelijking deels teniet gedaan. 
Hoofdstuk 3
In Hoofdstuk 3 bestudeer ik veranderingen in egalitaire genderopvattingen. Dit heeft 
betrekking op de opvatting dat mannen en vrouwen in menig opzicht gelijk zijn (of zouden 
moeten zijn). Verschillende onderzoekers hebben geopperd dat deze veranderingen 
kunnen worden toegeschreven aan ontwikkelingen in de sociale structuur van de 
bevolking, zoals de stijging van het opleidingsniveau van de bevolking, ontkerkelijking 
en een toename van vrouwen op de arbeidsmarkt. Eerder onderzoek heeft namelijk 
aangetoond dat hogeropgeleiden, mensen die niet naar de kerk gaan en vrouwen die actief 
zijn op de arbeidsmarkt meer egalitaire genderopvattingen onderschrijven. Daarnaast 
blijkt uit onderzoek dat jongere generaties er meer egalitaire genderopvattingen op na 
houden dan oudere generaties. De natuurlijke opeenvolging van generaties zou daarom 
eveneens kunnen hebben bijgedragen aan een toename van publieke steun voor egalitaire 
genderopvattingen. Hoewel deze verklaringen veelvuldig zijn getheoretiseerd, is er nog 
weinig empirisch onderzoek gedaan naar de afzonderlijke bijdragen van bovengenoemde 
ontwikkelingen aan de trend in deze genderopvattingen. In deze studie probeer ik een 
antwoord te vinden op de vraag in hoeverre veranderingen in genderopvattingen in 
Nederland kunnen worden toegeschreven aan de hierboven geschetste demografische 
ontwikkelingen. Ook onderzoek ik in hoeverre deze verklaringen verschillen tussen 
mannen en vrouwen.
Ik maak gebruik van data die is verzameld het kader van het onderzoek Culturele 
Veranderingen in Nederland (CV). Voor dit onderzoek wordt sinds 1975 elke twee jaar een 
representatieve steekproef van zo’n tweeduizend Nederlanders tussen 16 en 74 jaar 
ondervraagd met behulp van enquêtes. Om veranderingen in egalitaire genderopvattingen 
over de tijd te onderzoeken vergelijk ik de antwoorden van deze Nederlanders op de 
stelling “een vrouw is geschikter om kleine kinderen op te voeden dan een man” op zestien 
184 Samenvatting
tijdstippen tussen 1979 en 2012. Ik veronderstel dat hoe minder men het eens is met deze 
stelling, des te meer men egalitaire genderopvattingen onderschrijft. 
De resultaten van deze studie laten zien dat Nederlanders tussen 1979 en 2012 gemiddeld 
genomen steeds minder instemden met de stelling dat een vrouw geschikter is voor het 
opvoeden van kleine kinderen. Nederlanders zijn in de afgelopen tijd dus in toenemende 
mate gaan denken in termen van gelijkheid tussen mannen en vrouwen. De toename 
is sterker onder vrouwen dan onder mannen. Deze trend is deels toe te schrijven aan 
de geleidelijke vervanging van oudere generaties door jongere generaties die er meer 
egalitaire genderopvattingen op na houden. Met name onder vrouwen vormt deze 
demografische ontwikkeling een belangrijke verklaring voor de trend naar meer 
egalitaire genderopvattingen. Ook de stijging van het aantal mensen met een hogere 
opleiding heeft bijgedragen aan de trend. Daarentegen is de bijdrage van ontkerkelijking 
en de stijging van het aantal werkende vrouwen in Nederland beperkt. Blijkbaar zijn 
deze demografische verschuivingen in de onderzochte periode niet sterk genoeg 
geweest om hun weerslag te hebben op de mate van publieke steun voor egalitaire 
genderopvattingen.
Hoofdstuk 4 
In het vierde hoofdstuk bouw ik voort op de voorgaande studie waarin ik veranderingen 
in egalitaire genderopvattingen onderzocht. Uit deze studie bleek de mate waarin 
Nederlanders egalitaire genderopvattingen onderschrijven te zijn toegenomen, zowel 
over de tijd als onder opeenvolgende geboortecohorten (generaties). In deze studie bleef 
de vraag echter onbeantwoord waarom de opvattingen van mensen die in verschillende 
tijden leven of opgroeien van elkaar verschillen, ongeacht hun opleidingsniveau of mate 
van religiositeit. Gaat de invloed van onderwijsexpansie en ontkerkelijking wellicht ook 
verder dan alleen de demografische verschuiving in de samenstelling van de bevolking?
Volgens de socialisatietheorie heeft de maatschappelijke omgeving waarin mensen 
opgroeien een blijvende invloed op hun waarden en opvattingen. Mensen die in dezelfde 
maatschappelijke context zijn opgegroeid, gekenmerkt door bepaalde sociale en culturele 
normen, zullen daardoor meer op elkaar lijken wat betreft hun opvattingen dan mensen 
die onder andere omstandigheden zijn opgegroeid. Een andere theorie stelt dat de 
maatschappelijke context waaraan mensen zijn blootgesteld niet alleen tijdens de jeugd, 
maar ook later in de levensloop van invloed is op de waarden en opvattingen die mensen 
eropna houden. In deze studie onderzoek ik deze zogeheten contextuele verklaringen 
voor de trend naar meer egalitaire genderopvattingen in Nederland. Daarbij beschouw 
ik onderwijsexpansie, ontkerkelijking en de toegenomen arbeidsmarktparticipatie 
van vrouwen als drie theoretisch relevante indicatoren voor veranderingen in de 
maatschappelijke context.
  185
Voor deze studie maak ik opnieuw gebruik van gegevens die voor het Culturele Veranderingen 
in Nederland (CV) onderzoek zijn verzameld. Daarnaast heb ik op basis van de Nederlandse 
Volkstellingen en arbeidsmarktonderzoeken gegevens verzameld over de mate van 
onderwijsexpansie, ontkerkelijking en de arbeidsdeelname van vrouwen vanaf 1900. Deze 
gegevens gebruik ik als indicatie voor de specifieke maatschappelijke context waaraan 
mensen zijn blootgesteld tijdens hun jeugd en gedurende de rest van de levensloop.
Op grond van de resultaten concludeer ik dat Nederlanders inderdaad meer egalitaire 
genderopvattingen onderschrijven in tijden dat de bevolking gemiddeld een hoger 
opleidingsniveau heeft. Dat geldt met name voor mensen die in zulke maatschappelijke 
contexten zijn opgegroeid, ongeacht hun eigen opleidingsniveau. Bovenop de invloed 
van onderwijsexpansie heeft de ontkerkelijking van Nederland nog maar een kleine 
invloed. Rekening houdend met beide ontwikkelingen blijkt dat de toegenomen 
arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen niet de veronderstelde ‘liberaliserende’ invloed heeft 
gehad op egalitaire genderopvattingen. Een mogelijke verklaring voor deze onverwachtse 
bevinding is dat de toename van de arbeidsdeelname van vrouwen in Nederland pas laat 
op gang kwam en nog steeds werken Nederlandse vrouwen grotendeels in deeltijd. Het 
is dus de vraag in hoeverre de toegenomen participatie van vrouwen op de Nederlandse 
arbeidsmarkt daadwerkelijk een cultuurveranderingen in het denken over de rol van 
mannen en vrouwen teweeg heeft gebracht of dat deze cultuurverschuiving op conto van 
het toegenomen opleidingsniveau van de bevolking moet worden geschreven.
Hoofdstuk 5
In het laatste hoofdstuk onderzoek ik recente veranderingen in autoritaire waarden 
in Europa. Volgens de moderniseringstheorie zou maatschappelijke vooruitgang 
ertoe leiden dat mensen zich afkeren van autoriteiten en steeds meer hun eigen leven 
vormgeven. De gedachte hierachter is dat wanneer mensen voldoende zekerheid 
hebben om zich niet meer voortdurend bezig te hoeven houden met het voorzien in hun 
basisbehoeften, zij op zoek gaan naar andere invullingen van het leven, zoals zelfreflectie 
en zingeving. Economische groei, maar ook onderwijsexpansie en ontkerkelijking zouden 
hieraan hebben bijgedragen. Recentelijk heeft Europa echter te maken gehad met een 
economische crisis en toegenomen etnische diversiteit door immigratie. In deze studie 
onderzoek ik in hoeverre deze contextuele ontwikkelingen hebben geleid tot een afname, 
dan wel een toename van autoritaire waarden onder de Europese bevolking. Hierbij kijk ik 
niet alleen naar geleidelijke ontwikkelingen, maar ook naar plotselinge veranderingen in 
nationale contexten. Daarnaast bekijk ik in hoeverre de invloed van deze ontwikkelingen 
verschilt tussen West- en Oost-Europa. 
Ik maak gebruik van gegevens die zijn verzameld voor het grootschalige European Social 
Survey. Dit onderzoek wordt sinds 2002 elke twee jaar in een groot aantal Europese landen 
afgenomen. Autoritaire waarden worden gemeten aan de hand een vijftal stellingen, 
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waarbij mensen aangeven hoe belangrijk bepaalde zaken voor hen zijn, zoals gebruiken 
en tradities, zich houden aan de regels en een sterke overheid die haar burgers beschermt. 
De antwoorden op deze stellingen zijn beschikbaar voor dertien West-Europese landen 
en vijf Oost-Europese landen op zeven meetpunten tussen 2002 en 2014. Daarnaast heb 
ik gegevens verzameld over de stand van de economie, het percentage tertiair opgeleide 
mensen, de mate van ontkerkelijking, en het aantal asielverzoeken in dezelfde periode.
Op grond van de resultaten concludeer ik dat Europeanen tussen 2002 en 2014 nauwelijks 
zijn veranderd wat betreft de mate waarin zij autoritaire waarden onderschrijven. 
Wel vond er een lichte stijging plaats tussen 2008 en 2012, zowel in Oost- als in West-
Europa. In tegenspraak met de moderniseringstheorie blijkt dat economische groei 
niet noodzakelijkerwijs gepaard gaat met minder steun voor autoritaire waarden. Zo 
bleef de steun voor autoritaire waarden in West-Europa nagenoeg gelijk, terwijl het 
bruto binnenlands product toenam. De stijging van de werkeloosheid lijkt wel deels 
verantwoordelijk voor een lichte stijging in publieke steun voor autoritaire waarden ten 
tijde van de economische crisis. De bevindingen laten daarnaast zien dat de stijging 
van het opleidingsniveau van de bevolking in West-Europa niet tot minder steun voor 
autoritaire waarden heeft geleid, terwijl dit in Oost-Europa zelfs samenging met een 
toename in steun voor autoritaire waarden. Ontkerkelijking ging daarentegen wel gepaard 
met afnemende steun voor autoritaire waarden. Toegenomen immigratie heeft in beide 
delen van Europa geen effect gehad op publieke steun voor autoritaire waarden wanneer 
rekening gehouden wordt met de economische situatie. De economische crisis heeft 
Europeanen mogelijk meer bewust gemaakt van het feit dat economische zekerheid en 
stabiliteit geen vanzelfsprekendheden (meer) zijn. Vooralsnog heeft dit echter niet geleid 
tot een algehele toename in publieke steun voor autoritaire waarden. 
Conclusie en discussie
In de afgelopen decennia hebben steeds meer mensen een hoger opleidingsniveau 
bereikt en is het aantal kerkleden en kerkgangers aanzienlijk gedaald. In dit proefschrift 
onderzocht ik in hoeverre en op welke manier deze maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen 
gepaard zijn gegaan met veranderingen in publieke steun voor cultureel conservatieve 
opvattingen. Daarbij heb ik mij in het bijzonder gericht op drie dimensies van cultureel 
conservatisme, voornamelijk in de Nederlandse context. Deze dimensies reflecteren 
de onderliggende waarde van culturele vrijheid zoals die in eerdere studies inzichtelijk 
is gemaakt. Ik vergeleek de mate van steun voor etnische vooroordelen, egalitaire 
genderopvattingen en autoritaire waarden op verschillende momenten in de tijd 
gedurende een periode van zo’n tien tot veertig jaar.
Concluderend hebben de ontwikkelingen van onderwijsexpansie en ontkerkelijking 
deels bijgedragen aan trends in verschillende dimensies van cultureel conservatisme in 
Nederland en Europa. Op grond van de bevindingen van dit onderzoek constateer ik dat 
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de rol van de christelijke kerk in het vormen en beïnvloeden van normen, waarden en 
opvattingen is afgenomen. Terwijl de culturele erfenis van de kerk nog steeds zichtbaar is bij 
oudere generaties, zal het een kwestie van tijd zijn voordat deze generaties zijn vervangen 
door jongere generaties die in een andere tijdsgeest zijn opgegroeid. Het opleidingsniveau 
van mensen blijkt daarentegen nog steeds van grote betekenis als voorspeller voor welke 
waarden en opvattingen zij eropna houden. De expansie van onderwijs heeft daarom een 
belangrijke rol gespeeld in het reduceren van cultureel conservatisme in de bevolking. Bij 
deze conclusies zijn echter drie kanttekeningen te maken.
Ten eerste is het van belang een onderscheid te maken tussen de verschillende 
dimensies van cultureel conservatisme. De veronderstelde liberaliserende invloed 
van onderwijsexpansie en ontkerkelijking komt wel naar voren met betrekking tot 
genderopvattingen, maar niet met betrekking tot steun voor etnische vooroordelen en 
autoritaire waarden. Ondanks de stijging van opleidingsniveaus en de toegenomen 
ontkerkelijking, is de weerstand tegen etnische minderheden in Nederland gestegen 
en bleef de steun voor autoritaire waarden in Oost- en West-Europa nagenoeg gelijk. 
Wel heeft de expansie van onderwijs, en ontkerkelijking in mindere mate, een bijdrage 
geleverd aan de toename van steun voor egalitaire genderopvattingen in Nederland. Met 
deze ontwikkelingen is de samenstelling van de bevolking, alsmede het maatschappelijke 
klimaat waaraan iedereen is blootgesteld veranderd. Toekomstig onderzoek moet 
uitwijzen in hoeverre deze bevindingen ook gelden voor andere opvattingen die onder 
de noemer van cultureel conservatisme kunnen worden gerekend, zoals afwijzende 
houdingen ten aanzien van homoseksualiteit alsook afkeuring van euthanasie en 
abortus. Daarvoor is het van belang om de verzameling van grootschalige representatieve 
gegevens met meetinstrumenten die vergelijkbaar zijn over de tijd voort te zetten.
Ten tweede concludeer ik op grond van de bevindingen van dit onderzoek dat de bijdrage 
van onderwijsexpansie en secularisering niet overal en voor iedereen even sterk is 
geweest. Sommige groepen of individuen in de samenleving lijken meer ontvankelijk 
voor veranderingen in de maatschappelijke context, bijvoorbeeld vanwege hun sociale 
posities en belangen. Zo is de toename in egalitaire genderopvattingen onder vrouwen 
sterker en tevens beter te verklaren aan de hand van demografische ontwikkelingen 
dan onder mannen. Met name jongere generaties hogeropgeleide vrouwen hebben 
er baat bij gehad om de traditionele gendernormen die een ondergeschikte positie 
van vrouwen in de maatschappij in stand houden, in twijfel te trekken. Toekomstig 
onderzoek zou zich kunnen richten op de vraag welke factoren of maatregelen tot meer 
egalitaire genderopvattingen onder mannen leiden. Beantwoording van deze vraag kan 
aanknopingspunten bieden voor beleid ter bevordering van gendergelijkheid. 
Ook constateer ik op basis van de bevindingen dat de invloed van onderwijsexpansie 
en ontkerkelijking afhankelijk is van de historische en culturele context waarin deze 
ontwikkelingen zich voordoen. Zo blijkt de toename van het opleidingsniveau van de 
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bevolking in Oost-Europese landen gepaard te gaan met een lichte stijging van de publieke 
steun voor autoritaire waarden. Het lijkt erop dat de erfenis van de voormalige autoritaire 
communistische regimes in deze landen nog weerklinkt in het onderwijssysteem. 
Voor de ‘liberaliserende’ invloed van onderwijs is het dus van belang welke waarden er 
worden overgedragen binnen socialiserende contexten zoals scholen. Met behulp van 
panelstudies en kwalitatief onderzoek kan meer inzicht worden verkregen in de specifieke 
rol die het onderwijs speelt in de overdracht van deze waarden alsook in de mechanismen 
die ten grondslag liggen aan verschillen in opvattingen tussen mensen met uiteenlopende 
opleidingsniveau’s.
Tot slot hebben zich de laatste decennia maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen voorgedaan die 
de veronderstelde invloed van onderwijsexpansie en ontkerkelijking hebben tegengewerkt. 
Zulke ontwikkelingen kunnen verklaren waarom trends in cultureel conservatisme afwijken 
van de veronderstelde richting. Zo heb ik in dit proefschrift laten zien dat iedereen in 
Nederland zich – tegen de aanvankelijke verwachting in – negatiever is gaan uitlaten 
tegen over etnische minderheden. Mogelijk liggen toenemende zorgen over immigratie en 
etnische diversiteit hieraan ten grondslag. Maar we zien ook dat belangrijke publieke figuren 
zich de laatste jaren steeds openlijker negatief uitlaten over etnische minderheden, waarbij 
regelmatig wordt benadrukt dat zij de typisch Nederlandse waarden zouden ondermijnen. 
Daarmee lijkt het eens zo sterke taboe op het uitspreken van negatieve vooroordelen over 
etnische minderheden onder alle lagen van de bevolking langzaam te verdwijnen. 
Daarnaast lijkt er sprake te zijn van een tegenreactie op de alsmaar toenemende steun 
voor egalitaire genderopvattingen, die mogelijk verband houdt met de toegenomen 
arbeidsdeelname van vrouwen. Nog steeds heersen er in Nederland sterke ideeën over 
het moederschap. Arbeidsdeelname maakt het voor moeders moeilijker om aan het 
ideaalbeeld te voldoen. Ook leidt een toenemende arbeidsdeelname van vrouwen mogelijk 
tot conflicten over de rolverdeling binnen het gezin en tot zorgen in de samenleving over 
het welzijn van het kind. Het bijstellen van opvatting over de geschiktheid van vrouwen 
om kinderen op te voeden zou een manier kunnen zijn om met zulke conflicten, zorgen of 
schuldgevoelens om te gaan. Meer onderzoek is nodig om inzicht te krijgen in welke andere 
ontwikkelingen een rol spelen in het verklaren van trends in cultureel conservatisme, niet 
alleen op het niveau van de samenleving maar ook in de meer directe leefomgeving, zoals 
het gezin en de buurt waarin iemand opgroeit. Daarbij zou het waardevol zijn om ook 
te kijken naar de invloed van sociale bewegingen en netwerken, rolmodellen, publieke 
figuren, de media, specifieke gebeurtenissen en beleidsmaatregelen.
Samenvattend acht ik met dit proefschrift een bijdrage te hebben geleverd aan kennis over 
sociale veranderingen door te bestuderen hoe publieke steun voor cultureel conservatisme 
zich op de lange termijn heeft ontwikkeld en op welke manier onderwijsexpansie, 
ontkerkelijking en andere maatschappelijke veranderingen hierin een rol hebben 
gespeeld. Daarmee plaatst deze studie hedendaagse maatschappelijke discussies over 
culturele thema’s in een breder perspectief.
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What if...?
In the last century, Europe has witnessed mass expansion of 
educational levels and substantial declines in church membership, 
church attendance and religious beliefs. These processes have 
fundamentally reshaped the socio-demographic composition of 
European societies. This book explores to what extent these societal 
developments have been accompanied by changes in public opinions. 
In four empirical chapters, trends in public support for ethnic 
prejudice, gender egalitarianism and authoritarian values (in short: 
cultural conservatism) in the Netherlands and in other European 
countries are explored, based on representative surveys. In addition, 
different explanations for the relationship between educational 
expansion, secularisation, and changes in these public opinions are 
tested. The results show that public support for cultural conservatism 
has developed in different directions. Educational expansion and 
secularisation have to a certain extent contributed to these trends, 
although the ‘liberalising’ influence of these developments is 
not as clear-cut as is often expected. This book contributes to the 
understanding of long term changes in cultural conservatism and 
puts contemporary societal debates about issues of cultural freedom 
into a wider perspective.
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